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THE CONCEPT OF UNIVOCITY REGARDING THE PREDICATION OF GOD AND CREATURE ACCORDING TO WILLIAM OCKHAM

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To
MY STUDENTS

PREFACE

This publication had its origin in a seminar on analogy in the Pontifical Athenaeum of St. Anthony, Rome. My contribution to this seminar was to be a report on analogy according to Ockham. Dissatisfied with the solution, I wanted to continue the investigation, and Fr. Erhardus Platzeck, O. F. M., professor of the seminar, kindly encouraged me to go ahead. I found, however, that Ockham had so little on analogy that it was necessary to turn to his theory of univocity.

Without the untiring help of Fr. Platzeck, this book could never have been written. To him I wish to express my sincere thanks for his patience in correcting the manuscript. To Fr. Philotheus Boehner, O. F. M. I owe an unpayable debt of gratitude for his prompt and thorough criticisms, for his generosity in letting me use any and all material on Ockham, and for helping me with difficult texts — all this in spite of his many other duties. I wish to thank Fr. Gaudence Mohan, O. F. M. of the Franciscan Institute for correcting texts, and Mr. Ernest A. Moody of Columbia University for the same reason. Finally, the Irish Franciscans of St. Isidor's College in Rome deserve a vote of thanks for their liberality in letting me use Ockham's works, as well as for their willingness in locating them for me.

Cleveland, Ohio, 1951.

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INTRODUCTION

The fourteenth century is of particular interest to philosophers as a period of transition. The Golden Age of scholasticism is declining, but new ideas are still arising. The famous syntheses of the scholastics have been completed, and men of a scientific turn of mind are occupied in writing critical works about these syntheses, drawing the lines of thought always sharper and sharper. They interested themselves especially in the application of logic to doctrines already developed.

In this environment William Ockham lived (1285 ca. — 1349) and taught at the University of Oxford. Living in such times, following Scotus (a renowned logician) and possessing in his own right a highly critical mind, Ockham rose quickly to a prominent place in the scientific world.¹

Under the influence of Ockham, medieval "nominalism" took on new life. His doctrine reached the University of Paris, where certain decrees of 1339 demonstrate his prominence.² But Ockham made

¹ Whether Ockham was a student of Scotus or not is unclear. Jansen denies it. (Cf. Jansen, Bernhard, S. J., *Aufstieg zur Metaphysik heute und ehem.* Freiburg im Br., Herder, 1933, p. 206). But Ockham certainly knew Scotus' teachings. Moreover, his scientific life was almost at an end within twenty years of the death of Scotus. (Cf. Day, Sebastian, O. F. M. *Intuitive cognition; a key to the significance of the later scholastics*. St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Franciscan Institute, 1947, p. 140.) There is only one work which was written after this period, scil., the *Elementarium logicae*, or *Tractatus medius*. This was probably written after his flight to Munich (1328).

² For the discussion of these decrees, see Moody, Ernest A., *Ockham, Buridan and Nicholas of Autrecourt*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 7, 1947, pp. 113-146.

For the life of Ockham, see Hofer, Johannes, C. SS. R., *Biographische Studien ueber Wilhelm von Ockham*, O. F. M., in *Arch.* vol. 6, 1913, pp. 209—233; 439—465; 654—669; Boehner, Philotheus, O. F. M., *Tractatus*

a tragic mistake by attacking Pope John XXII on political matters. For this reason, the Parisian doctors dissociated the name of Ockham from his doctrines. At any rate, this is Moody's opinion, and it seems to be based on solid reasons.³ But whatever the truth of the matter may be, one thing is certain: we must distinguish between his political and non-political teachings. The former were condemned, but not the latter. Many err in thinking that his philosophical and theological writings were censured.⁴ Although the Venerable Inceptor was, it is true, excommunicated and expelled from the Franciscan Order, only his political doctrines were condemned. It is also true that he was summoned before the ecclesiastical tribunal at Avignon to answer accusations regarding his philosophical and theological opinions. John Lutterell, the Chancellor of Oxford University, introduced the process, but it was never completed. The trial, protracted over a period of three years without reaching any conclusion, ended when Ockham fled to King Louis of Bavaria.

We are not at all interested in Ockham's political writings. In his non-political works, two tendencies seem to stand out. First, he wished to establish a logic which would be universally valid even in the supernatural sphere.⁵ This does not mean that he limited himself to merely logical and mental speculations. By his theory of first and second intentions, personal and simple supposition, he distinguished between real and logical science at least as clearly as the other scholastics.

His second tendency was to purge platonic elements which still clung to the aristotelian tradition. This is seen in his attempt to eliminate the last traces of extra-mental universals, e. g., when he points out that certain or the majority of the predicaments are

de successivis attributed to William Ockham. St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Franciscan Institute, 1944, pp. 1—15; Baudry, Léon, *Guillaume d'Occam; sa vie, ses œuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques; tome I: l'homme et les œuvres.* Paris, Vrin, 1950.

³ Moody, op. cit. p. 144.

⁴ Guelluy, Robert, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham.* Paris, Vrin, 1947, p. 11.

⁵ Boehner, *Medieval crisis of logic and the author of the Centiloquium,* in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 4, 1944, pp. 157—167.

not extra-mental, but are intentions of the mind signifying extra-mental things. Again he insists that genus does not contain the species because genus is a *concept*, and is merely more universal than species. Another instance is found where he rejects the pre-eminence of universal cognition, beginning with and preferring singular knowledge. To establish the absolute truth of contingent propositions, he does not appeal to some third, an Idea, but turns to the hypothetical mode: if man is, then man is man. He goes so far in eliminating universals that he has no problem of individuation. Things are singular of themselves.

All these are attempts to reach a pure aristotelianism. Whether he succeeded or not is another question. Just what is genuine aristotelianism is not entirely settled up to the present. Much depends on the current dispute about the authenticity of the *De Praedicamentis*. We cannot conclude the question in a work of this kind, and there is no point in taking sides. The above examples were mentioned to show that Ockham wanted to return to Aristotle.⁶

Closely connected with this aim is Ockham's theory of universals. As is known, the doctrine of universals is related to the doctrine of univocity, for univocal concepts are common universal concepts. This present work will examine Ockham's teaching on the univocity of being. It will try to show that Ockham rejects analogical predication reducing it always either to univocity or equivocation. Being is predicated univocally of God and of all things.

In bringing this out, we will see how Ockham begins with intuitive knowledge of singular things. Then the intellect forms a universal concept which signifies all singular things which are common in some kind of "similarity". Such a concept is considered as a representation of the object; therefore, the intellect knows things outside the mind. But the intellect does not know extra-mental

⁶ Ockham thought he was returning to Aristotle because, for example, on the question of substance, all medieval writers took the authenticity of the *Categories* of Aristotle for granted. Mansion has pointed this out. Cf. Mansion, Suzanne, *La première doctrine de la substance: la substance selon Aristote*, in *R. P. L.* vol. 44, 1946, p. 351. On the following page, the author admits this dispute is not settled.

reality on account of correspondence between universal concepts and *universal* things. Things are singular; only concepts and terms in general are universal. Thus, predication is of terms. Whenever a term signifies different things, even though they differ infinitely, one term can always be predicated of them univocally. If, however, a term is used in two meanings, the one its proper and the other its figurative meaning, two concepts are necessary to signify the different things. Thus, a common *word*, along with *two* concepts, is used to signify two different things, and the predication is equivocal. In Ockham's system there is no medium between univocal and equivocal predication.

Briefly, this is the gist of Ockham's theory of univocity. What is the origin of this opinion? He insists repeatedly that it is the teaching of Aristotle. Certainly he quotes the Stagirite often enough. But Ockham does not follow the Porphyrian interpretation of Aristotle. Moody⁷ calls attention to the fact that Porphyry restored platonism to aristotelianism.⁸ Porphyry considered the predicamental order as a metaphysical order, while Ockham says Aristotle considered the predicaments as concepts which *signify* things in the metaphysical order. Ockham rejects all universals outside the mind, separated or not separated.⁹

Ockham's principal source is Scotus, for whom he had a warm admiration. His theory of intuition is a development of the Subtle Doctor's. It is not precisely the same; in part, it returns to the position of Henry of Ghent,¹⁰ and in part, it is directed against

⁷ Moody, *Logic of William of Ockham*. N. Y. Sheed & Ward, 1935, p. 17.

⁸ Whether Ockham must be pigeon-holed as aristotelian or pseudo-aristotelian, platonic or neo-platonic, is unimportant in this work. Possibly the truth is that he is none of these, but that he turned the authority of Aristotle to support his own ideas.

⁹ This makes it difficult to see how Ockham can be classified as platonic. Cf. Federhofer, Franz X., *Die Philosophie des Wilhelm von Ockham im Rahmen seiner Zeit*, in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 12, 1925, pp. 293—294 where the author says the logic of Ockham is platonic because it holds the separated ideas. Ockham however rejects the Ideas.

In the same article is a discussion of the sources of Ockham, pp. 276 ff.

¹⁰ Boehner, *Notitia intuitiva of non-existents according to William Ockham*, in *Traditio*, vol. 1, 1943, p. 223.

Peter Aureoli.¹¹ Ockham sides with Scotus as to intuition without the *species impressa*, but disagrees when Scotus postulates a *species* in abstractive cognition. Hochstetter thinks Ockham's position comes from John of Salisbury and Abaelard.¹²

Ockham follows Scotus again in the idea that concepts are natural, formal signs of reality, and consequently, that they can have but one signification. This is the reason Ockham eliminates analogical concepts. As to analogy in general, it seems that Scotus is indifferent to it, whereas Ockham is directly opposed to it as a separate mode of predication.

Perhaps the greatest difference between the Subtle Doctor and Ockham is found regarding the common nature. For Ockham, things are absolutely singular of themselves. Since he denies the formal distinction in creatures, not however in the Trinity, he differs from Scotus as to community of nature.

In our own problem of univocity, Ockham might be called a commentator of Scotus. He accepts the latter's definition¹³ and cites him time and again. There are some differences of opinion, usually of minor importance, such as the arguments for univocity. One point of difference, however, is of greater moment, and that is the question of distinction, which plays a significant part especially when it comes to the attributes of God.

Other sources found in Ockham are Augustine's teaching on the intellect's independence of sense knowledge, though he parts company

¹¹ Boehner, *Notitia intuitiva of non-existents according to Peter Aureoli*, O. F. M. 1322, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 8, 1948, p. 410.

¹² Hochstetter, Erich, *Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham*. Leipzig, Walter De Gruyter, 1927, pp. 80—81; Day, op. cit. pp. 108, 164; Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 1, p. 227; Heiser, Basil, O. F. M. Conv., *Primum cognitum according to Duns Scotus*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 2, 1942, p. 195.

¹³ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. B: "Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, conceptum univocum dicunt: qui ita est unus quod eius unitas sufficit ad contradictionem, affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem. Sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri."

This definition is taken from Scotus verbatim. See Oxon. I. d. 3. q. 2. n. 5. Vives ed. vol. 9, p. 18a.

2 Menges, Ockham.

with Augustine on universals.¹⁴ The Venerable Inceptor follows St. Anselm (and Scotus) in the definition of God and in the formula for pure perfections: *melius est ipsum quam non ipsum*. He refers to Damascene often, particularly in the question about our knowledge of God. Some of Ockham's passages are remarkably close to St. John Damascene, especially in Logic. The same is true of Alexander of Hales. It makes a person wonder if this is a tradition of the Oxford Franciscans.

Abaelard is probably Ockham's source for "nominalism", although the Venerable Inceptor never mentions him.¹⁵ Boehner informs us that Ockham did not know the conceptualism of Olivi, and did not depend on Aureoli.¹⁶ Peter of Spain is his forerunner in the theory of supposition. Peter, however, is a realist in the question of universals, and this opinion colors his tract on supposition. Ockham turns back to a stand close to that of Abaelard. Boehner sees the influence of Raymond Lull in the division of supposition. On the same question, Ockham differs from Lambert of Auxerre, and approaches William of Shryswood.¹⁷

In a specific subject such as that of univocity, there are bound to be many related problems. Obviously, not all of them can be treated. Consequently, only questions necessarily connected with univocity will be discussed here. Thus, for example, the problem of pre-conceptual knowledge must be brought in if we are to grasp some of Ockham's texts on univocity, for he sometimes uses an argument of exclusion in which he introduces all possible forms

¹⁴ Guelluy, op. cit. p. 368; Federhofer, *Die Psychologie und die psychologischen Grundlagen der Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Ockham*, in *Phil. Jahr.* vol. 39, 1926, p. 282.

¹⁵ Vignaux compared Ockham and Abaelard extensively. See Vignaux, Paul, *Nominalisme*, in *Dic. de théol.* vol. 11-A. Paris, Letouzey et Ane, 1931, pp. 733—784.

¹⁶ Boehner, *William Ockham. (pro manuscripto)*, p. 18. Koch on the contrary says that Olivi prepared the way for Durandus a S. Porciano, Ockham and the nominalists. See Koch, Jos., *Der Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus Johannis Olivi*, in *Rech.* vol. 2, 1930, pp. 309—310.

¹⁷ Boehner, *Ockham's theory of supposition and the notion of thruth*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, 1946, pp. 264—265.

of cognition. If we are to see why he settles on univocal concepts in a text of this kind, we must understand why he rejects the other types of knowledge, such as pre-conceptual cognition. In the same way, the theories of signification and supposition play an important role in univocity. So does the distinction between predication of concepts and words, especially when he reduces all predication to univocity or equivocation.

Other problems, however, which in themselves might be even more important, but which have little or no relation to our topic, will be mentioned briefly or ignored altogether. We could investigate, for instance, the theory of natural signification, and show that concepts are natural signs because the mind is in direct contact with reality. But our question must be restricted to the *fact* that Ockham taught concepts are natural signs. The reason is that, in his theory, whether well founded or not, we find one of the fundamental ideas by which he justifies his univocity. We must establish the fact that Ockham taught natural signification, not examine its roots and validity.

Again, it would be interesting to pry into the question of individuation and elaborate Ockham's arguments against its necessity. But to understand univocity this is superfluous. We will stress the fact that he denies the principle of individuation, not the correctness or incorrectness of this denial.

Another problem entirely omitted here is that of intuitive cognition of non-existents. It has no bearing on our subject. Let it suffice to say that Ockham is accused of skepticism on this score more than on any other.

In general, little will be said about Ockham's relation to philosophical errors. He has already been accused of every possible intellectual crime, so nothing new in the form of accusation could be added here. To bear out or refute any or all of them would take volumes, and besides, they have no influence on our topic.

The same holds for comparisons between Ockham and the moderns. It is useless to compare, let us say, Ockham's similarity with modern equality before we know what Ockham means by this term, and

what modern authors mean by their term. Only then could a comparison be made, but it would require more pages than can be allotted to this specific subject. It is no small thing to make a comparative study of men who live 600 years apart.

We could also find a large field open if we would look into the psychological and historical reasons which led Ockham to use his terms in a sense different from the other scholastics. But this would take more space than can be given to a side issue. We can let it pass by saying that he avoids any meaning savoring of realism, and chooses a sense in line with his conceptualism.

Finally, we could bring in a tremendous amount of material on analogy because it surely is a topic related to univocity. But this work is intended to be a historical exposition of Ockham's teaching on univocity. He has little to say on the subject of analogy, so little is in place here. If more were to be said, it would have to be borrowed from some other author or school, and compared with Ockham's univocity. But to whom should we go for analogy? To the Thomists? If so, to which branch? To Scotus? If so, only Scotists would appreciate the comparison. To the moderns? If so, to which of them? One book would be needed to explain why one was chosen in preference to others, and another to compare the one selected with Ockham.

The particular aspect of this treatise will be to show the importance of similarity in Ockham's theory of univocity, especially in relation to God and creature. I prefer to treat this aspect historically rather than critically for the above-mentioned reasons. Moreover, another criticism would only confuse Ockham's historical position still further. It seems to me far better to begin with a study of what Ockham really taught before trying to fit him into a historical pigeon-hole. Consequently, this explanation of Ockham's doctrine on univocity, particularly regarding God and creature, is a historical exposition. It represents neither my own opinion on the matter, nor an approbation of Ockham. On the other hand, I see no motive for refusing to defend Ockham's consistency within his own system. Nor is it necessary to condemn outright his view on this subject. It is an open question, and liberty of opinion is permitted.

One of the difficulties for a student of Ockham is the condition of the text. Perhaps the reason for the many contradictory and nearly always unfavorable views on the Venerable Inceptor can be traced to the lack of a critical edition of his works. Now the situation is somewhat better. We know, for example, that Ockham changed his opinion on certain questions, such as the universals. First he held the *fictum* theory, but later went over to the quality or *intellectio* theory.¹⁸ This change of doctrine, in turn, helps to establish the chronology of his works. Though the question is not yet completely settled, Boehner's latest article on the matter seems to prove that Baudry's chronology needs revision. The following list brings out the difference of opinion between Boehner¹⁹ and Baudry²⁰ on the order of composition of Ockham's philosophical works:

| Bohner | Baudry |
|---|---|
| 1. <i>Reportatio</i> , or Commentary on the Sentences. It includes Books I—IV. | 5. <i>Commentarium in Sententias</i> . Books I—IV. |
| 2. <i>Ordinatio</i> , or Ockham's own redaction of the <i>first</i> book of Sentences. | |
| 3. <i>Expositio super librum Porphyrii, Praedicamentorum, Perihermenias, Elenchorum</i> . | 1. <i>Expositio Aurea</i> , which includes the exposition of the books of Porphyry, the Categories and Perihermenias. |
| 4. <i>Ordinatio</i> , or the second redaction of the first book of Sentences. | 2. <i>Expositio super libros Elenchorum</i> . |
| 5. <i>Expositio super octo libros Physicorum</i> . | 3. <i>Expositio super octo libros Physicorum</i> . |

¹⁸ Boehner, *Realistic conceptualism of William Ockham*, in *Traditio*, vol. 4, 1946, pp. 315 ff.; *ibid.* *Relative date of Ockham's Commentary on the Sentences*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 11, 1951, — p. 307.

¹⁹ *ibid.* and *Tractatus de Successivis*, ed. Boehner, pp. 16 ff.

²⁰ Baudry, *op. cit.* pp. 24 ff. and 260—270.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 6. <i>Quodlibeta.</i> | 7. <i>Quodlibeta.</i> |
| 7. <i>Quaestiones in libros Physicorum.</i> | 8. <i>Quaestiones in libros Physicorum.</i> |
| 8. <i>Summa totius logicae.</i> | 6. <i>Summa totius logicae.</i> |
| 9. <i>Summulae in libros Physicorum.</i> | 4. <i>Summulae in libros Physicorum.</i> |

The above-mentioned discrepancies in chronology have no influence on Ockham's theory of univocity. As far as I can find, he did not change his opinion on this matter. But what is of interest here, is that the non-political writings of Ockham will appear in a critical edition, published by the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. (J. G. Sikes of Manchester, England, is publishing the political works. One volume has appeared to date.)

As of now, two small volumes have appeared: the *Tractatus de Successivis* and the *Tractatus de Praedestinatione*, both edited by Boehner. Neither has anything to tell us about univocity. The *Summa totius logicae* is being printed at present, and the first twenty-six chapters are finished. Of the same work, a large part is available *pro manuscripto* in mimeographed form. This is important for us as well as a number of individual questions from various other works which have been edited critically or in a revised condition. These texts will always be used in the present work in preference to older editions. The following is a complete list of critical or revised texts which have appeared to date:

Ordinatio:

- | | |
|--|---|
| <i>Quaestio prima principalis Prologi.</i> | Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1939. |
| dist. 2. q. 8. | in <i>New Scholasticism</i> , vol. 16, 1942, pp. 224—240. |
| dist. 2. q. 9. B—H. | in <i>Franciscan Studies</i> , vol. 6, 1946, pp. 101—107. |
| dist. 2. q. 10. | in <i>Franciscan Studies</i> , vol. 8, 1948, pp. 177—191. |
| dist. 36. q. 1. O. | in <i>Review of Metaphysics</i> , vol. 1, no. 4, 1948, p. 74. |

dist. 43. q. 2. in *Franziskanische Studien*, vol. 32, 1950,
pp. 92—96.

Reportatio:

II. q. 14. in *Traditio*, vol. 1, 1943, pp. 245—246.

II. q. 15. in *Traditio*, vol. 1, 1943, pp. 246—275.

Commentarium in Perihermeniam:

c. 1 (16 a 3—4) in *Traditio*, vol. 4, 1946, pp. 320—333.

Quodlibeta:

II. 7. in *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 1, no. 4,
1948, pp. 79—81.

Summa totius logicae:

- I. c. 1—26 — printed at Franciscan Institute,
St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1950.
- c. 38 in *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 1, no. 4,
1948, pp. 64—66.
- c. 62—76 — *pro manuscripto*, Franciscan Institute.
- II. c. 1—37 — *ibid.*
- III. 1. c. 1—68 — *ibid.*
- 2. c. 1—26 — *ibid.*
- c. 27 in *Review of Metaphysics*, vol. 1, no. 4,
1948, pp. 77—78.
- c. 27—41 — *pro manuscripto*, Franciscan Institute.

All of these texts were edited by Boehner with the exception of dist. 2. ques. 10 and dist. 43. ques. 2 of the *Ordinatio*, which were done by Frs. Evan Roche, O. F. M., and Allan Wolter, O. F. M., respectively, of the Franciscan Institute. In some cases, Mr. Ernest Moody kindly corrected the texts for me, and this will always be noted in the footnote. These texts are from the expositions on the books of Porphyry and the Predicaments.

Whenever these sources failed to provide necessary texts, the following editions of Ockham were used:

Commentarium in Sententias. Lyons, 1495.

Defensorium Ockham. Rome, bibl. Angelica, 1017, ff. 21—36.
(authenticity doubtful).

Elementarium or *Tractatus medius*. Clm 1060 (Munich Staatsbibliothek).

Expositio super librum Porphyrii. Bologna, 1496.

Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum. Bologna, 1496.

Expositio super octo libros Physicorum. Oxford, Merton ms. 293.

Quodlibeta. Strassbourg, 1491.

Summa totius logicae. Venice, 1507.

The main secondary sources are Gabriel Biel, a disciple of Ockham, who usually gives more or less of a summary of Ockham's thought.²¹ Another follower whose name is unknown wrote in the year 1362. He gives us almost in Ockham's words the doctrine of universals, and defends the conceptualist position.²² A third disciple, also unknown, wrote the *Tractatus de principiis theologiae*. According to the editor, Baudry, he is certainly a contemporary of the Venerable Inceptor, and he aimed to assimilate the doctrine of his master as well as to comprehend the fundamental ideas of Ockham. The tract represents a sort of compendium of Ockham's opinions.²³ Finally, if the *Defensorium Ockham*²⁴ is not authentic, it should be listed here also. Its teaching conforms to Ockham's at least on our subject, and goes into analogy more extensively than the works which certainly belong to Ockham.

As for the presentation of Ockham's univocity, two ways of doing it suggest themselves. One might be called the logical method. This would divide the material into two parts: 1. Ockham's terminology, or an explanation of the notions necessary to understand univocity and equivocation; 2. Application of this terminology to our principal question, i. e., to God and creature. But this division, although logical, is not practical. The second part would be too

²¹ Biel, Gabriel, *Commentarium in Sententias*. Tuebingen, 1501.

²² *Quaestio de universali secundum viam et doctrinam Gulielmi de Ockham*. ex cod. Vat. Palat. 998. ed. Martin Grabmann. Muenster, 1930.

²³ *De Prin.* p. 15.

²⁴ It is listed above on p. 10 with the works of Ockham, but its authenticity is doubtful.

brief and would throw the whole out of proportion. To get a better balance of chapters, therefore, a division into five chapters was decided upon.

Chapter I explains Ockham's theory of knowledge, beginning with intuitive knowledge of singular things and tracing the development of cognition to universal concepts. In the same chapter are found Ockham's theories of natural and artificial signification and of supposition. The first chapter, then, is introductory material, which will be used throughout the teaching on univocity.

The second chapter takes up what was said in the first on signification and views univocity from this aspect. A univocal concept is one concept about many things which differ in reality. We must seek the connection between diverse objects and one concept. This is found in his theory of natural signification.

But such a natural sign of one object should be restricted to one object. Why is it a sign of many? Chapter three will tell us that this is due to "similarity". Univocity in relation to similarity as the basis of one concept is the subject of this chapter.

The two preceding chapters cover the general ideas of univocity. In Chapter four we will investigate the only other distinct predication which Ockham admits, viz., equivocation. There is no third predication possible in his system. Consequently, in this chapter we will have to see how he reduces analogy to either univocity or equivocation.

The fifth and last chapter will take up the ideas explained in the preceding ones, and investigate the problem which attracted all the scholastics: the predication of being about God and creature. We will find that Ockham rules out analogy and equivocation and accepts univocal predication. After this we will see how he abstracts one concept signifying infinite and finite things. In his explanation we will find that the so-called "pure" perfections, i. e., perfections which include no imperfection in their formal character, are common to God and creature. If all perfection is added to the concept, the concept becomes proper to God alone. Finally, we will see that being is predicated quidditatively of God and creature, while all other common notions are denominative (*in quale*). The treatise will conclude with a few critical words.

The following abbreviations will be used:

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| Arch. | — <i>Archivum Franciscanum Historicum</i> . |
| Biel, Com. | — Gabriel Biel, <i>Commentarium in Sententias</i> . Tuebingen, 1501. |
| Bull, inter. | — <i>Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres</i> . |
| Com. ed. Lug. | — <i>Commentarium in Sententias</i> of Ockham. Lyons, 1495. |
| De prin. | — <i>Le Tractatus de principiis theologiae</i> attribué à G. d. Occam. Édition critique par Léon Baudry. Paris, Vrin, 1936. |
| Def. Ock. | — <i>Defensorium Ockham</i> . Rome, bibl. Angelica, 1017. |
| Dic. de théol. | — Dictionnaire de théologie catholique. |
| Elem. | — <i>Elementarium</i> or <i>Tractatus medius</i> . Clm 1060, Munich, Staatsbibliothek. |
| Fran. Studies | — <i>Franciscan Studies</i> . |
| Franz. Stud. | — <i>Franziskanische Studien</i> . |
| New Sch. | — <i>New Scholasticism</i> . |
| Ord. ed. Boehner | — <i>Ordinatio</i> Ockham. question edited by Boehner. |
| Oxon. | — <i>Opus oxoniense</i> of Scotus. |
| P. G. | — <i>Patres graeci</i> , Migne edition. |
| P. L. | — <i>Patres latini</i> , Migne edition. |
| Perih. ed. Boehner | — <i>Commentarium in Perihermeniam</i> , chapter edited by Boehner. |
| Phil. Jahr. | — <i>Philosophisches Jahrbuch</i> . |
| Phil. Rev. | — <i>Philosophical Review</i> . |
| Phys. | — <i>Expositio super octo libros Physicorum</i> . Oxford, Merton ms. 293. |
| Porph. | — <i>Expositio super librum Porphyrii</i> . Bologna, 1496. |
| Porph. Moody | — <i>Expositio super librum Porphyrii</i> . Text corrected by Moody. |

- Praedicam.* — *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum.* Bologna, 1496.
- Praedicam.* Moody — *Expositio super librum Praedicamentorum.* Text corrected by Moody.
- Prol. ed.* Boehner — *Quaestio prima principalis Prologi in primum librum Sententiarum.* ed. by Boehner. Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1939.
- Prol. ed.* Lug. — Prologue to the first book of Sentences by Ockham. Lyons ed. 1495.
- Quaes. de univers.* — *Quaestio de universali secundum viam et doctrinam Gulielmi de Ockham.* ex cod. Vat. Palat. 998. ed. Grabmann, Muenster, 1930.
- Quod.* — *Quodlibeta.* Strassbourg, 1491.
- Quod. ed.* Boehner — *Quodlibeta.* question edited by Boehner.
- R. P. L.* — *Revue philosophique de Louvain.*
- Rech.* — *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale.*
- Rep. ed.* Boehner — *Reportatio* Ockham. question edited by Boehner.
- Rev. des sc.* — *Revue des sciences religieuses.*
- Rev. Met.* — *Review of Metaphysics.*
- Sum. tot. log.* — *Summa totius logicae.* Venice, 1507.
- Sum. tot. log. ed.* — *Summa totius logicae.* chapter edited by Boehner.
- Boehner

CHAPTER I

FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS ON THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE AND SIGNIFICATION

The purpose of this first chapter is to explain the terms necessary to begin a study of Ockham's doctrine on univocity, for Ockham's terminology is very exact and complicated. Moreover, it differs in many respects from the terminology of other scholastics. The fact that we know the meaning of a philosophical term according to other scholastics is no guarantee that we understand this same term when Ockham uses it. A few words, then, on the Venerable Inceptor's theory of knowledge and signification are surely in place.

In his theory of knowledge the role of signification plays an important part. Ockham distinguishes repeatedly between natural and artificial signification. In fact, this distinction will be a decisive factor in determining whether predication is univocal or equivocal. Consequently, we will look into his natural signification, then his artificial signification, or imposition, as he calls it. Finally, we will note briefly what he says about signification in a proposition, and this is his teaching on supposition.

I. OCKHAM'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

The first step in acquiring knowledge from outside is sense perception. Sense knowledge, however, does not suffice to give *evident* knowledge.¹ To attain evidence, we need intellectual intuition.

¹ Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. Y, p. 21: "Ad notitiam alicuius veritatis contingentis non sufficit notitia intuitiva sensitiva, sed oportet ponere praeter illam etiam notitiam intuitivam intellectivam."

The following brief tract on Ockham's theory of knowledge is not intended to be a complete explanation; it aims only at laying the necessary foundation for his doctrine on univocity. For a complete treatise on this subject, especially intuition, see Day, *op. cit.*

This intellectual intuition is at times called "*cognitio in se*", as opposed to "*cognitio in conceptu*".²

Intuition, or "*cognitio in se*", is *immediate*; there is no intermediate species³ between intellect and object. What, then, does Ockham know immediately? What is the content of this intellectual act? First of all, he does not know substances immediately.⁴ The content of intellectual intuition of things outside the mind is the same as the content of sense knowledge, viz., the sensible accidents.⁵ To

² Perih. ed. Boehner, c. 1 (16a 3—4) E: "Intellectus apprehendens rem singularem elicit unam cognitionem in se, quae est tantum illius singularis."

The opposition between *cognitio in se* and *in conceptu* is seen in this text: "Aut cognoscimus Deum non in se sicuti est, sed in aliquo conceptu." — Quod. V, 14.

³ Rep. ed. Boehner, II. q. 15. O: "Ad cognitionem intuitivam habendam non oportet aliquid ponere praeter intellectum et rem cognitam et nullam speciem penitus. Hoc probatur: Quia frustra fit per plura, quod potest aequaliter fieri per pauciora; sed per intellectum et rem visam sine omni specie potest fieri cognitio intuitiva."

Cf. Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 308; Moody, op. cit. p. 50; Day, op. cit. p. 188.

Why no *species* is required is found in Day, pp. 193 ff.

⁴ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. R: "Pro univocatione nescio nisi tantum unam rationem in cuius virtute omnes aliae rationes tenent, et est ista: omnes concedunt quod aliquam notitiam incomplexam habemus de Deo pro statu isto, etiam de substantia creata materiali et immateriali."

Cf. also I. d. 8. q. 3. C.

As we will see, pp. 152—153, we know God not intuitively, but conceptually. In this text, substance is said to be known in the same way: not intuitively, but conceptually. Cf. Guelluy, op. cit. pp. 348—349.

⁵ Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. Z. q. 24: "Notitia intuitiva est talis, quod quando aliquae res cognoscuntur, quarum una inhaeret alteri, vel una distat loco ab altera, vel alio modo se habet ad alteram, statim virtute illius notitiae incomplexae illarum rerum scitur, si res inhaeret vel non inhaeret, si distat vel non distat, et sic de aliis veritatibus contingentibus . . . Sicut si Sortes in rei veritate sit albus, illa notitia Sortis et albedinis, virtute cuius potest evidenter cognosci, quod Sortes est albus, dicitur notitia intuitiva."

Or also this text: "Patet etiam, quod intellectus noster pro isto statu non tantum cognoscit ista sensibilia, sed in particulari et intuitive cognoscit

these are added some non-sensible, existential notes, such as distance, sadness, and in general, facts about our interior life.⁶

Furthermore, this intuition is a knowledge of *singulars*. For Ockham, the preeminence of universal knowledge is simply denied. Our first knowledge is of an individual and its sensible accidents existing before us here and now. Universal knowledge is posterior and more imperfect.⁷

Another important point in this theory is that things are *singular of themselves*. We cannot begin with universals, or even with a common nature, and ask how they are singularized. The question must be reversed: we must begin with singulars, and ask how our concepts about them become universal.⁸ He answers this question by showing that a singular is known first in proper — not common — knowledge, as we said above.

aliqua intelligibilia, quae nullo modo cadunt sub sensu . . . cuiusmodi sunt intellectiones, actus voluntatis, delectatio . . . tristitia et huiusmodi, quae potest homo experiri inesse sibi; quae tamen non sunt sensibilia, nec sub aliquo sensu cadunt." — *ibid.* HH. p. 29.

Perhaps Federhofer overlooked this text when he said that Ockham and the author of *De Spiritu et anima* do not distinguish between sense and spiritual cognition. Cf. Federhofer, *op. cit.* in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 12, p. 277.

Day, *op. cit.* p. 9, comments at length on Allers' view that the intellect cannot know material singulars because of individuation by matter. Allers answers this comment in an article entitled *Intuition and abstraction*, in *Fran. Stud.* vol. 8, 1948, pp. 47—68.

⁶ See second text in note 5.

⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 6. G: "Universale est simpliciter imperfectius et posterius ipso singulari; ergo, intellectus non cognoscit obiectum sensus modo eminentiori."

Cf. also Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. T. p. 18; Porph. Moody, c. De genere, Ad: *Aliter autem rursus dicitur genus*; Biel, Com. I. d. 3. q. 5. E.

⁸ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 6. Q: "Ita quaelibet res extra animam seipsa erit haec, nec est quaerenda aliqua causa individuationis, nisi forte causae extrinsecae et intrinsecae quando individuum est compositum, sed magis esset quaerenda causa, quomodo possibile est aliquid esse commune et universale."

Porph. Moody, Proemium, Ad: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*: "Est autem tenendum indubitanter quod quaelibet res imaginabilis existens est de se sine omni addito res singularis et una numero, ita quod nulla

This first proper knowledge is also *distinct* cognition. Ockham does not believe that a notion of the universal is necessary for distinct knowledge.⁹ In other words, a thing can be known distinctly without knowledge of its definition. A thing can be known intellectually, therefore, without a universal concept of it.

From the first intuitive act of knowing singulars, we pass to what Ockham calls the *first abstraction*. He calls it abstraction because it abstracts from the existence and presence of the thing known in this first intuitive act. This "abstraction" must not be confused with abstraction taken in the ordinary sense of the scholastics. For, the usual meaning of the term is an act of attention, and it regards things as common and universal. Ockham's abstraction here¹⁰ is of a *singular*, and is based on intuitive knowledge. He abstracts, as he says, "from the existence and non-existence and from other conditions which contingently happen to a thing or are predicated about a thing".¹¹

Ockham does not mean that he ignores the existence and the accidents of this thing. He means that he does not care whether

res imaginabilis est per aliquod additum sibi singularis, sed ista est passio conveniens immediate omni re."

Ockham seems to have the following text of Scotus in mind: "Ideo concedo, quod quaerenda est causa universalitatis, non tamen quaerenda est causa communitatis alia ab ipsa natura; et posita communitate in ipsa natura secundum propriam entitatem et unitatem, necessario oportet quaerere causam singularitatis, quae superaddit aliquid illi naturae, cuius est." — Oxon. II. d. 3. q. 1. vol. 12, p. 55.

⁹ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 5. O: "Confusum enim cognoscitur, quando aliquid totum habens partes intrinsecas sibi cognoscitur, vel quando aliquod universale commune ad multa cognoscitur, et tamen utrumque istorum potest distincte cognosci." Cf. also C.

Not also that universal knowledge, although called "confused," can still be distinct. Confused must be taken as *common*.

¹⁰ We say "here" because he will use the term in the ordinary meaning in note 12. How the intellect abstracts from material conditions of things is found in Day, *op. cit.* pp. 169—170.

¹¹ Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. Z. p. 24: "Aliter accipitur cognitio abstractiva, secundum quod abstrahit ab existentia et non-existentia et ab aliis conditionibus, quae contingenter accidunt rei vel praedicantur de re."

Cf. Vignaux, *Nominalisme au XIVe siècle*. Paris, Vrin, 1948, pp. 29—31.

it really exists and is present or not; he is considering only his *knowledge* of this particular fact. In this singular abstraction, Ockham is indifferent as to its existence or non-existence.

Finally, the mind passes on to *common* or universal knowledge in the *second* act of abstraction. This is the universal concept. The formation of universal cognition Ockham calls second abstraction. The universal according to the Venerable Inceptor is "abstrahibilis a multis".¹² He does not intend to say that the universal *exists* in the thing.¹³ Abstraction, says Guelluy,¹⁴ does not consist in the isolation of the universal inhering in the thing, but in the formation of a notion which applies to other singular things equally as well as it applies to the singular thing perceived. For, a singular thing is known in *proper* knowledge, and other things corresponding to it are known in *common* knowledge.

Ockham's universals are qualities of the mind, or as he says, they are "subjectively and really in the mind as true qualities of the mind".¹⁵ The universal, on the one hand, is a singular thing,

¹² *ibid.*: "Sciendum tamen, quod notitia abstractiva potest accipi dupliciter: Uno modo, quia est respectu alicuius abstracti a multis singularibus, et sic cognitio abstractiva non est aliud quam cognitio alicuius universalis, abstrahibilis a multis."

How the intellect forms universal concepts is called a vital act (Com. ed. Lug. II. q. 25. C), and an occult and natural act of the soul (I. d. 2. q. 7 CC).

¹³ Perih. ed. Boehner, c. 1 (16a 3—4) Y: "Nec passiones animae nec universalis aliqua sunt res extra animam et de essentia rerum singularium."

Porph. Moody, Proemium, Ad: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*: "Secundo tenendum quod nullum universale est extra animam existens realiter in substantiis individuis, nec est de substantia vel essentia earum, sed universale vel est tantum in anima, vel est universale per institutionem quomodo haec vox prolata: 'animal,' et similiter: 'homo,' est universalis quia de pluribus est praedicabilis, non pro se sed pro rebus quas significat."

Cf. also Ord. ed. Boehner, d. 2. q. 8. T; Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 7.

¹⁴ Guelluy, op. cit. p. 346; Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 312.

¹⁵ Perih. ed. Boehner, c. 1 (16a 3—4) E: "Et quia ista opinio videtur mihi probabilior omnibus opinionibus, quae ponunt istas passiones animae esse subiective et realiter in anima tamquam verae qualitates ipsius."

Ockham changed his opinion on the nature of universals. Cf. p. 9.

i. e., as a psychic entity. In this sense it is called a quality of the mind. On the other hand, such a concept is a universal, i. e., regarding its significative function, it is a sign destined to stand for many things.¹⁶

These universal concepts existing only in the mind are *similarities* of singular things.¹⁷ Similarity does not mean a photographic representation of a singular object, but it means an exemplar, indifferently regarding all singulars outside the mind.¹⁸ Ockham does not give a precise definition of similarity between the universal concept and singular things, but rather describes it: "Such universals declare, express, explain, import and signify the substances of things."¹⁹

¹⁶ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 14, line 31: "Dicendum est igitur, quod quodlibet universale est una res singularis, et ideo non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurium."

Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De Universalibus*: "Est autem universale stricte sumptum praedicabile de pluribus non quidem pro se semper sed pro illis quae significat hoc nomen universale. 'Animal' praedicatur de homine et de asino et de bove et de Sorte et de Platone, non quidem pro se, quia per istam, 'omnis homo est animal,' non denotatur quod omnis homo est hoc universale animal, quia nullus homo est hoc universale animal, sed hoc commune 'animal' praedicatur de pluribus pro rebus quae significat. Per istam enim, 'omnis homo est animal,' denotatur quod omnis homo est aliqua illarum rerum quae significantur per hoc nomen 'animal.'"

Cf. Boehner, loc. cit. This doctrine of universals according to Ockham is found also in Hochstetter, op. cit. p. 96; Weinberg, J., *Ockham's conceptualism*, in *Phil. Rev.* vol. 50, 1941, pp. 523—528.

¹⁷ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 12, line 25: "Partes talium propositionum mentalium vocantur conceptus, intentiones, similitudines et intellectus."

¹⁸ Ord. ed. Boehner, d. 2. q. 8. E: "Et illud potest vocari universale, quia est exemplar et indifferenter respiciens omnia singularia extra."

The object perceived causes an effect (knowledge) similar to itself; it is a univocal cause of knowledge. Cf. Rep. ed. Boehner, q. 15. EE. This similarity is spiritual and intellectual, i. e., concept and object correspond to each other. The content, not the universality or predicability of many, corresponds to reality. Cf. Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 310; Allers, op. cit. p. 54.

¹⁹ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 17, line 77: "Talia universalia declarant, expriment, explicant, important et significant substantias rerum."

Similarity between concept and thing, therefore, is a certain correspondence, a natural representation, "and because of this similarity . . . they can suppose for things outside which have consimilarity of being outside the intellect".²⁰

Similar things outside the mind are really represented by the universal idea. The universal as such is not extra-mental, but the universal *signifies* singular things. The *content* of the concept corresponds to reality. But the *universality* of the concept, that is, its predicability of many, does not correspond to something universal outside the mind.²¹

The universal concept is a natural sign of many. This concept does not say a real universal is present in the singular, but says the concept signifies the singular thing and all other like things. The concept "man" signifies all real men. There is no common man, but all real men *participate in the concept* of man. For Ockham, "participate" means to be the subject of the same predicate.²²

To verify a universal proposition, it suffices if the universal stands for each singular thing.²³ There is nothing in singulars which could

²⁰ Ord. ed. Boehner, loc. cit.: "Et propter istam similitudinem . . . potest supponere pro rebus extra, quae habent consimile esse extra intellectum."

²¹ Cf. note 16. See also Quaes. de univers. p. 21, line 28: "Universale non est nisi unus terminus mentalis."

²² Praedicam. Moody, c. 3, De Denominativis, Ad: *Denominativa vero dicuntur*: "Participare aliquando est idem quod subiici alteri tamquam praedicato."

This is the sense of our author when he says: "Species est unum collectivum multorum in unam naturam non realem, sed in unum quod importat naturas multorum. Et ideo dicitur una natura per significationem quia est unum importans multa." — Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. Z.

Cf. Moody, op. cit. p. 113, note 1; Guelluy, op. cit. pp. 340—346. With such a doctrine of universals, it is difficult to see how Ockham can be classified as platonic, as Gandillac pointed out. Cf. Gandillac, M. de, *Ockham et la "via moderna"*, in *Histoire de l'église; fondée par Augustin Fliche & Victor Martin*; vol. 13: *Le mouvement doctrinal du IXe au XIVe siècle*. Bloud & Gay, 1951, p. 421.

²³ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, II. c. 4: "Est igitur primo sciendum, quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis non requiritur, quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, sed requiritur, quod prae-

be the basis of the *universality* of a concept. Singulars do not come together in some third reality, e. g., in a specific nature.²⁴ Singulars correspond really, *of themselves*, by their whole entity. The whole entity of one corresponds to the whole entity of another, and at the same time, the whole entity of one differs from the whole entity of the other. "Man" signifies Socrates and Plato, each one totally, and in this sense Socrates and Plato correspond totally. Nevertheless Socrates is not Plato, and thus they differ wholly of themselves.²⁵

The universal, therefore, is a concept of the mind naturally signifying many things, and in no way exists in the singular thing, not even as a common nature.²⁶ Ockham cannot admit the common nature of Scotus because he rejects the formal distinction placed by Scotus between the common nature and the principle of individuation (*haecceitas*).²⁷

dicatum supponat pro omnibus illis pro quibus supponit subiectum, ita quod de illis verificetur; et si ita sit — nisi aliqua causa specialis impediatur — propositio universalis est vera. Et hoc est, quod communiter dicitur, quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis sufficit, quod quaelibet singularis sit vera."

Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 6. EE.

²⁴ Praedicam. cap. de relatione, Ad: *Ad aliquid vero talia*: "Sortem esse similem Platoni non est aliud quam Sortem esse album et Platonem esse album, vel habere qualitates eiusdem rationis."

Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 6. AA; Quod. VI, 8; Quaes. de univers. p. 39, lines 6—15: "Duo individua quae sunt eiusdem speciei et quae sunt similia, seipsis sunt similia et non in ente aliquo tertio alio. Sunt enim similia in hoc, quia habent formas substantiales eiusdem speciei et de quibus illa species praedicatur non pro se, sed pro individuis, quia species quando praedicatur de individuis suis non supponit simpliciter et pro se, sed personaliter."

Cf. Moody, op. cit. p. 156.

²⁵ Cf. Guelluy, op. cit. p. 370: In a doctrine of this kind, real sciences do not need a replica of the universal concept in the singular thing. It requires only an aptitude of the concept to be substituted for things in a proposition. Ockham thinks we are certain of this aptitude because the concept is a *natural sign* of reality.

See also Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. M.

²⁶ Cf. Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 308.

²⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 1. F: "Quia tamen est difficillima [scil.

A universal concept can be either *simple* or *composed*. A simple concept is one which does not include many.²⁸ If it is simple, it is *de facto* conceived in *one* act of the intellect and not in many acts. "Man" is a simple concept. It is not *simpliciter* simple because it can be conceived in many acts: "animal" and "rational." As a matter of fact, however, "man" is conceived in one act, and thus is called simple. "Being" on the other hand cannot be resolved into more simple notions; therefore, it is a *simpliciter* simple concept.²⁹

A *composed* concept, then, is one which is not simple and includes several concepts.³⁰ De facto, a composed concept is conceived in several acts of the intellect. It is not, therefore, *one* concept, but a collection of concepts. When an object is conceived in a composite manner, we might call the knowledge *mosaic*, something like the vision of a fly. The fly sees the object wholly many times because of the peculiar structure of its eye. Similarly, each concept in a composed concept signifies the whole object. If we say, "Socrates is a rational animal," both "animal" and "rational" signify the subject, Socrates. But the signification of such a concept is *confused*,

the formal distinction] ad ponendum ubicumque ponatur, non credo eam esse faciliorem ad tenendum quam Trinitatem Personarum cum unitate essentiae, ideo non debet poni, nisi ubi evidenter sequitur ex traditis in Scriptura Sacra vel determinatione Ecclesiae, propter cuius auctoritatem debet omnis ratio captivari."

As we see here, Ockham does not reject the formal distinction in the doctrine of the Trinity. Cf. Boehner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 4, pp. 163—164.

²⁸ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 5. P: "Distinguo de conceptu et dico quod quidam est simplex, qui non includit plures conceptus."

Cf. Biel, Com. I. d. 3. q. 5. D.

²⁹ Def. Ock. c. 7: "Nullus tamen istorum conceptuum est simpliciter simplex quin quilibet possit resolvi in plures conceptus seorsum conceptibiles, sed conceptus entis qui est simpliciter primus est simpliciter simplex et in plures conceptus resolubilis non est."

³⁰ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 5. P: "Quidam compositus qui non est simplex, et includit plures conceptus suo modo sicut compositum actualiter plures res reales . . . includit."

Cf. Biel, Com. loc. cit.

in the sense of common or not proper. When the concepts "animal" and "rational" are composed, we have a notion still common, but at least it is more proper than the concept of "animal" alone. The notion is now restricted to men, while before, "animal" was conceived of Socrates in common with other men and also with brutes; "rational" was conceived in common with Socrates and other men and also with angels. If other accidental notes are added to the composition, e. g., Greek, philosopher, opponent of the sophists, etc., the composed concept becomes more and more proper to Socrates.³¹ In this sense we call a composed concept "mosaic" knowledge.

Since the concept is a natural sign, its signification is limited to one formal character. Perhaps we can compare the intellect, as Ockham understands it, to a wax tablet. If one side of a coin is impressed on it, the tablet faithfully represents the coin, but not completely, perfectly, since only one side of the coin is represented on the tablet. Still, this impression is proper to this coin, and is correctly reproduced on the tablet. The impression is also common to all coins of the same type. Such an impression is *natural*, and it cannot signify other objects whose formal character differs from this coin. If the coin is turned over and again pressed on another part of the tablet, the whole coin is now represented on the tablet in two acts, i. e., in a composed concept. These two impressions taken together are more perfect than the first simple impression. Nevertheless, the first concept (or impression) is surely not altogether useless.

This seems to be the meaning of Ockham's theory. He denies extra-mental reality to universals, but holds the universal concept.

³¹ Def. Ock. c. 17: "Res simplex potest conceptu quidditativo concipi confuse et distincte. Et confuse quidem per multos gradus confuse concipiendo; primo, quod si concipiatur tali conceptu quod intellectus non distinguit hanc rem a quacumque re et est conceptus entis. Secundo, si concipitur tali conceptu quo intellectus non distinguit hanc rem ab aliis rebus sui generis, et est conceptus generis generalissimi. Et sic ulterius usque ad conceptum speciei specialissimae, et usque ad conceptum proprium in quo concipitur distincte."

Cf. note 9.

In this sense he can be called a conceptualist. But Boehner insists that Ockham is not an idealist, but a *realistic* conceptualist.³² He argues first of all that Ockham holds immediate cognition.³³ Therefore, there is a strong connection between object and thought. Secondly, Ockham holds a firm causal connection between object and thought,³⁴ which leads to the same conclusion. Thirdly, idealism teaches the denial of correspondence between reality and thought — or at least that thought is not determined by reality, but at most, reality is an occasion for thought. Ockham, however, as we saw, teaches a strict causality between reality and thought; he says expressly of correspondence between thought and object: "Knowledge is a similarity of the object."³⁵

De Vries³⁶ explains the conceptualist's position in a way that Ockham could subscribe to. In general, when concept and reality are compared, we see these oppositions: the concept is a universal, reality is singular; the concept is abstract, reality is concrete; the concept sees unity constantly the same, reality (of life) is multiplicity always changing; the concept perceives necessity and eternity, the experience of reality is contingent and temporal. Therefore, the conceptualist argues that the universal is only a concept. "Man," "animal," etc., predicated of Peter do not say that the content of these concepts pertains to Peter, but it says that Peter is one of the individuals for whom these concepts can stand as natural signs.³⁷ Why? Because of something not different in Peter and Paul

³² Boehner, op. cit. in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 308; Vignaux, op. cit. p. 73.

³³ Cf. p. 17.

³⁴ Ockham holds with Scotus the partial causality theory. Both the intellect and the thing perceived cause intuitive knowledge from which proceeds the universal concept. For the text on partial causality, see note 3; cf. also Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. CCC, pp. 50—51.

³⁵ Rep. ed. Boehner, II. q. 15. EE: "Intellectus est similitudo obiecti." Cf. also p.—21.

³⁶ DeVries, Joseph, S. J., *Denken und Sein*. Freiburg im Br., Herder, 1937, p. 69.

³⁷ Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De universali*: "Per istam enim: 'Omnis homo est animal,' denotatur quod omnis homo est aliqua illarum rerum quae significantur per hoc nomen 'animal;' et ideo non denotatur

which causes the same effect (one concept) in the mind. Ockham expresses it this way: "That Socrates is similar to Plato is nothing else than that Socrates is white and Plato is white, or that they have qualities of the same formal character."³⁸

Maréchal says that Ockham cannot show the conformity of the universal with reality.³⁹ But this conformity is evident to Ockham because there is no *species* between object and thought, and consequently, there is immediate contact with reality. If this conformity were *assumed*, then Federhofer would be right in his assertion that here is the origin of Descartes' rationalism. Eventually, he says, such attempts fall into the empiricism of Locke and Hume.⁴⁰

Finally, from all that has been said, it is clear that Ockham — though he may be the forerunner of many things, and though many labels may be attached to his teachings — surely is not a nominalist, if nominalism is taken in the modern sense of denying universal concepts.⁴¹

II. OCKHAM'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

We have summarized the steps in the acquisition of knowledge from sense perception to the formation of universal concepts. This was done by way of introduction to the terminology of Ockham which will occur during this work. Another point which needs a

per propositionem huiusmodi quod subiectum sit praedicatum, vel quia subiectum et praedicatum sint idem, sed denotatur quod illa res quae significatur per subiectum est aliqua illarum rerum quae significantur per praedicatum."

³⁸ Cf. note 24.

³⁹ Maréchal, Joseph, S. J., *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*, vol. 1. ed. 3. Paris, Desclée, 1944, pp. 236—237.

As a matter of fact, Ockham must be classified as a naive realist according to Boehner, *Metaphysics of William Ockham*, in *Rev. Met.* vol. 1, no. 4, 1948, p. 63.

⁴⁰ Federhofer, *Ein Beitrag zur Bibliographie und Biographie des Wilhelm von Ockham*, in *Phil. Jahr.* vol. 38, 1925, p. 28.

⁴¹ For the different meanings of nominalism and Ockham's relation to this term, see Martin, Gottfried, *Ist Ockhams Relationstheorie Nominalismus?* in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 32, 1950, pp. 31—35.

cursory clarification before beginning the discussion of univocity itself is Ockham's theory of signification. Signification can be natural or artificial, in terms or in propositions. Let us look into each in turn.

In its broadest aspect, Ockham's theory of signification is divided into natural and artificial signification. A natural sign cannot change its signification because by nature it is designed to signify one type of being, and no other. Natural language signs are *concepts*, and like the impression on the wax tablet, they stand for the thing which causes the impression (and for all similar things), and for nothing else. Artificial signs are *spoken and written words*. These can signify anything at all, depending on the voluntary disposition of the user.⁴²

A. NATURAL SIGNIFICATION

The concept is a natural sign, and Ockham, like many others, often calls it an *intention* of the mind. He divides intentions into *first* and *second*.

A *first* intention is a natural sign of something which is *not* a sign. The concept "man," for example, is a natural sign of first intention because it signifies real men, not other signs.

A *second* intention is also a natural sign. It signifies — not things outside which are not signs — but *another natural sign*. The concept "species" is a natural sign, because it is a concept, but it is second intention since it signifies *another concept*, e. g., the concept "man," for real men are not species according to Ockham.⁴³

⁴² Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 1. line 47: "Conceptus sive passio animae naturaliter significat quidquid significat; terminus autem prolatus vel scriptus nihil significat nisi secundum voluntariam institutionem. Ex quo sequitur alia differentia, videlicet, quod terminus prolatus vel scriptus ad placitum potest mutare suum significatum, terminus autem conceptus non mutat suum significatum ad placitum cuiuscumque."

⁴³ *ibid.* c. 12 line 42: "Tale autem signum duplex est. Unum quod est signum alicuius rei, quae non est tale signum, sive significet tale signum simul cum hoc sive non, et illud vocatur intentio prima, qualis est illa intentio animae, quae est praedicabilis de omnibus hominibus, et similiter intentio praedicabilis de omnibus albedinibus et nigredinibus et sic de

This division, however, does not cover all cases. Ockham saw the necessity of subdividing first and second intentions. Here we are interested only in his subdivision as pertinent to first intentions. Some concepts can signify an individual, and others cannot; nevertheless, both are first intentions. "Animal" can signify this animal or that animal. But "similarity" cannot signify one individual, for it is evident we cannot say: this animal is similar. Ockham, therefore, divides first intentions into those which signify *divisim*, and those which signify *coniunctim*. "Animal" signifies real animals *divisim*, i. e., each individual animal taken separately. "Similar" signifies animals *coniunctim*, i. e., two or more animals (real ones, of course, and not concepts) considered simultaneously by the mind.⁴⁴

This distinction of first and second intention is an attempt to avoid confusion between logical and real science. The predication of a concept of first intention concerns *real* things outside or inside the mind in which the concept is substituted for *things*. The *predicaments* are concepts of first intention.⁴⁵ The predication of second intentions concerns natural signs in the mind, or the reflexion of the intellect on its own concepts. The *predicables* are second intention.⁴⁶

In the example, "Man is an animal," we have significative predication of things which are not signs: *real* men, such as Socrates, Plato, etc., are animals. This is the predication used by the *real*

aliis . . . Intentio autem secunda est illa, quae est signum talium intentionum primarum, cuiusmodi sunt tales intentiones 'genus,' 'species' et huiusmodi."

⁴⁴ Porph. Moody, cap. de specie. Ad: *Sed in familiis*: Aliqua praedicamenta significant res pro quibus non tantum coniunctim sed divisim supponunt, ita scilicet quod quando ponuntur in propositione denotatur quod praedicatum vere dicitur de contento sibi subiecto, non tantum cum alio sed etiam per se sumpto . . . Sed aliqua praedicamenta . . . magis significant tales diversas res coniunctim ut non possit verificari quod aliqua una res sit talis vel talis, sed magis quod plures res simul sumptae recipiunt praedicationem talis praedicamenti. Sicut non possum dicere quod hoc album est similitudo vel quo illud sit similitudo, sed possum aliquo modo dicere quod haec duo alba sunt similitudo."

⁴⁵ As we see in the two preceding notes.

⁴⁶ As we see in note 43.

sciences, scil., the predication of first intentions (animal) about first intentions (man), in such a way that both predicate and subject actually signify things which are not signs. If we say, "Animal is a genus," we have significative predication of things which are signs. This predication is used in logical science, scil., the predication of second intention (genus) about first intention (animal), in such a way that the subject does not actually signify things which are not signs, but the subject represents itself.⁴⁷ In logic we also use the predication of second intention about second intention, e. g., "Species is a universal" (i. e. one of the five predicables).

B. ARTIFICIAL SIGNIFICATION OR IMPOSITION

Besides natural signs (concepts of first and second intention), we have *artificial* signs instituted by men, and these are spoken and written words. These artificial signs are connected with their signified objects by *imposition*. Imposition, therefore, regards language as such; it connects artificial signs with certain significates. Natural signs or concepts are connected with their significates *naturally*.⁴⁸

Artificial signs can be of *first and second* imposition. *First* imposition is any artificial sign (word) that does not signify an artificial sign as such. "Man," "concept," "species," etc., are words of first imposition. All such artificial signs signify something other than an artificial sign, whether it be a thing outside (man signifies Socrates, Plato, etc.) or a concept (species). In the spoken proposition, "Man is a species," "species" is a spoken term (artificial sign) which signifies the *concept* "man". Thus, it is a term of first imposition, since it signifies a concept, that is, something which is not an artificial

⁴⁷ In this proposition, "animal" does not exercise its significative function. In other words, "animal" is *destined* naturally to signify real men, but in this proposition it cannot do so, as we know from the predicate "genus," for a real man cannot be called a genus according to Ockham. For a complete explanation of Ockham's theory of signification, see Boehner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, pp. 143—170. This present tract is taken from Boehner's article.

⁴⁸ Cf. note 42.

sign. In the same proposition, "man" is an artificial sign of first imposition because it, too, signifies the *concept* "man."

Second imposition is an artificial sign which signifies an artificial sign as such. "Declension," "plural," etc., are signs of second imposition. In the proposition, "And is a conjunction," "conjunction" can signify only the *spoken word* "and;" that is, the artificial sign, "conjunction," signifies an artificial sign, scil., "and."

We are not concerned with terms of second imposition. The important thing for us is that Ockham says words do not signify concepts, but that words and concepts signify *things* by *parallel* signification.⁴⁹ A word, therefore, can be substituted for things in a true proposition; in other words, a word can signify. But a word always signifies subordinately to a concept because it calls to mind a concept.

The doctrine on imposition is important to us because of the

⁴⁹ Here he differs from Boethius while trying to draw him to his side. Boethius held indirect signification, i. e., written words signify spoken words, spoken words signify concepts, and concepts signify things: "Rem concipit intellectus, intellectum vero voces designant, ipsas vero voces litterae significant." — *De Interpretatione*. ed. 1. lib. I. P. L. vol. 64, p. 297 B.

Concerning this text of Boethius, Ockham says: "Dico autem voces esse signa subordinata conceptibus seu intentionibus animae, non quia proprie accipiendo hoc vocabulum 'signa' ipsae voces significant ipsos conceptus animae primo et proprie, sed quia voces imponuntur ad significandum illa eadem, quae per conceptus mentis significantur, ita quod conceptus primo naturaliter aliquid significat, et secundario vox significat illud idem, in tantum quod voce instituta ad significandum aliquod significatum per conceptum . . . Sic etiam intendit Boethius, quando dicit voces significare conceptus." — *Sum. tot. log.* ed. Boehner, I. c. 1, line 25.

Again Ockham says: "Non quod vox primo significet illum conceptum, sed quia imponitur ad significandum primo et praecise omne illud de quo conceptus praedicatur." — *Com.* ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. P.

In reality Ockham is not following Boethius but Scotus on this point of parallel signification, as we see from this text of the Subtle Doctor: "Ad secundum, licet magna altercatio fiat de voce, utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus, tamen breviter concedendo quod illud quod significatur per vocem proprie est res." — *Oxon.* I. d. 27. q. 3. n. 19. vol. 10, pp. 377—378.

limitation of a natural sign. A natural sign can signify only *one*, i. e., only one kind of thing, simply because it is a natural, formal sign. An artificial sign, however, is not limited; it can signify anything man wants it to.⁵⁰ This will become clearer when applied as a distinguishing mark between univocal and equivocal predication in Chapter IV.

C. SUPPOSITION

Before proceeding to our main quest, one more introductory explanation is in order. Concepts considered alone are said to signify. In a proposition they are said to *suppose*.⁵¹ Ockham defines supposition as a "*quasi pro alio positio*"; it is a property of terms (mental, spoken or written) but only when used in a proposition.⁵²

For our purpose, we need only a brief look at *personal* and *simple* supposition. *Personal* supposition is had when a term supposes for its signified objects.⁵³ Take, for instance, "Man is an animal." "Man" is used *significatively*, i. e., it supposes for real men: Socrates, Plato, etc., and therefore, it has personal supposition. In a true proposition, "man" can stand or suppose for each and every real man. Also, the predicate "animal" has personal supposition because in a true proposition it stands for each and every man.

A term of *first* intention in personal supposition signifies things which are not signs. The real sciences use propositions of this kind. A term of *second* intention in personal supposition always signifies something in the mind. The significative predication of second intentions is in the field of logical science.

Personal supposition speaks of *significative* predication. To this is opposed *non-significative* supposition, called *simple* and *material*

⁵⁰ Cf. note 42.

⁵¹ A complete exposition of supposition is not necessary. For further information, see Boehner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, pp. 261—292.

⁵² Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 62: "Dicitur autem suppositio quasi pro alio positio, ita quod quando terminus stat in propositione pro aliquo, utimur illo termino pro aliquo, de quo sive de pronomine demonstrante ipsum, ille terminus . . . verificatur."

⁵³ ibid. c. 63: "Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato."

supposition.⁵⁴ When a concept signifies and supposes for something other than itself, it is said to be taken significatively. To signify something other than self can mean it signifies things outside the mind or inside the mind (e. g. intellection), or it can signify *another concept*. In each case it is taken significatively because it signifies something other than itself. But a sign can also *suppose only for itself*, and in this consists *non-significative* supposition, or *simple* supposition. Ockham tells us, "simple supposition is had when the term supposes for an intention of the mind, but it is not taken significatively."⁵⁵

In simple supposition, the term supposes for itself as a *concept*, but does not suppose for the thing of which it is a sign, e. g., man is a species. "Man" does not suppose for real men in this proposition because real men are not species; it supposes only for the *concept* "man" in a true proposition, and it is thus used non-significatively.⁵⁶ "Man" is and remains a term of first intention; it is destined by nature to signify real men. But in this proposition it does not exercise its significative function because it does not signify real men. For Ockham, "man" cannot signify real men when "species" is predicated of it, since universals are not extra-mental.⁵⁷

It will be noticed that the predicate always has personal supposition; for, if the predicate supposed for nothing but itself, the proposition would be meaningless. Personal supposition of the subject means the subject supposes for something other than itself. Simple supposition of the subject means that the subject supposes only for itself. This will be important from the very beginning of Ockham's doctrine on univocity, which we are now ready to take up after a summary look at the terminology used in this chapter.

⁵⁴ Material supposition is omitted because it is not needed. It is non-significative supposition of an *artificial* sign. For instance, "man is a noun". "Man" does not stand for real men, nor for its corresponding concept. It stands only for itself as a spoken or written artificial sign.

⁵⁵ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, loc. cit.: "Suppositio simplex est, quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative."

⁵⁶ Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. M.

⁵⁷ Cf. pp. 20, 25—27.

Summary

1. There are *four leading ideas*:

- a) *Supposition* deals with the *significant and non-significant* use of terms *in a proposition*, whether mental, verbal, or written.
- b) *Signification* deals with *terms as representative* of something different from themselves. Signification can be *natural or artificial* (concepts or words).
- c) *Imposition* concerns *artificial* signification only.
- d) *Intention* is a *concept*, a *natural* sign of something. Intention is divided into:
 - aa) *First* intention which is a sign of a *non-sign*.
 - bb) *Second* intention which is a sign of *another* sign.

2. Now follow the *subdivisions* of supposition and signification with examples illustrating the various cases:a) *Supposition* is divided into:

- aa) *Personal* supposition, in which the term is used *significantly*, whether the term is natural (concept) or artificial (word), whether first or second intention.
 - aaa) *First* intention: Socrates is a *man*; *man* is an animal.
 - bbb) *Second* intention: Man is a *species*; *species* is a universal (concept).

bb) *Simple* supposition, in which the term is used *non-significantly*, whether the term is first or second intention:

- aaa) *First* intention: *man* is a species; *dog* is a universal.
- bbb) *Second* intention: *species* is a predicable.

b) *Signification* is divided into:

- aa) *Natural*, in which a *concept* signifies something. Concepts are either first or second intention:
 - aaa) *First* intention: concept signifies something which is not a sign, e. g., Socrates, white, animal.
 - bbb) *Second* intention: concept signifies *another* natural sign; e. g., species, genus, universal.

- bb) *Artificial* signification, in which a *word* signifies something. Artificial signification is called *imposition*. Imposition is divided into:
 - aaa) *First* imposition: the word signifies something which is *not an artificial* sign, e. g., man, species.
 - bbb) *Second* imposition: the word signifies *another artificial* sign, e. g., declension, plural, noun.

CHAPTER II

UNIVOCITY IN RELATION TO SIGNIFICATION

We are now in a position to take up Ockham's teaching on univocity. According to him, it is possible to predicate only univocally and equivocally. Denominative (*in quale*) predication, for instance, is reduced to univocal or equivocal predication, subject to the unity or plurality of concepts. The same is to be said of analogical predication. It is either predication of one concept, or of more than one; hence, it is either univocal or equivocal.

In this chapter we will look at univocity from the aspect of *signification*. This point of view can be called univocity taken *subjectively* or from the angle of the mind conceiving. In the following chapter we will examine univocity from the objective viewpoint or from the object conceived (univocity based on similarity).

In the key text for this chapter, Ockham tells us there are two ways of predicating univocally: *strictly and denominatively*, or *in quid and in quale*:

"Concerning univocity, I distinguish, because at times it is taken strictly, scil., when the subject and predicate signify those things for which they suppose by a single imposition and by means of one concept, and one logical and grammatical mode of signifying. Thus, all univocal predication is *in quid* predication. For thus, 'animal' is predicated univocally of man and ass, and *in quid*, because just as 'animal' signifies all its signified objects by one imposition and by means of one concept, and directly signifies them all equally primarily — and not one directly and another obliquely, nor one principally and one secondarily — so also, 'man' signifies all its signified objects in the same way,

and similarly 'ass', and, therefore, it is predicted univocally and *in quid*.

"Sometimes univocity is taken broadly, scil., when subject and predicate signify those things for which they suppose by a single imposition and by means of one concept, and indifferently to one mode of signifying or another. Thus, univocal predication is not *in quid*, but denominative. For thus, 'white' signifies all its significates by a single imposition and by means of one concept, but it does not signify by means of one logical mode, since it signifies one thing directly, viz., the subject, and another obliquely, viz., whiteness."¹

Ockham speaks of first imposition here. This means that the subject and predicate are artificial signs which are imposed to signify *things* (not other artificial signs), as is evident from the examples he uses: animal, man, ass, white.² The concepts corresponding to these artificial signs by parallel signification³ signify the same real things.

This imposition is called a *single* imposition. We are dealing with artificial signs. Of these artificial signs (subject and predicate

¹ Quod. IV, 16: "Distinguo de univoco, quia aliquando accipitur stricte, quando scil., subiectum et praedicatum significant illa pro quibus supponunt unica impositione et uno conceptu, et uno modo significandi logicali et grammaticali. Et sic, omnis praedicatio univoca est praedicatio *in quid*. Sic enim, 'animal' praedicatur univoce de homine et de asino et *in quid*, quia sicut 'animal' significat omnia sua significata unica impositione mediante uno conceptu, et *in recto* significat omnia aequè primo — et non unum *in recto* et aliud *in obliquo*, nec unum principaliter et aliud secundario. — Ita per omnia significat 'homo' eodem modo sua significata et 'asinus' similiter, et ideo praedicatur univoce et *in quid*."

"Aliquando accipitur univocum large, quando scil., subiectum et praedicatum significant illa pro quibus supponunt unica impositione mediante uno conceptu, et indifferenter uno modo significandi vel diverso, et sic praedicatio univoca non est praedicatio *in quid* sed denominativa. Sic enim, praedicatur 'albus' univoce de homine et de asino, quia 'albus' significat omnia sua significata una impositione et mediante uno conceptu, sed non significat uno modo significandi logicali, quia unum significat *in recto*, puta subiectum, et aliud *in obliquo*, puta albedinem."

² Cf. p. 30. ³ Cf. p. 31.

⁴ Menges, Ockham.

in a verbal or written proposition), each one has only one imposition by which it signifies something. If the same word (artificial sign) has more than one imposition corresponding to two different concepts (natural signs), the predication is equivocal, because unity of concept and one imposition are required for univocity. But when the artificial sign has only one imposition, and the parallel concept is one, the predication is univocal. The spoken word "stake" furnishes an example. It signifies artificially a pointed piece of wood made to be driven into the ground, and so it is predicated univocally of all such pieces of wood. If, however, the word "stake" is imposed to signify such a piece of wood, and also to signify the supplies of a mining prospector, we have two impositions of this artificial sign. In the mind there will be two parallel concepts corresponding to this one artificial sign. Such a predication is equivocal. For univocity we need a single imposition of the artificial sign signifying things, and one concept signifying the same things.

Consequently, says Ockham, "animal is predicated univocally of man and ass." For, in the propositions, "Man is an animal," and "Ass is an animal," the predicate "animal" is an artificial sign which has only one imposition,⁴ and the parallel natural sign (sensitive being) is also one, signifying both man and ass. Since these signs stand for things which are not artificial signs, there is a case of first imposition of signs predicated univocally because of unity of concept.

But unity of concept is not enough. Ockham demands that the "subject and predicate *signify those things* for which they suppose". His example fulfills this requirement also. In the proposition, "Man is an animal" and "Ass is an animal", both terms of the subject are first intention,⁵ signifying real entities outside the mind. They are used significatively, standing in personal supposition, since they signify *this* man or *that* man, *this* ass or *that* one. The predicate

⁴ It is true, "animal" has another imposition, since it can signify the picture of an animal. This does not change our case, for Ockham will tell us in Chapter IV that the same word (artificial sign) can at times be univocal and at other times equivocal because of different usages, or different impositions.

⁵ Cf. p. 28.

"animal" is also first intention signifying real things outside the mind. Since it is used significatively, it too stands in personal supposition; it imports *this* man or *that* man, *this* ass or *that* ass. As a result, both subject and predicate signify those things for which they suppose.

In both definitions of univocity, *strict* and *broad*, Ockham demands *unity of concept*. So far the conditions for strict and denominative univocity agree. Both signify their significates by a single imposition and by means of one concept. But they differ in their *mode* of signifying. Strict univocity signifies with one logical and grammatical mode of signifying.

Now, continues Ockham, univocal terms signify either by *one mode* of signifying or by a *different* mode. One mode of signifying is had when the term signifies the subject directly.⁶ Direct signification refers to the grammatical mode; the term predicated is in the nominative case (*Socrates est animal*). In his example, "animal" signifies man and ass only directly, and not indirectly or *in obliquo*. We do not say, "*Homo habet animalitatem*", which would be an oblique or non-nominative case. This is strict univocity or *in quid* predication. A *different* mode of signifying is had when a term signifies the subject directly (*Socrates est albus*), but obliquely signifies the term from which it is derived (*Socrates habet albedinem*). This latter case is *denominative* predication or *in quale*. Ordinarily Ockham speaks of denominative, but there are occasions when he uses the term "*in quale*".⁷

⁶ Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De nominibus absolutis et connotativis*: "Item nominum quaedam sunt mere absoluta et sunt quae nihil significant nisi in recto, ita quod in definitione exprimente quid nominis, si potest talem habere, nulla pars orationis ponitur nisi in recto."

Direct signification here and in Chapter I, note 49, are not the same. Here, direct signification means that the predicate signifies the whole subject. In the previous place, direct signification means that both words and concepts signify things.

⁷ As, for instance, in the Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 23, line 104: "Est igitur differentia quaedam intentio animae exprimens determinatam partem rei praedicabilis in quale de eisdem, de quibus species, cum qua convertitur, praedicatur in quid."

Cf. Moody, op. cit. p. 97, note 1.

While direct and oblique signification refer to the grammatical mode, *principal* and *secondary* refer to the *logical* mode. If a term signifies its signified objects *aeque primo*, as does "animal" regarding man and ass, the predication is *in quid*. But if a term signifies its signified objects principally, and something else secondarily, we have denominative predication, as in the example of "white" signifying first the subject, and then whiteness. Direct and principal signification on the one hand, and oblique and secondary on the other, are corresponding terms. Direct and oblique refer to the grammatical mode; principal and secondary refer to the logical mode.

In order to make the teaching of Ockham perfectly clear, let us introduce another of his distinctions which supersedes those mentioned above. *Properly* speaking, univocity is only in the order of spoken language; *improperly*, however, univocity is extended to concepts.⁸ Ockham makes this distinction because univocity is often referred to the orders both of concepts and of words. Equivocation, as we will see in Chapter IV, pertains only to the order of words. If someone wants to compare univocity with equivocation, he should compare them in the same order, the order of words. But when the question comes up as to whether one *concept* is predicable of God and creature, the notion of univocity must be extended to the order of concepts. Univocity in the order of concepts is univocity taken *improperly*. Properly speaking, he says, univocity deals with the predication of words, and in this order it is distinguished from equivocation, for there is no equivocation in the order of concepts.

Taken broadly and properly, univocity is divided into *in quid* univocal predication and *in quale* (denominative) univocal predication. When Ockham speaks of *strict* univocity, he means *only in quid*

⁸ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. K: "Dico quod univocum proprie accipitur pro voce univoca, quia accipitur secundum quod distinguitur contra aequivocum vel denominativum. Et isto modo nihil est quaerere, an ens dicat conceptum univocum Deo et creaturae, sed debet quaeri, an sit aliquis unus conceptus alicuius praedicabilis in quid de Deo et creaturis, et ita extendendo nomen univoci, potest improprie dici quod aliquis conceptus est univocus, quia aliquis conceptus est unus, sed nec proprie nec improprie debet dici, quod aliquis conceptus est aequivocus."

predication. When he speaks of univocity in the broad sense, he includes both: *in quid* and *in quale* predication. This is his meaning when he says (under univocity in the broad sense in our key text) "indifferent to one or a different mode of signifying."

This terminology may be confusing if we do not pay close attention to his words. *Strict (in quid only)* univocity is opposed to denominative (*in quale only*). *Strict* in *not* opposed to *improper*; *improper* (in concept) is opposed to *proper* (in word). Taken properly and broadly therefore, univocal predication is indifferent to *in quid* and *in quale* predication. *Strict univocal predication* is only *in quid*. *Strict* and *broad* are not opposed. Perhaps this outline will clarify the matter:

| | | | | | | |
|-----------|---|-----------------------------------|---|-----------------------|---|--|
| UNIVOCITY | { | Proper (in word) Broad | { | Strict | = | Direct signification only. It signifies the subject. |
| | | | | or <i>In Quid</i> | | |
| | | Improper (in concept) Broad | { | Denominative | = | Directly signifies the subject, and obliquely signifies the term from which it is derived. |
| | | | | or <i>In Quale</i> | | |
| UNIVOCITY | { | Proper (in word) Broad | { | Strict | = | One signification only |
| | | | | or <i>In Quid</i> | | |
| | | Improper (in concept) Broad | { | Denominative | = | Primarily signifies the subject, secondarily it signifies something else. |
| | | | | or <i>In Quale</i> | | |

In quid predication only is strict univocity, while *in quale* is denominative. *In quid* predication tells us *what* a thing is; *in quale* tells us what *kind* of thing it is.

I. IN QUID

To predicate *in quid*, three requisites must be present. First, it must be a *true* predication. To predicate truly of man, for instance, excludes such predicates as "tree," "brute," etc., which are obviously false. *In quid* predication must *not be extrinsic*. This eliminates extrinsic predicates, such as "risible," from being applied to man quidditatively.⁹ In consequence, properties and accidents as predicates are excluded because they are extrinsic. *In quid* predication is limited to genus and species,¹⁰ and to terms essentially above them, such as, substance, being. As an example of species, we can say, "Peter is a man." "Man is an animal", gives us an example of genus predicated *in quid*. Under the aspect of grammar, *in quid* predication is always a noun. But we have not yet considered the third requisite of *in quid* predication: *totally*.

In quid predication demands that the predicate signify the subject not only directly, but also totally. Thus Ockham eliminates the predication of specific difference. Difference is truly and intrinsically predicated, but not totally, at least not in its secondary signification where it signifies the *part* of that for which it supposes.¹¹

⁹ Porph. c. De genere, Ad: *Tripliciter igitur*: "Notandum est quod praedicari in quid de aliquo est praedicari vere de aliquo et non importare aliquod extrinsecum competens illi de quo praedicatur, nec significare determinatam partem illius de quo verificatur.

"Per primam particulam [scil., vere] excluditur quod 'asinus' praedicatur in quid de homine, nec econverso. Per secundam particulam [scil., non extrinsecum] excluditur omnis praedicatio passionis et importantis aliquid extrinsecum illi pro quo subiectum supponit, sicut 'risibile' non praedicatur in quid de homine quia hoc nomen 'risibile' importat actum ridendi qui nec est homo nec pars hominis."

¹⁰ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 18, line 29: "Vocatur genus illud, per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quid' de aliqua re per pronomen demonstrans illam rem. Sicut si quaeretur: Quid est hoc? demonstrando Sortem, convenienter respondetur dicendo, quod est animal vel homo, et sic de aliis generibus. Et consimiliter est de specie."

Cf. Elem. Lib. I. De Terminis, Ad: *De praedicamentis*.

¹¹ Porph. loc. cit.: "Per tertiam particulam excluditur differentia, quia omnis differentia essentialis importat determinate unam partem

As has been said, *in quid* predication answers the question "what."¹² If someone asks, "What is Socrates," the response is that Socrates is an animal, not that he *has* animality. "Having" animality would imply that "animal" does not suppose for the *whole* man. Our key text says, "one logical mode of signifying . . . directly signifies all its signified objects *equally principally*, and not one directly and another obliquely." "Having" animality would mean that the concrete term (animal) signifies principally the subject, but it would signify secondarily a *part* of man (animality).¹³

Ockham rejects this interpretation, and holds that man *is* an animal. Furthermore, he says that man *is animality*, since he maintains that animal and animality are synonyms.¹⁴ Predicating in this way states boldly that both "animal" and "animality" signify

illius pro quo supponit et non aliam, sicut 'rationale' quod supponit pro Socrate et Platone, quando ponitur in propositione, importat determinate animam intellectivam, nec sic 'animal' importat aliquam partem correspondentem; et ideo illud quod importat totum et non importat partem, nec aliquid extrinsecum, praedicatur in quid."

¹² Cf. note 10.

¹³ Porph. loc. cit.: "Quia quaerendo quid sit aliquid, puta Socrates, convenienter respondetur quod est animal, et non quod habet animalitatem, sed quod est animal. Sed per differentiam non convenit sic respondere, quia quaerendo quid est Sortes, non convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem illam, quod est rationalis, quia 'rationale' non dicit principaliter totum Sortem, sed dicit primo partem, illo modo quo concretum dicit illud quod importatur per abstractum sibi correspondens. Est igitur differentia inter genus et differentiam, quia genus importat totum, propter quod 'animal' non importat partem, quia 'animalitas' non est pars hominis sed est homo. Differentia autem dicit partem primo, et ideo abstractum sibi correspondens importat praecise partem; unde si 'rationale' sit differentia hominis, 'rationalitas' importabit idem quod 'anima intellectiva', et rationalitas est anima intellectiva, etiam sicut 'materiale', quod est differentia primo importat partem illius cuius materia est pars."

¹⁴ See previous note, and Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 6, line 16: "Dico, quod concretum et abstractum quandoque sunt synonyma; sicut secundum intentionem Philosophi ista nomina sunt synonyma: 'Deus' et 'Deitas', 'homo' et 'humanitas', 'animal' et 'animalitas', 'equus' et 'equinitas'."

Cf. also Porph. Moody, Ad.: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*.

the whole man. "Animal" signifies man, and unlike denominative predication, it does not have a secondary signification other than man.¹⁵ "Animal" signifies the whole man directly and equally primarily.

It is different with terms which are not predicated *in quid*. "Rational," "risible," "white," etc., signify principally the object, and secondarily the term from which they are derived.¹⁶ "Rational" primarily signifies man, and secondarily, a part of man — the intellectual soul.¹⁷ Specific difference, properties and accidents signify principally the *whole* subject, but their secondary signification is a part of the object conceived as inhering in that object.¹⁸

Genus and species signify directly and equally primarily the whole subject. Terms which signify directly and equally primarily

¹⁵ The genus is not a part of man, but a universal term: "Notandum quod genus non continet multitudinem sicut quoddam totum compositum ex partibus, quomodo homo continet multa ossa et multos nervos, et sic de aliis partibus hominis. Sed 'continere' hic accipitur pro illo quod plura significat, et pro communiore." — Porph. Moody, c. De genere, Ad: *Aliter autem rursus dicitur genus*.

¹⁶ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. M: "Ad hoc quod haec sit vera, 'homo est albus', requiritur quod haec sit vera, 'homini inest albedo', ita quod albedo aliquo modo significatur per album, quae albedo praedicatur de homine secundum alium modum grammaticalem, quia oportet quod alterum illorum sumatur in recto, ita quod semper ad talem propositionem verificandam, requiruntur duae propositiones, in quarum una aliquid praedicetur in recto de subiecto, et in alia praedicetur aliquid de altero extremorum sumpto in obliquo."

Porph. Moody, Proem. Ad: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*: "Si illud praedicabile non importat totum, sed principaliter importat unam partem alicuius totius, et non importat extrinsecum, sic est differentia, sicut 'rationale', si sit differentia hominis, debet importare principaliter animam intellectivam ad modum quo 'album' importat albedinem. 'Rationale' tamen praedicatur de toto homine, sicut 'album' praedicatur de subiecto albedinis."

¹⁷ Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De differentia*: "Rationale est differentia hominis quia rationale in obliquo significat partem hominis, scil., animam intellectivam, et in recto hominem."

¹⁸ See note 16.

the whole and not a part are called *absolute* terms, or terms which signify *precisely the same* as the subject signifies.¹⁹

That *in quid* and *in quale* predication signify the *whole* subject should not be a matter for surprise. Toohey explains this position well in these words: "It may be objected that the term 'being' stands for the whole object to which it is applied and not for a part of the object. But this is true, not only of the term 'being,' but of every general concrete term. In the proposition, 'Peter is a man', the term 'man' stands for the whole Peter, not for a part of him. It is true that the term 'man' does not signify everything that can be said about Peter, but then what is said about Peter is never a part of him. A term which signifies only a part of Peter cannot be used correctly in the predicate position of an affirmative proposition in which Peter is the subject. Thus, it would be wrong to say 'Peter is a spinal column' or 'Peter is a left ear'. Every general concrete term stands for the whole object to which it is applied, though it does not *describe* the object exhaustively. While a general concrete term in the predicate position stands for the whole object which is the subject, it describes the subject only to the extent of the meaning or connotation which convention has attached to the term."²⁰

It may be well to mention another point regarding "parts." We saw that Ockham does not consider "animality" a part of man. In fact he does not believe that either the predicamental or predicable order is exactly paralleled by an order of things outside the mind, nor do the terms in these orders constitute metaphysical parts of things outside the mind. For him the predicaments belong to the

¹⁹ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 10, line 4: "Nomina mere absoluta sunt illa, quae non significant aliquid principaliter et aliud vel idem secundario, sed quidquid significatur per idem nomen, aequè primo significatur; sicut patet de hoc nomine 'animal', quod non significat nisi boves et asinos et homines et sic de aliis animalibus, et non significat unum primo et aliud secundario, ita quod oporteat aliquid significari in recto et aliud in obliquo."

See also note 6.

²⁰ Toohey, John J., S. J., *The Term "Being,"* in *New Sch.* vol. 16, 1942, pp. 120—121.

order of *intentions* which are *signs* of individual things.²¹ The predicables are *second* intentions, signs which signify concepts of first intention. For instance, it is often asserted that species is a *part* of genus, or that genus is a part of species. Ockham denies this. The term "man" (a specific term) is not a part of the term "animal" (a generic term), nor vice versa. Likewise, the individuals signified by the term "man" (Socrates, Plato, etc.) are not parts of things signified by the term "animal," nor vice versa. "Animal" signifies Socrates, Plato, etc., and all other individual men, just as the term "man" signifies them. But it cannot be said that an individual thing is a part of itself. If someone says that genus is a part of the *definition* of species, and that the definition is the same as that which is defined, and therefore, it follows that genus is a part of species, Ockham answers that this does not follow. It is not true that the definition is the same as the thing defined. They are the same only in the sense that the definition is a *sign* of the same things as are signified by the term defined.²²

Moreover, comments Moody, only in a metaphorical sense can this proposition be understood: genus *contains* species, and species is contained by genus. This can be interpreted only to mean that the genus is predicable of every term of which the species is predicable, but not vice versa. Likewise, if it is said that species contains individuals, this means either that the species (specific term) is

²¹ Cf. Moody, op. cit. pp. 99 ff.

²² Porph. cap. de specie, Ad: *Amplius autem*: "Sicut genus non est de esse speciei nec pars eius, ita species non est de esse individui, sed est quaedam intentio in anima significans ipsa individua, et est praedicabilis de eis non pro se sed pro ipsis individuis."

Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 20, line 22: "Ex quo sequitur, quod genus non est pars speciei. Et non solum hoc, sed etiam nec genus importat partem speciei. Immo, genus importat totum. Non enim illa intentio plus importat materiam quam formam, nec econverso, proprie loquendo de 'importare' . . .

"Et si dicas, quod genus est pars definitionis, et definitio est eadem realiter cum definito, igitur est pars definiti. Dicendum est, quod de virtute sermonis ista est simpliciter falsa: 'Definitio est eadem realiter cum definito.' Sed ista est simpliciter vera: 'Definitio et definitum significant idem.' Nec aliud intendunt auctores."

the *sign* of many individuals outside the mind, or that the species is *predicable* of many terms which cannot stand for the same things, or which are not predicable of each other.²³

The Porphyrian tree, for Ockham, is not something in the metaphysical order, but something in the logical order. This means, of course, *first* intentions, signs which *signify* things *outside* the mind, things in the metaphysical order. The elements of this tree are not things outside the mind, nor parts of things outside the mind, but *intentions*, and since they are *first* intentions, they are concepts which signify the individuals really existing outside the mind. That genus is higher than species in the tree means only that genus is *more common*, predicable of more things.²⁴

II. IN QUALE

From the foregoing we could deduce the meaning of *in quale* or denominative predication. But Ockham tells us explicitly that *in quale* predication is either *intrinsic* or *extrinsic*. If it is predicated intrinsically, it is a case of specific difference, or a term essentially superior to specific difference, e. g., the transcendentals. Thus "rational" is predicated intrinsically of man. Extrinsic would be, for example, "risible", because risible implies an act of man. It qualifies man, but extrinsically, since it is not an essential note.²⁵

²³ Moody, op. cit. p. 100; Cf. note 15; also Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 22, line 32: "Alia differentia ponitur, videlicet quod genus continet speciem, species autem non continet genus. Quod est sic intelligendum, quod genus natum est praedicari de pluribus hoc enim hic 'continere' vocatur —, species autem non potest praedicari de pluribus quam genus suum."

²⁴ Porph. c. De Specie, Ad: *Planum autem erit*: "Notandum est quod ordo praedicamentalis non componitur ex rebus extra animam, sed componitur ex conceptibus sive intentionibus in anima, quae non habent aliquem ordinem nisi quod unum est communius et dicitur de pluribus, et illud vocatur superius, et aliud est minus commune, et dicitur de paucioribus, et istud est inferius."

²⁵ Cf. notes 9, 11. We do not ask *what* a *proprium* (risibility) is, but what does it signify? The answer is: something can laugh. All connotative terms have only a *definitio quid nominis*.

Furthermore, we have seen that Ockham distinguishes between *in quid* and *in quale* predication on the basis of direct and total signification.²⁶ Denominative predication signifies *principally* the whole object (*man* is white), but *secondarily*, it signifies a part of the object. This part is usually conceived as really inhering in the object,²⁷ although this is not always the case. For instance, "producer" does not mean that the movie produced inheres in the subject that produced it. "Inherence" or "non-inherence" is not the reason the person is called the producer.²⁸ In the same way, "health" does not inhere formally in the food of which it is predicated denominatively.²⁹

Terms which signify principally the object and something else secondarily are called *connotative* terms. They do not signify *precisely* the same as the object.³⁰ An absolute term³¹ signifies precisely the

²⁶ Cf. p. 42.

²⁷ Cf. note 16.

²⁸ Praedicam. Moody, c. 3, Ad: *Denominativa vero dicuntur*: "Large dicitur [denominativum] omne concretum cui correspondet aliquid abstractum sive illud abstractum significet rem inhaerentem formaliter illi de quo vel pro quo praedicatur suum concretum sive non. Et isto modo omnia nomina relativa concreta sunt denominativa quia vere praedicantur, et differunt sola terminatione a nominibus abstractis quae sunt nomina principalia, et tamen secundum intentionem Aristotelis non significant rem relativam alteri formaliter inhaerentem, sicut produciens non significat aliquam rem inhaerentem illi quod producit."

²⁹ Def. Ock. c. 14: "Dicimus enim per denominativam extrinsecam quod dieta est sana a sanitate in animali quam efficit . . . Et quod locus est sanus et tempus sanum a sanitate in animali quam efficiunt . . . Nihil enim horum formaliter est in ipsis denominativis, sed est extra ipsa, et ideo ipsa non sunt formaliter talia, sed solum per denominationem extrinsecam."

It need not be stressed that "extrinsic" denomination in this passage differs from "extrinsic" as taken, for example, in note 9.

³⁰ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 10, line 38: "Nomen autem connotativum est illud, quod significat aliquid primario et aliquid secundario . . . et frequenter oportet ponere unum illius definitionis in recto et aliud in obliquo."

Cf. note 19; Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De nominibus absolutis et connotativis*.

³¹ Cf. pp. 44—45.

object. In the proposition, "Man is an animal", both "animal" and "man" signify this man or that man, etc., and the absolute predicate "animal" has no further connotation. But in the proposition, "man is rational", "man" again signifies this man or that man with no further connotation, since "man" is also an absolute term. But "rational" is different. It signifies this man or that man, etc., *plus* the secondary signification or connotation of a part of these men, namely, their intellectual souls. Consequently, connotative terms, such as "rational", do not signify *precisely* the object.

From the grammatical aspect, *in quale* predication will usually be either an *adjective* or a *derived term*, e. g., grammarian is derived from grammar.³² This derivation has nothing to do with the philological sense of the word, but it indicates the *formal character* from which the term is derived. In the logical sense, "white" is derived from "whiteness". We are not concerned about which came first in language; the point has no bearing on Ockham's doctrine. All he says is that "white" signifies principally the object, and secondarily it connotes the formal character "whiteness" conceived as existing in the object signified.

The fact that this connotative term secondarily signifies something real in the object signified, disproves Ockham's affiliation with platonism, at least in this matter.³³ Ockham does not refer to a universal existing apart, but to a singular quality inhering in the thing signified. "Rational" signifies man principally; secondarily

³² Praedicam. Moody, c. 3. loc. cit.: "Denominativa dicuntur quaecumque sunt ab aliquo nomine descendencia, et secundum tale nomen appellationem habentia et differentia a tali nomine solo casu, hoc est, sola terminatione, sicut a grammatica grammaticus, et a fortitudine fortis, et a iustitia iustus."

Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. FF; Elem. Lib. I. De terminis, Ad: *De denominativis*.

³³ Gilson, Étienne, *La philosophie au moyen âge*. 3rd ed. Paris, Payot, 1947, pp. 260—261.

John of Salisbury cites Bernard of Chartres as an example of this platonic doctrine: "Idem principaliter significant denominativa, et ea, a quibus denominantur; sed consignificatione diversa aiebat Bernardus Carnotensis, quia *albedo* significat virginem incorruptam; *albet*, eandem

it signifies the individual *soul* of man, which exists as a part of man. "White" signifies the man who is white, and connotes the quality of whiteness really inhering in the man signified.³⁴ That "white" should signify the whole man need not disturb us. The sense is not that man = white, but that man is one of the individuals in whom whiteness inheres.³⁵

We have seen that *in quid* predication employs *absolute* terms.³⁶ With these, the abstract form of the term does not signify something distinct from the whole object, but the abstract and concrete forms signify the same, if they are really taken as absolute terms. "Human" and "humanity" signify *man* because man separated from humanity is nothing.³⁷ *Connotative* terms, on the contrary, principally signify the object, but secondarily they signify the abstract form of the

introeuntem thalamum aut cubantem in toro; album vero, eandem, sed corruptam.

"Hoc quidem quoniam *albedo*, ex assertione eius, simpliciter, et sine omni participatione subiecti, ipsam significat qualitatem; videlicet coloris speciem, disgregativam visus. *Albet* autem, eandem principaliter, etsi participationem personae admittat. Si enim illud excutias, quod verbum hoc, pro substantia significat, qualitas albedinis occurret, sed in accidentibus verbi, personam reperiens. *Album* vero, eandem significat qualitatem, sed infusam commistamque substantiae et iam quodammodo magis corruptam." — P. L. vol. 199, p. 893 B—C.

³⁴ Cf. text in note 16. Ockham confirms this in the *Sum. tot. log.* ed. Boehner, I. c. 5, line 25: "Abstractum supponit pro accidente vel forma quacumque realiter inhaerente subiecto, et concretum supponit pro subiecto eiusdem accidentis vel formae, vel e converso. Primo modo est de talibus: 'albedo-album', 'calor-calidum', 'sciens-scientia', loquendo de creaturis, et sic de aliis. Nam in omnibus talibus abstractum supponit pro accidente inhaerente subiecto et concretum supponit pro subiecto eiusdem."

³⁵ See Chapter I, note 37. This text also exemplifies Ockham's meaning: "Et ideo, quando genus praedicatur de specie, non denotatur, quod subiectum sit praedicatum, nec quod praedicatum realiter conveniat subiecto in esse reali, sed denotatur, quod illud, quod importatur per subiectum, est illud, quod importatur per praedicatum." *Sum. tot. log.* ed. Boehner, I. c. 20, line 14.

³⁶ Cf. pp. 44—45, 48—49.

³⁷ Cf. notes 13, 14.

term (white — whiteness, rational — rationality), which is a *part* of the object conceived as really in the object, or something else.

There is one last point to be mentioned about denominative predication as explained in our key text. Ockham tells us there that denominative predication is univocal. This is true if the predication is of *one* concept corresponding to the term, as it is in the examples he offers. But if denominative predication is made of several concepts, the predication is equivocal. Denominative predication is not a third mode of predication, but is reduced either to univocity or to equivocation.³⁸

Briefly, the difference between equivocal denominative predication and univocal denominative can be seen in the time-honored example of "healthy." For, "healthy" is predicated of Socrates and Plato by means of one concept signifying Socrates and Plato and all men in whom the quality of health really inheres. Moreover, "healthy" is a denominative term; it is predicated *in quale*. This predication is univocal. But the same term, "healthy", predicated of *man and diet*, signifies by means of two concepts. In so far as it signifies man, "healthy" means a quality found in man. But when it signifies diet, "healthy" means the *cause* of the quality found in man. Besides, "health" does not inhere in diet. This is an example of equivocal denominative predication.

If we predicate by means of one concept signifying many, we predicate univocally; if by many concepts, we predicate equivocally. In this way Ockham reduces denominative predication to one or the other. There is no third way in his system.³⁹

³⁸ Praedicam. Moody, c. 3, loc. cit.: "Notandum est hic quod praedicatio denominativa non est aliquid simpliciter distinctum a praedicatione univoca et aequivoca . . . cuius ratio est, nam omne nomen praedicabile de multis aut habet quid nominis convertibile cum nomine . . . vel habet aliquem conceptum correspondentem in anima, aut non habet tale . . . Si primo modo, sic est univocum, nam nomen est idem et ratio substantiae eadem. Si secundo modo, sic est aequivocum. Sed omne denominativum vel habet quid nominis, etc. vel non habet. Igitur omne nomen denominativum vel est univocum, si habet tale quid nominis, vel conceptum correspondentem, vel est aequivocum, si non habet."

³⁹ This is the way to understand such passages as: "Dico . . . quod

Per Se and Per Accidens

Another idea related to *in quid* and *in quale* predication belongs here, even though it is not found in our key text. This idea is a further development of *in quid* and *in quale* predication, and is called *per se* and *per accidens* predication. It will be used when we reach our main problem regarding univocity between God and creature.

Per se is opposed to *per accidens*. *Per se* predication is necessary, while *per accidens* is contingent.⁴⁰ *In quid* predication is necessary, or *per se*, as is evident. "Man is an animal", is predicated *in quid* because it answers the question *what* is man; it is *per se* because, it is necessary, if man exists, man is an animal.⁴¹

triplex est praedicatio, scil. univoca, aequivoca, et denominativa." — Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. D. Cf. also note 8.

⁴⁰ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, III. II. c. 7: Viso igitur quod ad hoc quod propositio sit *per se* requiritur, quod sit necessaria."

Cf. also Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. B; Moody, op. cit. p. 207; Guelluy, op. cit. pp. 215 ff.

⁴¹ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, loc. cit.: "Si tales essent necessariae, essent *per se*: omnis homo est animal rationale, Omnis homo est animal."

Ockham expresses himself in the unreal conditional mood, says Vignaux, op. cit. p. 25, to establish the necessity of propositions. He does not admit, e. g., an intelligible man, an Idea, whose eternity renders absolutely valid the assertion: man is man. How then are propositions true? Ockham goes over to the hypothetical mood: *if* man is, then man is man. He attains necessity in hypothetical necessity.

Cf. *The Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus of William Ockham*, ed. by Philotheus Boehner. St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Franciscan Institute, 1945, pp. 70—75.

Moody, op. cit. p. 229.

Cf. Quod. V, 15. The same idea is found in *De Prin.* p. 127: "Hec enim conditionalis est omnino necessaria, si homo est homo est homo, si homo est animal homo est et huiusmodi."

Apparently Federhofer misinterprets Ockham's logic on this point. He says that ockhamistic logic is platonic because it holds the eternally valid ideas. — op. cit. in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 12, p. 293, and on p. 294 he says these Ideas stand above the thinker and are independent of him. In this Federhofer sees a relation of Ockham to Rickert, Husserl and Bolzano (p. 295).

Cf. Chapter I, note 22.

In *quale* predication can be *per se*, e. g., man is rational, man is risible. These are *in quale* because they respond to the question, what *kind*. They are *per se* because, it is necessary, if man exists, he is rational and risible.⁴² "Man can become white" is also *in quale per se* because, although "white" is predicated contingently (*per accidens*) of man, "can become white" is predicated necessarily.⁴³ From this, we can deduce that denominative predication can also be *per accidens*, e. g., man is white.

Finally, Ockham divides *per se* predication into the *first and second mode*. The basis of this division looks to the definition of the terms predicated. *Per se* predicated in the first mode if the *subject* or something superior to the subject is defined by the predicate.⁴⁴ The second mode of *per se* predication occurs if the subject enters into the definition of the *predicate*. He gives various cases of both modes:

1. The *first* mode of predicating *per se* is seen in two cases:

a) When the *predicate defines the subject*, e. g., man is a rational animal. Here we see that *per se* in the first mode can be either *in quid* (animal) or *in quale* (rational), but it is always *per se* because essential terms are demanded for a definition.

b) The second case is had when the predicate is essentially predicated of a term logically superior to the subject, e. g., man is a substance. The predicate "substance" does not define man, but it is predicated essentially of terms logically superior to man, e. g., body. "Body", "substance", etc., can be abstracted from man and brute by means of one concept because they are essentially superior to man and brute.⁴⁵

⁴² Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, loc. cit.: "Ista est per se, si sit necessaria: omnis homo est risibilis."

⁴³ ibid.: "Ex praedictis claret, quod omnes tales sunt per se: omnis homo potest dealbari, omnis materia potest suscipere formam."

⁴⁴ ibid.: "Et est primus modus, quando praedicatum definit subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum."

Cf. Boehner, *Scotus' teachings according to Ockham. I. On the univocity of being*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, 1946, p. 101; also Phys. V. Text. 1: *Transmutat autem transmutans omne*.

⁴⁵ Such universal concepts signify things outside the mind and suppose

2. The *second* mode of predicating *per se* is had when the subject or a term *per se* superior to the subject defines the predicate or a term *per se* inferior to the predicate.⁴⁶ He gives three cases:

a) The *subject enters* the definition of the predicate, e. g., every man is risible. "Risible" is the predicate. The definition of risible is "A *man* capable of laughing". This predicate is denominative *per se*, as we have seen. It is the second mode of predicating *per se* because "man", the subject, enters into the definition of the predicate, "risible".

b) In the definition of the *predicate*, a term *essentially superior to the subject is placed*. For instance, "Every man is susceptible to contrary determinations." The predicate, "susceptible to contrary determinations", can be defined: "A *substance* capable of change." "Substance" is a term essentially superior to the subject "man", and the term "substance" is placed in the definition of the predicate (susceptible to contrary determinations).

c) The third case is found when the subject enters the definition of a term *essentially inferior to the predicate*. Let us take the same example: man is susceptible to contrary determinations. A term inferior to the predicate would be "susceptible to *certain* contraries" (such as moral good and evil). Since the inferior, scil., susceptible to the contraries of moral good and evil, is essentially inferior, it is predicated *per se secundo modo*. The reason is because "susceptible to moral good and evil" is necessarily predicated only of man.⁴⁷

personally, as Ockham says in the Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. BB: "In ista propositione, 'omnis homo est animal', et in ista, 'omne animal est corpus', et in ista, 'omne corpus est substantia', termini non supponunt pro seipsis et simpliciter, sed pro ipsis singularibus et personaliter, et tamen quilibet istorum est per se primo modo."

Cf. *ibid.* q. 7. X; Moody, *op. cit.* p. 207.

⁴⁶ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, *loc. cit.*: "Secundus autem modus est, quando subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum definit praedicatum vel per se inferius ad praedicatum."

⁴⁷ *ibid.*: "Similiter haec per se, si sit necessaria: Omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum, quia in definitione praedicati ponitur substantia vel corpus, quod est per se superius ad hominem, et quia homo definit hoc praedicatum 'esse susceptibile talium contrariorum', demonstratis.

In the three cases of the *second* mode, we see that the terms are *connotative*. Consequently, the second mode of *per se* predication will always be *denominative*. The first mode can be either *in quid* or *in quale*. Schematically, the teaching on *per se* and *per accidens* predication can be represented as follows:

In Quid — equally primarily signifies its signified objects.

Per Se

First mode — predicate defines the subject, or is predicated essentially of a term logically superior to the subject.

In Quale — principally signifies the subject and secondarily signifies something else.

Per Se

First mode — predicate defines the subject, or is predicated essentially of a term logically superior to the subject.

Second mode — subject enters the definition of the predicate.

Per Accidens

From the subjective viewpoint of signification, we are now in a position to summarize what Ockham requires for univocal predication:

1. The first requisite is *significative* predication with subject and predicate signifying the *same* things.⁴⁸ This is had when the subject and predicate are predicated in personal supposition.

2. Secondly, the common term has only one imposition⁴⁹ with *one* parallel concept.⁵⁰ Otherwise the predication is equivocal.

aliquibus, quae non possunt competere nisi homini, et illud est per se inferius ad hoc commune 'susceptibile contrariorum', ideo haec est per se: Omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum."

⁴⁸ Cf. pp. 38—39.

⁴⁹ Cf. pp. 37—38.

⁵⁰ Cf. p. 31.

— But we have not yet examined closely the requirement “by means of *one* concept”. Up to now, our investigation was about univocity taken subjectively. We saw the univocal concept as *signifying* things. It remains, then, to examine univocity more from the objective side, and to ask *how one* concept can signify *many* things. This question will be taken up in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III

UNIVOCITY IN RELATION TO SIMILARITY

We have seen how a universal concept is formed according to Ockham. In his system, univocity postulates one concept signifying many things. These things are singular and distinct. The concept caused partially by the object signifies real things. One concept "man" signifies all the realities about which we can predicate the notes "animal" and "rational". It follows that all realities, though singular, having some kind of community can be signified by *one* concept, and consequently, we can predicate some concept univocally of them. But we must remember there is no common nature in these realities.¹ In this chapter, our aim is to find out what kind of community there can be under these circumstances. Ockham calls it "*similitudo*", so our first step will be an analysis of his concept of similarity. He gives three degrees of abstraction regarding this similarity. In the third case, even though he finds no similarity between the things compared, he still says there is community, and therefore, univocal predication. After examining the concept of similarity, we will move on to an examination of this threefold division.

I. CONCEPT OF SIMILARITY

Ockham takes his concept of similarity from Aristotle: "The Philosopher says: those things are the same whose substance is one, similar whose quality is one, equal whose quantity is one."²

¹ Cf. p. 23.

² Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 19. q. 1. Q: "Philosophus . . . dicit sic . . . Eadem namque quorum una est substantia, similia vero quorum qualitas est una, aequalia vero quorum quantitas est una."

Identity means "whose substance is one". This can be understood in two ways. In the first sense, it is a *lack of duality*; the substance is one, and there are not two or more substances. Such a substance coincides with itself. We are speaking of one thing: "Numerical identity corresponds to one thing only."³ If it is applied to substance, it is what Ockham calls "first substance". It is a singular thing really existing outside the mind.⁴

The predication of a singular thing is made by a *discrete* term. This predication is not universal; it is proper and singular, e. g., Socrates, this man, etc. It is not the predication of one concept common to many, but the predication of one proper cognition of a singular thing.⁵

There is another meaning of identity which applies to our case, viz., *specific identity*. While numerical identity excludes plurality, specific identity implies plurality. If Plato and Aristotle are talking about Socrates, they are speaking of the identical man, i. e., about one and the same man. This is numerical identity. If I say that one

See also H.

Aristotle says the same: ταὐτὰ μὲν γὰρ ὧν μία ἡ οὐσία, ὅμοια δ' ὧν ἡ ποιότης μία, ἴσα δὲ ὧν τὸ ποσὸν ἔν. — *Metaph.* Book IV. c. 15, ed. Bekker, vol. 2, p. 1021a, 11—12.

³ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. DD: "Identitas numeralis convenit uni soli rei."

⁴ Praedicam. c. 8. Ad: *Substantia autem est*: "Accipit philosophus 'substantias primas' . . . ipsas res extra animam."

Cf. also Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. C. Ockham seems to refer to this text of Aristotle: Πᾶσα δὲ οὐσία δοκεῖ τὸδε τι σημαίνειν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀναψισβήτητον καὶ ἀληθές ἐστιν ὅτι τὸδε τι σημαίνει· ἄτομον γὰρ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ τὸ δῆλουμένον ἐστιν. — *De Categoriis*, c. 5, ed. Bekker, vol. 1, p. 3b, 10—14.

Elem. Ad: *De Praedicamentis*: "In praedicamento substantiae ponuntur termini substantiales qui ideo possunt vocari substantiales quia praecise indicant substantias et nihil aliud, et aliquando vocantur ab Aristotele 'substantiae'. Huiusmodi autem terminorum quia quidam sunt proprii uni substantiae et isti vocantur primae substantiae, id est, principalia nomina substantiarum sicut Sortes, Plato."

⁵ Cf. Moody, op. cit. p. 139.

dime is identical with another dime, I mean these *two* coins are of the same type, i. e., they belong to the same species. This is specific identity. Here, two or more are signified by one concept.⁶ Identity of "substance" in this sense is Aristotle's *second* substance. This is universal predication. *First* substance is the thing outside the mind, but "*second* substance" is a second intention, that is, a concept signifying things which are signs, scil., universal concepts.

Ockham calls attention to the fact that the term "substance" is equivocal. When we say, for example, "Man is a first substance", the term "substance" is used properly because it signifies things outside the mind which are not signs: Peter, Paul, etc. But at times the word is employed to signify *intentions* of the mind, and this is an improper use of the term, for such things are *second* substances.⁷

Numerical identity, then, is singular predication, and the term "identity" is first intention. It signifies Socrates, Plato, etc. Now, if we say, "Socrates is a *first* substance", the signification is: Socrates is a singular, real being. This is also first intention. But it is univocal

⁶ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. DD: "Identitas autem specifica non convenit uni soli individuo, sed convenit pluribus individuis, ita quod non praedicatur de quocumque uno, sed de pluribus."

See also Toohey, op. cit. p. 125. The same must be said, *mutatis mutandis*, for generic identity.

⁷ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 70. *Ad quintum*: "Haec est falsa: Genera et species sunt substantiae; sed haec potest concedi: Genera et species sunt secundae substantiae; et tunc ly 'secundae substantiae' supponit personaliter et determinate, quia hoc nomen 'secunda substantia' imponitur ad significandum intentiones secundas importantes veras substantias."

Second substance does not signify true substances outside the mind. Ockham implies here that concepts are predicated of concepts, not of things. The concepts of first intention however are valid substitutes for things outside. It is of these that second substance is predicated.

In the same passage Ockham distinguishes and shows the equivocation in the term "substance": "Substantia est aequivocum: aliquando enim significat res veras, quae sunt distinctae realiter ab omni accidente reali et ab omni intentione secunda, et tunc accipitur substantia proprie; aliquando significat ipsas intentiones importantes substantias primo modo dictas."

predication because "first substance" signifies Socrates and all other singular things.

Specific identity is one substance as to *notes* or intentional content. This is universal predication, e. g., Socrates and Plato are identical. This proposition means that these two (Socrates and Plato) can be identified in the predication of one concept, such as "man".

Regarding *second* substance, Ockham seems to differ from Aristotle, although he appeals to Aristotle's authority to support his doctrine. The Stagirite took second substance as real, extra-mental, but not separated, as in Plato. This is the thesis of Robin, who argues that there is something common in things which needs individuation.⁸ Moody opposes this contention, insisting that Aristotle divided substance into first and second, not as things, but as terms.⁹ Mansion however says that Aristotle did not know substance as a term, a concept.¹⁰ For us, the important point is that Ockham certainly understood Aristotle in the sense of Moody; for he says that Aristotle never intended to call genera and species true substances outside the mind. It was Aristotle's intention to call "substance" that which more distinctly and expressly signified a thing.¹¹

Ockham rejects the universal outside the mind in any form. For him the universal is a natural sign signifying individual things and nothing more. In univocal predication we are interested in

⁸ Robin, L., *Aristote*. Paris, 1944, pp. 89—91.

⁹ Cf. Moody, op. cit. pp. 136 ff. where he offers these texts of Aristotle: "Ἐτι τοίνυν οὔτε τὸ καθόλου οὐσία οὔτε τὸ γένος. — *Metaph.* Book VII, c. 1. ed. Bekker, vol. 2, p. 1042a, 21.

"Ἐκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερόν ὅτι οὐθὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων οὐσία ἐστίν, καὶ ὅτι οὐθὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων τῶδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε. — *ibid.* Book VI, c. 13, pp. 1038b—1039a.

¹⁰ Mansion, op. cit. p. 357.

¹¹ *Praedicam*, c. 8. Ad: *Secundarum vero substantiarum*: "Dicendum est absolute quod numquam fuit intentio Philosophi quod genera et species essent vere substantiae extra animam, nec quod essent de essentia individuum, et ideo species non est magis substantia realis quam genus, nec e converso. Sed magis substantiam vocat illud quod expressius et distinctius et determinatius ipsam rem significat, scil., istam substantiam individuum."

second substance because it is predication of many. It is a universal concept predicated univocally because in one concept it signifies several individual things conceived as specifically or generically identical.¹²

Summary

First substance

Numerical identity

First intention — it signifies non-signs, e. g., Socrates is a first substance.

Supposition:

Personal — supposes for something other than itself — e. g., Socrates is a first substance.

Simple — supposes for itself, e. g., first substance is an intellectual cognition.

Second substance:

Specific or generic identity

Second intention — it signifies other signs, e. g., animal is second substance.

Supposition:

Personal, e. g., animal and man are second substance.

Simple, e. g., second substance is a universal.

Identity:

Numerical — one substance in *number*

Singular term

Specific and Generic — one substance in *essential notes*.

Universal term

The primary value of the preceding terminology lies in the clarification of Ockham's teaching on universals. In dealing with his theory of univocity, he never again returns to "first and second" substance, or to "specific and generic" identity. Instead he always speaks of "genus" and "species," and of terms which are identical in genus and species. Let us take up some examples of the latter; for

¹² Cf. Moody, *op. cit.* p. 137; see Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 6. X.

identity regards essential notes: "those things are identical whose *substance* is one."

We know already that the concepts "genus" and "species" are second intention.¹³ Such signs can signify only other signs. But a *concept* which is *generic*, e. g., animal, or *specific*, e. g., man, is *first* intention, because it signifies *non-signs*.¹⁴ It is necessary to keep this in mind, for a person might reason that "genus" is second intention, and since "animal" is a genus (generic concept), it should follow that "animal" is second intention. But Ockham says that "animal" is and remains first intention. In the proposition, "Socrates is an animal", we see that "animal" signifies Socrates, a real, extra-mental individual, something which is not a sign. Therefore, it must be first intention. In the proposition, "Animal is a genus", "animal" cannot signify real individuals outside the mind, because Ockham says that real individuals are not and cannot be a genus. But "animal" remains first intention. In this proposition it does not exercise its significative function, but has *simple* supposition.¹⁵ The following summary will illustrate the difference between "genus" and the generic term "animal", between "species" and the specific term "man".

Summary

Genus: — concerns second substance as to generic notes.

Second intention — signifies only concepts.

Supposition:

Personal — e. g., animal is a genus.

Simple — e. g., genus is a universal.

Species — concerns second substance regarding specific notes.

Second intention — signifies only concepts.

Supposition:

Personal — e. g., man is a species.

¹³ Cf. Chapter I, note 43.

¹⁴ *ibid.* or, *Sum. tot. log.* ed. Boehner, I. c. 11, line 68: "Nomina autem primae intentionis vocantur omnia . . . quae non sunt signa . . . cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia: 'Homo', 'animal', 'Sortes', 'Plato', 'albedo', 'album'."

¹⁵ Cf. pp. 32—33.

Simple — e. g., species is a universal.

Animal:

Generic identity — when compared with two species, e. g., man and brute.

First intention signifies non-signs, e. g., Socrates and this horse are animals.

Supposition:

Personal — e. g., animal is sensitive.

Simple — e. g., animal is a genus

Man:

Specific identity — when compared with two beings under it, e. g., two men.

First intention e. g., Socrates and Plato are men.

Supposition:

Personal — man is an animal

Simple — man is a species.

While identity looks to the unity of at least the essential notes (genus and species), *similarity* regards the unity of *qualities*,¹⁶ that is, two beings are similar when both have a quality of the same species.¹⁷ But Ockham extends the notion of “quality” beyond the accidental category. He includes essential notes. As we will see under the division of similarity, he says that things are “similar” even in genus and species, e. g., man and beast are similar because of the note “animal” (p. 75). From his own definition, we would expect him to say they are identical. “Quality,” therefore, is hardly the word to be used in defining similarity. “Note” would fit much better.

Even at that, Ockham is not satisfied with the extension of the word “quality”. We will find that he applies the idea of similarity to the so-called “pure perfections”-wisdom, will, etc. (p. 106). He

¹⁶ Cf. p. 57.

¹⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 19. q. 1. S: “Ideo dicit Philosophus quod similia sunt quorum qualitas est una. Hoc est, quorum qualitates sunt eiusdem speciei.”

considers two things similar if they have the *same formal character*, whether this character is essential or accidental.¹⁸

We know that similarity is a concept of first intention,¹⁹ when it signifies non-signs, individuals existing outside the mind. Not that individuals have in them a note which we call "similarity". The concept "similarity" signifies Socrates and Plato *coniunctim*, considered simultaneously, not *divisim*, or considered separately. If Socrates and Plato are similar in their whiteness of color, then "similar" is predicated of them in first intention conjunctively, and "white" is predicated in first intention *divisim*.

Whether this white color has the same intensity in the two or not, is irrelevant for the concept of similarity. In other words, similar notes can be either *equal or unequal* according to Ockham: "A thing which is more perfect or less perfect than something else is said to be unequal; it is said to be equal when it is equally perfect."²⁰

Equality, therefore, means that two things have the *same degree* of some note or quality, such as, two white things with the same intensity of whiteness.²¹

Is this a revelation of the mathematical mentality of which he is often accused?²² According to Ockham "equality" is a concept of mathematical equality between two qualities. Ockham seems to

¹⁸ Or at least some community as in the case of God and creature. The problem of similarity between God and creature forces Ockham to extend his concept of similarity. In the present meaning of similarity, God and creature are not similar. How they can be called similar cannot be explained here without confusing our present issue, which is a comparison of identity, similarity and equality. It will be taken up later, pp. 91 ff.

¹⁹ Cf. p. 29.

²⁰ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 19. q. 1. L: "Quaelibet res est aliqua re perfectior vel imperfectior, et tunc dicitur inaequalis; vel est aequae perfecta, et sic dicitur aequalis."

²¹ "Aequalia vero quorum quantitas est una." — see note 2.

Cf. Quod. VI, 9.

²² Cf. Jansen, Bernhard, S. J., *Die Geschichte der Erkenntnislehre in der neueren Philosophie bis Kant*. Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1940, p. 120; Giacon, Carlo, S. J., *Guglielmo di Occam*. vol. 1. Milan, Vita e Pensiero, 1941, pp. 66—78; Federhofer, op. cit. in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 12, pp. 280, 282—283, 291.

say that equality is restricted to the *same degree*, to the same number of units, whether these degrees or units are a measure of quantity or quality, e. g., two triangles are equal if all three sides are the same length and the angles the same degree. Socrates is equal to Plato if he is the same size, the same figure, the same in looks, the same degree of perfection, etc. But even here we must remember that quantity is taken in the wide sense of the categories.

Ordinarily equality is not taken so exactly; it usually signifies only that the notes of both are in the same species.²³ On the other hand, equality has little importance in the system of the Venerable Inceptor, since for him, similarity and not equality is the basis of univocity. His imputed mathematical mentality need not excite us much in our present investigation.²⁴

Perhaps the comparison of similarity and equality can be summed up in this way. A natural sign can signify only *one*, that is, one *kind* of being.²⁵ The concept of "whiteness", for instance, signifies whiteness in both Peter and Paul. It has the same qualitative make-up in both men; therefore, the two men are similar. But Peter can be less perfectly white than Paul, and so his whiteness is *unequal* to Paul's. Ockham says unequal things are still similar if the quality is the same in both. But Peter's whiteness may be *grayish* and Paul's may be *pure* white. How can one concept which is limited to one type of quality signify these different shades of white? Does not the quality of whiteness differ in Peter from that in Paul? If Paul's (pure) whiteness caused the concept of whiteness in me, must not now a new concept be formed to signify Peter's (grayish) whiteness? Or perhaps we have to admit an analogical concept: one which says "partly the same and partly different" regarding the qualities in Peter and Paul?

Here is where Ockham's simple and composed concepts come

²³ Platzeck, Erhardus W., O. F. M., *De conceptu analogiae respectu univocationis*, in *Antonianum*, vol. 23, 1948, pp. 83—84.

²⁴ Cf. Giacon, op. cit. p. 70.

²⁵ Cf. pp. 25, 32.

into play.²⁶ The simple concept "whiteness" signifies whiteness in both Peter and Paul. The reason is that this is a poorer, more imperfect concept since it ignores or does not perceive the difference in shade between them. But it does tell us *something* about the two. Instead of signifying the *difference* of *shade*, it signifies the specific *sameness* of *whiteness* which underlies the shades. If I want a more exact, a more proper concept, I add the notes which signify these shades (gray and pure). This is a *composed* concept, a collection of two or more concepts which signify that the two are partly the same and partly different.

Since Ockham uses these terms of similarity and equality in the ordinary Aristotelian sense, but differently from the moderns, it may be well to compare his usage with the latter. The common idea is that similarity is equality mixed with inequality.²⁷ Ockham tells us that similar things can be equal, sometimes unequal. Their equality or inequality makes no difference; the essential point of similarity is that two things pertain to the same formal character (*eiusdem rationis*). Practically all the moderns say that similarity implies inequality.

Ockham's similarity regards the order of quality, and says nothing about the *degree* of quality. His *equality* indicates degree of quality (or quantity). For the moderns, equality seems to consider the order of quality, and does not attend to the mathematical equality of quality. They say, for instance, that a lion is equal to a tiger in so far as both have the notes "feline animal". Ockham would say the lion and tiger are *similar* because they have the notes "feline animal". Similarity, not equality, is the basis of Ockham's unity of concept in univocal predication. Quantitative equality is univocal, of course, but has no bearing on the case either for Ockham or for the moderns.

Now let us recall our comparison of identity and similarity. Identity and similarity are both concepts of first intention,²⁸ since they signify things which are not signs. But they signify things conjunctively,

²⁶ Cf. pp. 24—25.

²⁷ Cf. Froebes, Joseph, S. I., *Tractatus logicae formalis*. Rome, Pont. univ. Gregoriana, 1940, p. 67; Platzeck, op. cit. pp. 75, 78, 83—84.

²⁸ Cf. pp. 29, 64.

or considered simultaneously by the mind. Since they signify several, it stands to reason that they are universal concepts.

So far they agree. But identity means unity of *substance*, while similarity says unity of *quality*.²⁹ But Ockham (under the division of similarity, p. 72) will extend the concept of similarity to include essential notes. To remain close to the thought of Ockham, this same use of similarity will be adopted from now on. *Similarity means that either essential or accidental notes have the same formal character.*

Is this similarity real? Yes, but real in an occamistic sense.³⁰ This is perhaps the most fundamental point of this chapter. We can truly say that things outside the mind are really similar. This does not imply that there is in things outside some *universal* corresponding to the universal note in the mind.

Nor does it hint that similarity *as such* exists in the things compared. But the denial of similarity *as such* existing in the object does not destroy the reality of similarity, as Doncoeur would have us believe.³¹ It is true that Ockham rejects the reality of relation in one sense of the word, viz., the relation is not an entity distinct from the object.³²

²⁹ Cf. p. 57. ³⁰ Cf. pp. 22—27.

³¹ Doncoeur, Paul, *Le Nominalisme de Guillaume Occam. La théorie de la relation*, in R. P. L. vol. 23, 1921, pp. 1—25.

³² Phys. V. Text. 19: *Quae autem est in eadem specie*: "Sciendum est quod ex ista littera sicut ex praecedenti, haberi potest quod intentio Philosophi est quod relatio non est aliqua res distincta a rebus absolutis, quia si esset, vere esset motus ad relationem immo ita continue acquireretur una pars relationis ante aliam, sicut acquiritur una pars albedinis ante aliam. Nam posito quod Sortes sit intense albus et Plato remisse albus, si albedo in Platone intendatur, oportet relationem in Sorte intendi, quia sicut Plato fit albior, ita fit Platoni similior. Et per consequens, si illa similitudo esset res in Sorte distincta a Sorte et ab albedine Sortis, vere una pars acquireretur ante aliam. Et ita vere esse motus continuus ad relationem illam quod negat Philosophus. Ideo non vult quod relatio sit alia res a re absoluta."

Def. Ockh. c. 15: "Patet quarto, quia si similitudo esset res alia a duobus albis, non esset contradictio illa alba esse sine similitudine."

ibid. c. 18: "Similiter relationem habere fundamentum similitudinem.

This does not imply nominalism, or if it does, then a great part of St. Thomas' relations are also nominalistic.³³ St. Thomas and Scotus both teach that a real distinction between the relation and its fundament is needed only for the predicamental relations, but that *there are other real relations*.³⁴ Consequently we can hardly say that a denial of real distinction between the relation and its fundament is nominalism. The difference between Ockham and the others is that Ockham denies the real distinction even in predicamental relations. But he does not deny *real relations*. Like other authors, he distinguishes between real relations and *relationes rationis*. The former are independent of acts of the intellect and the latter depend on acts of the intellect.³⁵ Here he is in opposition to Peter Aureoli, who denied all reality to relations, and made them completely dependent on acts of the mind.³⁶ Ockham says that the similarity of Plato to Socrates in whiteness is a real similarity.³⁷

fundari in albedine, nihil aliud est nisi similitudinem praedicari de albedine, non enim est aliquid ex parte rei fundantis et aliquid fundatum."

Cf. also Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 6, line 66.

³³ Cf. Martin, op. cit. p. 49.

³⁴ *ibid.* p. 46.

³⁵ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 30. q. 5. H: "Sicut quia unum album est simile alteri albo sine omni operatione intellectus comparantis vel non comparantis, ideo dicitur similitudo relatio realis."

This opinion is held even by well-known neo-scholastics, such as, Coffey, P., *Ontology*. N. Y. Peter Smith, 1938, pp. 349 ff. Consequently, it is amusing to hear that Luther, imbued with ockhamism, rejected relations and held that all is absolute, and therefore, the scope of ontology is reduced to single individuals. Cf. Meier, Ludger, O. F. M., *Research that has been made and is yet to be made on the Ockhamism of Martin Luther at Erfurt*, in *Arch.* vol. 43, 1951, p. 58.

³⁶ Peter Aureoli, Com. in Sent. I. d. 30. a. 2: "Unde non est aliud similitudo inter duas albedines, quam iudicium inter eas, sicut per contrarium dissimilitudo est iudicium discrepans et diversum."

³⁷ see note 35 and Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 30. q. 5. G: "Sed sicut similitudo dicitur realis relatio propter hoc, quod unum album ex natura rei est simile alteri albo, et ad hoc, quod unum sit simile alteri, non plus facit intellectus, quam facit ad hoc, quod Socrates sit albus vel quod Plato sit albus."

Doncoeur's position in this matter is hard to understand. He uses an example to illustrate Ockham's nominalistic relation. If a white wall is built, and then a second white wall, the first wall becomes similar to the second without acquiring any new reality distinct from whiteness. If the second white wall is destroyed, the first wall loses its relation of similarity without losing any reality.³⁸ But if this is nominalism, then St. Thomas is a nominalist. For St. Thomas says motion is not in relations *per se*, but *per accidens*, i. e., in as far as a new relation follows some change, for instance, a change in quantity is followed by equality or inequality.³⁹ This new relation of equality or inequality does not imply that the new relation is a new entity.

But, when we say, "Things are really similar is a predication of extramental reality", we mean: I have a concept, let us say, of "white". This concept is a singular thing in my mind. It signifies this present white object. I formed this concept from the object present before me in which whiteness really inheres. My concept of "white" signifies this object, but it also signifies every other object in which whiteness really inheres. This concept *entitatively* is a psychic singular thing in my mind; *significatively* it is *universal*.⁴⁰ Now each *whiteness* inhering in the object perceived and in all other objects is also a singular thing — not a universal, nor a common nature singularized — but it is singular by itself. Therefore, when I say, "These white objects are similar", this "similarity" is real, says

³⁸ Doncoeur, op. cit. p. 14.

³⁹ St. Thomas, Com. in VIII Libros Phys. Aris. ed. Leonina, II. p. 237a: "Deinde cum dicit: *neque est in ad aliquid* etc., ostendit quod non est motus in genere *ad aliquid*. In quocumque enim genere est per se motus, nihil illius generis de novo invenitur in aliquo, absque eius mutatione; sicut novus color non invenitur in aliquo colorato absque eius alteratione. Sed contingit de novo verum esse aliquid relative dici ad alterum altero mutato, ipso tamen non mutato. Ergo motus non est per se in *ad aliquid*, sed solum per accidens, inquantum scilicet ad aliquam mutationem consequitur nova relatio; sicut ad mutationem secundum quantitatem sequitur aequalitas vel inaequalitas, et ex mutatione secundum qualitatem similitudo vel dissimilitudo."

⁴⁰ Cf. Chapter I, note 16.

Ockham. That is, similarity is predicated of objects outside the mind on account of a reality (whiteness) existing in these objects. This is not logical predication of concepts of second intention, but real predication of things outside the mind. Hence, things are similar when they have the same formal character to which correspond outside the mind essential or accidental existing realities in any object signified.

This is Ockham's real similarity. It is founded on "qualities" which exist in objects. But it is not real in the sense that the "quality" in the object is *universal* or a common nature singularized. Similarity signifies this whiteness and that whiteness and all other singular whitenesses *conjunctively*. In other words, similarity is a universal concept signifying individual things outside the mind. These things do not differ "qualitatively".

Maurer says that Ockham cannot explain the likenesses of things because he rejects Abaelard's divine Ideas, and says these Ideas are the singular things. Since there is no universal *in re* and no common nature, the likenesses of things can be experienced, but not rationally explained. This sounds much like the position of Maréchal and Gilson.⁴¹ They object to Ockham's doctrine on the ground that a common nature is needed, or at least a common nature singularized. For, without it, how can a concept of similarity signify *two* things? What in the thing corresponds to the concept? There must be some *common* reality. Whiteness in Socrates has a certain constitution or make-up. If the whiteness of Plato is not common to the whiteness of Socrates, it follows that it is proper to Plato.

Ockham could ask in his response: does it follow that the whiteness in Plato has a different constitution from the whiteness of Socrates? By no means! One concept, "whiteness", has the same formal character signifying the real whiteness in Socrates and Plato. To this concept corresponds the singular quality of whiteness in Plato

⁴¹ Maurer, Armand, *Scotism and Ockhamism*, in *History of philosophical systems*. ed. Vergilius Ferm. N. Y. Philosophical library, 1950, p. 220; Gilson, *Unity of philosophical experience*. N. Y. Scribner's, 1937, pp. 73—74; Maréchal, Joseph, S. J., *Le point de départ de la métaphysique*. vol. 1. 3d ed. Paris, Desclée, 1944, pp. 232—233.

which is composed of x , and to the same concept corresponds the singular quality of whiteness in Socrates which is composed of x' . The singular whiteness of Plato (of the same shade) differs only *numerically* — not qualitatively — from the singular whiteness of Socrates.⁴² If the shade of whiteness differs in Plato and Socrates, there is a qualitative difference, and a composed concept is needed to signify the difference. But the simple concept “white” signifies — though imperfectly — the two beings who have different shades of whiteness.

Consequently, when Ockham speaks of the *same* (identical) formal character in his definition of similarity, “same” surely does not mean numerical identity. Nor does it signify *extra-mental* specific identity, for, outside the mind there is no species. He wishes to say that a singular “quality” in the object corresponds to the formal character of the universal concept. This “quality” is not otherwise constituted than the same “quality” in other “similar” objects. The two “whitenesses” in Socrates and Plato are numerically distinct, but not *qualitatively*. Although they do not differ qualitatively, they are not really identical in the sense of a common nature differentiated by a principle of individuation. This would be an *extra-mental* universal singularized. “Two things are similar” means that we identify them in a specific concept. But this concept signifies the *real* notes in things which are qualitatively the same.

Now let us see how Ockham proceeds with his division of similarity taken in this sense.

II. DIVISION OF SIMILARITY

Ockham holds that abstraction attends, not to some universal *in re*, but to a certain note or notes of the singular thing known in proper knowledge. Then the mind knows all similar things (of the same formal character) in common knowledge.⁴³ “Man” signifies this man before me in proper cognition, and all other men in common knowledge.

⁴² Cf. Chapter I, note 24; Quod. VI, 8; Moody, op. cit. p. 152.

⁴³ Cf. p. 21.

In his text on similarity, Ockham gives three degrees of abstraction. In the first two cases, notes are compared whose formal character is of the same species, or they are similar, because the perfections in the objects are qualitatively the same. In the last case, the things compared lack this similarity. They must be common in some way but their perfections are different. In the first degree of abstraction, Ockham turns his attention to things which, he says, are *perfectly* similar; all the notes in one and in the other have the same formal character. The second degree deals with things which have some notes the same, and some different. The notes which are the same can be signified by one concept. In the third degree, he says paradoxically that, even though no notes are the same, still we can form one concept about them. Each of these cases merits separate study.

A. PERFECT SIMILARITY

The first division of univocity based on similarity deals with things which Ockham says are *perfectly* similar. This similarity is found only in a *species specialissima*. Things are perfectly similar if *all* the notes of the things compared have the same formal character. Ockham gives us this text in the *Commentary on the Sentences*:

"In one way, univocity is taken for a concept common to some having perfect similarity in all essentials and without any dissimilarity, in such a way that this is true both in substantial and accidental things, so that in the accidental form, there is not to be found anything dissimilar to any form in another accidental form of the same character. For example: if whiteness in the fourth degree and in the third degree were not entirely similar, still there would not be found in one whiteness anything which is dissimilar to anything in the other whiteness. For, in individuals of the same species, we do not find anything of a different character in one and in the other."⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. Q: "Univocum accipitur uno modo pro conceptu communi aliquibus habentibus perfectam similitudinem in omnibus essentialibus sine omni dissimilitudine, ita quod hoc sit verum tam in substantialibus quam in accidentalibus, sic quod in forma accidentali

Ockham is considering these notes *concretely*, that is, the perfections are represented in the concept as they exist in the object — with their individual differences, which every object *de facto* has. The concept “man” signifies an adult and a boy, although the adult is more perfect than the boy. “White” signifies all white objects regardless of the degrees of intensity, irrespective of the difference in perfection found in the various white objects. There is no qualitative difference between the perfections as they exist in singular objects; or better: there may be a qualitative difference, but the simple concept does not advert to it, but considers things as qualitatively the same. Since the perfections do not differ qualitatively, they can be considered in one concept. The difference between white “A” and white “B” does not suffice to change the formal character of whiteness.⁴⁵ The difference is not qualitative but quantitative.

“Dissimilar” signifies that the notes are not of the same species, e. g., the notes of whiteness are dissimilar to the notes of redness, wisdom, etc. As we will see (p. 76), different colors can also have a common concept, but they are not *perfectly* similar. Perfect similarity is found only in a *species specialissima*.⁴⁶

A *species specialissima* is only a species; it is not a genus.⁴⁷ Peter and Paul are individuals of such a species. Both are men, white,

non est reperire quid dissimile cuilibet formae in alia forma accidentali eiusdem rationis. Exemplum: si albedo in quarto gradu et in tribus gradibus non fuit omnino similis, tamen non est reperire aliquid in una albedine quod est dissimile cuilibet in alia albedine. Et sic accipiendo univocum, solus conceptus speciei specialissimae solum est univocus, quia in individuis eiusdem speciei non est reperire aliquid alterius rationis in uno et in alio.”

Cf. also I. d. 2. q. 9. N.

⁴⁵ Cf. pp. 69—71; also Sum. tot. log. I. c. 18.

⁴⁶ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. N: “Distinguo de univoco . . . uno modo secundum quod praecise praedicatur de pluribus realiter distinctis, quae non sunt una res realiter, sed sunt simillima. Et isto modo non invenitur univocatio nisi in specia specialissima, quia sola individua speciei specialissimae sunt sibi simillima.”

Cf. Porphy. Moody, Proemium, Ad: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*; Sum. tot. log. I. c. 18.

⁴⁷ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 21, line 45: “Species autem specialissima est intentio non habens speciem sub se, hoc est, species spe-

Jews, etc. If a univocal concept is possible anywhere, it is here. All the notes are of the same formal character, even though not of the same degree of perfection.⁴⁸ The *species specialissima* can be substantial or accidental. Substantial things in this text mean things which are substances: men, horses, etc. Accidental things are things which are accidents: whiteness, wisdom, etc.

In perfect similarity then, all the notes of one object are in the same species as all the notes of the other. These notes are predicated by means of one concept because they are of the same formal character applying to both. In a proposition, they suppose personally, and since they suppose for their signified objects, they exercise their significative function of standing for real beings. The subject does the same, e. g., in the proposition, "These white things are similar". Here we have a case of single imposition⁴⁹ of first intentions. The predicates are applied only once to these real, white things. Both subject and predicate signify something that is not a sign, so they are first intention signifying realities outside the mind.

B. IMPERFECT SIMILARITY

Imperfect similarity is more general than perfect similarity. It abstracts similarity, not within the same *species specialissima*, but within *genus*. This type of similarity can include either essentials or accidentals. It is called *imperfect* to distinguish it from perfect similarity. It could also be called *partial* similarity because the individuals compared are partly similar and partly dissimilar. But "partial" might be misleading. Any perfection considered is the same as all others of like nature. Partial does not imply that a formal character of one is partly the same and partly different from the

cialissima de nullo communi praedicatur in quid, quamvis de multis singularibus possit praedicari in quid. Media autem inter speciem specialissimam et genus generalissimum vocantur genera et species subalternae."

Def. Ock. c. 3: "Species specialissima est, quae tantum est species et non genus."

⁴⁸ Cf. pp. 72—73.

⁴⁹ Cf. pp. 37, 55.

formal character of another. Ockham does not hold such concepts. What is implied is that we are seeking similarity in *genus*.⁵⁰

Aristotle held equivocation in genus, as our key text for imperfect similarity will tell us. The reason is because he considered the various species which fall under a genus as being of different essences. But Ockham says the different species are not *altogether* of a different character, but are partly the same. If we abstract whatever is the same between two species which fall under the same genus, we can find things of the same perfection. Surely man and beast differ because of their form, but something common can be discovered too, and this commonness is the basis of a univocal predication. In the following text Ockham continues his explanation of the division of similarity which began under perfect similarity:

“In another way univocity is taken for a concept common to some which are neither entirely similar nor entirely dissimilar. They are similar in some things, and dissimilar in others, either regarding intrinsic or extrinsic notes. In this way, ‘man’ and ‘ass’ meet in the concept of animal as in a univocal concept. And although their specific forms are of a different character, nevertheless their matter is of the same character. Thus they agree in one essential, and differ in another. In this way also, ‘man’ and ‘angel’ meet in the concept of substance as in a univocal concept, because although they do not correspond in anything intrinsic, still in

⁵⁰ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 18, line 7: “Aut illa multa de quibus praedicatur, sunt omnia similia, ita quod omnia essentialiter conveniunt, nisi forte unum componatur ex pluribus aequae similibus, et sic est species specialissima. Aut non omnia, de quibus praedicatur praedicto modo, conveniunt, sed contingit reperire aliqua duo, quae secundum se tota simpliciter et secundum suas partes dissimilia, sicut est de ‘animali’. Nam ‘animal’ praedicatur de homine et asino, et maior est similitudo substantialis inter duos homines quam inter hominem et asinum. Similiter est de ‘colore’ respectu albedinis et nigredinis; nam nec haec nigredo nec aliqua pars huius nigredinis tantum convenit cum hac albedine vel aliqua parte huius albedinis, quantum una albedo convenit cum alia; et propter hoc intentio praedicabilis de albedine et nigredine non est species specialissima sed genus. Sed ‘albedo’ est species specialissima respectu albedinum.”

some extrinsic notes they agree, since they have accidents of the same character, for example, intellection and volition. In this way too, blackness and whiteness come together in the concept of color. Although they do not communicate in anything intrinsic, since everything of one is of a different character from everything of the other, still they agree extrinsically, since they have a subject of the same character. Of this univocity, the Philosopher, VII. *Physicorum*, says that in genus lie hidden many equivocations. He accepts equivocation as distinct from perfect similarity. Thus the concept of genus, whether subaltern or most general, is not univocal, but rather, in genus there is equivocation."⁵¹

Again Ockham tells us that things are similar if they are of the same formal character; if not, they are dissimilar. Besides, it makes no difference whether the similar notes are essential ("animal" predicated of man and ass), or accidental ("color" predicated of black and white), intrinsic or extrinsic. In perfect similarity, the essential notes of the different objects had to agree. In imperfect

⁵¹ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. Q: "Alio modo accipitur univocum pro conceptu communi aliquibus, quae nec sunt omnino similia nec omnino dissimilia, sed in aliquibus similia et in aliquibus dissimilia, vel quantum ad intrinseca vel extrinseca. Hoc modo homo vel asinus conveniunt in conceptu animalis, sicut in conceptu univoco. Et licet formae specificae eorum sunt alterius rationis, tamen materia in eis est eiusdem rationis. Et sic conveniunt in aliquo essentiali et in aliquo differunt. Et hoc modo etiam homo et angelus conveniunt in conceptu substantiae sicut in conceptu univoco, quia licet non convenient in aliquo intrinsece, tamen in aliquibus extrinsecis conveniunt, quia habent accidentia eiusdem rationis, puta intellectionem et volitionem. Hoc modo etiam nigredo et albedo in conceptu coloris conveniunt, licet non communicant in aliquo intrinseco, quia quodlibet unius est alterius rationis a quolibet alterius, tamen extrinsece conveniunt, quia habent aliquod subiectum eiusdem rationis. Et de isto univoco dicit Philosophus, VII. *Physicorum*, quod in genere latent multae aequivocationes, quia accipiendo aequivocationem prout distinguitur contra similitudinem vel contra univocationem aliquorum habentium similitudinem perfectam, sicut conceptus generis tam subalterni quam generalissimi, non est univocus sed potius in genere, sic est aequivocatio."

Cf. also I. d. 2. q. 9. N; Porph. Proemium, Ad: *Altioribus quidem quaestionibus*.

similarity, an essential note may agree ("animal" predicated of man and ass), but it need not do so. In this latter case, even though the essential notes differ, e. g., between man and angel, still one univocal concept of substance can be predicated of them because of the similar accidents found in the two (intellect and will). Any essential or accidental notes can be lined up according to genus.

"Genus" is second intention.⁵² "Animal", the genus of man and ass, is first intention because it signifies real men and real asses. Moreover, "animal" signifies the *whole* being. Does this include the specific differences and all other notes? According to Zeller-Nestle⁵³ such a genus is a reality which is full but undetermined. Aristotle held that the genus is poorer than the concept of species. For the neo-platonists, genus signifies the whole man because the genus contains the species.⁵⁴

To say that Ockham's genus includes the specific differences and all other notes is a misleading accusation. If this means that Ockham's genus (a concept) corresponds adequately to a perfection *in the object* which contains in it the species, difference and other notes, there is nothing to the accusation.⁵⁵ Genus (animal) signifies the whole man in the sense of *confused* knowledge. The ordinary meaning of confused is common, universal cognition. It can, however, include the idea of *indistinct* knowledge. For instance, if I see an object in the distance, I do not perceive it clearly, and call it a "thing". As it approaches me, I see it is an "animal". After another and closer look, I can see it is a "man". Finally, I notice it is Socrates. While Socrates was still in the distance, I called him a "thing" and an "animal". Surely I predicated these concepts about the whole

⁵² Cf. p. 62 and Chapter I, note 43.

⁵³ Zeller-Nestle, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung*. 6th ed. Leipzig, O. R. Reisland, 1919, p. 60.

⁵⁴ Cf. Geiger, L. B., O. P., *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin*. Paris, Vrin, 1942, pp. 247—248, 254—255.

⁵⁵ Cf. Chapter I, note 37, and II, note 35; also Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 7. X. Although a generic concept is predicated of the *whole* individual, this concept does not include the notes proper to the specific differences which come under the genus. We predicate only the notes which are *common* to the different species under the genus.

Socrates in so far as I perceived him.⁵⁶ If this is what is meant by, "genus includes the species, difference and all other notes", then we might ask if there is any school which does not reason in the same way.

Although the predicates "being", "animal", "man" are not perfectly proper to Socrates, they are still predicated truly of him, but the knowledge is common, and in this case, indistinct.⁵⁷ Besides, it is even true to point to Socrates, who is now standing only two feet away from me, and call him a being, an animal, a man — though this knowledge is confused, general, not precise or proper.

Ockham holds that the genus is poorer than the species.⁵⁸ He does not say that the genus signifies the whole man for the reason that the genus *contains* the species.⁵⁹ He maintains that every individual which is signified by the specific term is also signified by the generic term. This follows from the fact that the genus is poorer and more universal than the species.⁶⁰ As for predicating "animal" of the *whole* man, Ockham insists that this means, not that "animal" is a reality of which man and ass are parts, but that "animal" *signifies* man and ass as a concept which is poorer and more general. This is the reason why Moody says that for Ockham "to participate" means "to be the subject of something".⁶¹

In the second example of our key text, we run into a slight difficulty because Ockham says angel and man are not similar in *intrinsic* notes, but are similar in *substance*. This seems to mean that angel

⁵⁶ Quod. V, 14: "Sit A homo, B animal, et sit C Sortes. Tunc arguo sic: Possunt formari tres propositiones tales vocales: C est A, C est B, C est ens. Ita possunt in mente similes tres propositiones formari, quarum duae sunt dubiae, tertia scita, quia possibile est quod aliquis dubitet utramque illarum: C est A, C est B, et tamen quod sciat istam: C est ens. Et patet hoc manifeste de veniente a remotis, quod videns frequenter dubitat utrum sit homo vel animal vel asinus, et tamen evidenter scit quod est ens."

⁵⁷ Cf. Chapter I, note 31.

⁵⁸ *ibid.* note 7.

⁵⁹ Cf. Chapter II, notes 15, 23, 35.

⁶⁰ *ibid.* This is brought out in Moody, *op. cit.* p. 99.

⁶¹ Moody, *op. cit.* p. 113, note 1; Cf. Chapter I, note 22.

and man are similar in the concept of *substantiality*, but are not similar in any genus which is more proximate. An angel is a pure spirit; it has no body. Man has matter intrinsically. The predicate "substance" implies that the notes "*ens in se*" can be abstracted from angel and man. They are dissimilar in any more proximate genus (corporeity), but similar in the higher genus of substance.

"Dissimilar" again means that the notes of the things compared are of a different formal character. But when man and angel are compared in a more remote genus (substance), in reference to the accidental species of intellection or volition, common and similar notes are found. Although an angel does not coincide with man in a proximate genus, still, from his similar accidents, he does not lack substance. Therefore, we can predicate univocally such notes as substance, intellection, volition.

Again Ockham is considering the common concept as signifying the perfections *concretely*.⁶² Objectively the intellect of man is the same as the intellect of the angel in so far as both are spiritual faculties of cognition. It is true, the intellect of the angel is more perfect, but "more perfect" does not change the notes of "intellect", scil., a spiritual faculty of knowing. Inequality of perfection does not make two beings dissimilar.⁶³ Even though we consider them concretely, with their differences of perfection, one concept still signifies both perfections.

In the last part of our key text, Ockham explains his version of why Aristotle does not speak of univocity in genus, but of equivocation when he says: "And this discussion serves to show that the genus is not a unity, but contains a plurality latent in it."⁶⁴ In the genus lie hidden *many different* subaltern genera, as is seen in the example of angel and man. For in the proximate genus of man (sensitivity), there is no similarity with the angel, and so even if a common term would be predicated of angel and man in this proximate genus of man, to this common term would correspond

⁶² Cf. p. 73. ⁶³ Cf. p. 64.

⁶⁴ καὶ σημαίνει ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὅτι τὸ γένος οὐχ ἓν τι, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τοῦτο λανθάνει πολλά. — *Physica*, VII. c. 4, ed. Bekker, vol. 1, p. 249a, 21—23.

two concepts. This would not be univocal predication. If, for instance, we would predicate "sensitivity" of man and angel, it would signify man as a being with corporal sense (one concept). Regarding the angel, "sensitive" would have to signify figuratively, e. g., a quick response to a spiritual stimulus, as, let us say, the angel has a sensitive conscience. Here we would have a second concept for "sensitivity". Since there are two concepts, there is no univocal predication. Moreover, the common term would not signify a *thing* in both cases because sensitivity in the angel is not a reality. Since it is not a reality, "similar" cannot be predicated of it in conjunction with man, for, "similar" must mean the same formal character applying to several things. Now, in the angel, the formal character "sensitive" does not correspond to a reality which is qualitatively the same as man's corporal senses. "Similar" in this instance must be predicated equivocally. For, in Ockham there is only one possible predication besides univocity, and that is equivocation. Hence, in the proximate genus is latent equivocation. For man and beast on the other hand, there is similarity in the proximate genus (sensitivity, animality). Hence, the predication is univocal because one concept can signify both objects.

As for angels and men, let us ascend higher in the Porphyrian tree to the note "organic" and again to "corporeity". Still we do not find a genus common to them. In all these subaltern genera, angel and man are dissimilar, of a different formal character, and the predication of a common term is equivocal. Finally, we climb to the top of the tree, to the most general genus (*genus supremum, remotissimum*). This genus refers to *substance*, and the concept of substance is common to angel and man. Here, we predicate univocally.

Aristotle opposes equivocation to *perfect* similarity (with the *species specialissima*), and therefore imperfect similarity (within genus) is equivocal.⁶⁵ But Ockham goes farther. From his examples we see that univocity is not to be identified with perfect similarity

⁶⁵ The *Defensorium Ockham*, c. 20, explains it this way: "Una enim species perfectior est altera, sicut albedo perfectior est nigredine in genere coloris, homo perfectior est asino in genere animalis. Propter hoc dixit Aristoteles, VII. Physicorum, quod in genere latent aequivocationes, et quod solum in specie specialissima est perfecta univocatio."

alone, and that equivocation is not to be identified with imperfect similarity. For Ockham, the difference between univocity and equivocation lies in this: in univocity there is *one* concept which is common and predicable of individuals on account of some similarity; in equivocation there is not one concept, but more than one, with a common spoken term. This common term is predicated on account of some similarity, but the predication is equivocal, since the note compared is *really* in one thing signified and *figuratively* in the other, as we saw in the example of sensitivity predicated of man and angel. This comparison will be treated more at length in Chapter IV. Let it suffice here to note that Ockham is not content with the extension of univocity in Aristotle.

C. FURTHER EXPLANATION AND DIVISION OF SIMILARITY IN RELATION TO GOD AND CREATURE

Similarity is a relation of "quality" with one formal character corresponding to it. But Ockham penetrates further. One concept of two things can be formed *even if there is no similarity* between the two. This means that things are still comparable even when they coincide neither in a *species specialissima*, nor in any essential or accidental genus, even the most remote.

This lack of similarity even in the most remote genus is taken *concretely*,⁶⁶ i. e., objectively no perfection of God is the same as the perfection of the creature. God's perfections are infinite, and when we consider similarity concretely, we take things as they are, with their individual differences. When God and creature are compared along with their *intrinsic modes*, they are not similar.

As a matter of fact, Ockham applies this type of comparison only to God and creature. It is a difficult question because in one case he says God and creature are not similar. Later on he will tell us that they are similar. In both cases he says we can abstract one univocal concept common to both. Where he says there is no similarity between God and creature, he is continuing the text we have used

⁶⁶ Cf. pp. 73, 79.

for the division of similarity. In the text where he admits similarity, he is commenting on Genesis: "Let us make man to our image and likeness." He could not and did not wish to deny this text. Our task is to find a reconciliation between these two passages, beginning with the one which repudiates similarity.

1. *God and creature are not similar.* The key text from pages 72 and 75—77, continues:

"In the third way, univocity is taken for a concept univocal to many, not having any similarity either in substantial or in accidental things. In this way, every concept applicable to God and creature is univocal to them, because in God and creature there is absolutely nothing either intrinsic or extrinsic of the same character. The Saints deny the first and second univocity of God. The first, because nothing essential in God and creature is of the same character. The second, because nothing accidental is of the same character. As the essence of God is dissimilar to the essence of the creature, so also the wisdom of God and His goodness."⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. Q: "Tertio modo accipitur univocum pro conceptu communi multis non habentibus aliquam similitudinem nec quantum ad substantialia nec quantum ad accidentalia. Isto modo quilibet conceptus conveniens Deo et creaturae est eis univocus, quia in Deo et creatura nihil penitus nec intrinsecum nec extrinsecum sunt eiusdem rationis.

"Primam univocationem et secundam negant Sancti a Deo. Primam, quia nihil essenziale in Deo et creatura est eiusdem rationis; secundam, quia nihil accidentale est eiusdem rationis in Deo et creatura; sicut enim essentia Dei est dissimilis essentiae creaturae, ita sapientia Dei et bonitas sua."

There is another possible reading of this text beginning with the second sentence: "In this way, every concept applicable to God and creature is univocal to them. Since, in God and creature, there is absolutely nothing either intrinsic or extrinsic of the same character, the Saints deny the first and second univocity of God." — This is a minor point, however, and will make no difference regarding Ockham's theory.

We must not infer from this text that the second degree of univocity includes only the accidental; for, it is evidently impossible to compare God and creature in essentials *and* accidentals. But if we omit the question of God and creature, the second degree regards *either* essentials *or* accidentals

Ockham teaches that there is equivocal predication when there is no common genus.⁶⁸ Here, even though he rules out imperfect similarity (similarity in genus), he maintains a univocal concept is possible. The reason is that a generic concept which signifies a thing and a figure of speech cannot be one concept, as in the example where "sensitive" is attributed to man and angel. If "sensitive" signifies angel, it must have a different formal character than "sensitive" signifying man. Consequently there will be two concepts. In man there *is* sensitivity; in the angel there is not. But in God there *is* real wisdom, and in creature there *is* real wisdom.⁶⁹ Therefore, he says, we can form one concept, "wisdom", common to God and creature, even though they are dissimilar. In other words, although Ockham does not say this expressly, he leads us to the assertion that *there is a common genus between God and creature*. This doctrine is not pantheism because genus does not exist outside the mind.⁷⁰ The Porphyrian tree is not of the metaphysical order, but is an order of concepts of the mind. These intentions *signify* things outside.

It is easy to see why the scholastics shrank from putting God in a genus. For them, this would have implied metaphysical composition in God. This in turn would have meant that His perfections were finite and related to one another as parts mutually completing each other. But if genus is only a concept, if a generic term signifies the *whole* being (God and creature), then it does not follow that such a generic term signifies a *part* of God.

as Ockham said on pp. 75—77. Man and ass correspond in an essential note (matter) and differ in some essentials, e. g., the specific form. In other words, an essential note *can* be of the same formal character in the second degree, but need not be (as in the case of man and angel).

⁶⁸ Cf. pp. 79—81.

⁶⁹ We are not interested in a study of Ockham's meaning of the term "wisdom". For our purpose it makes no difference, since it is used only as an example of a perfection which is real both in God and in creature. We could just as well say: let "x" equal a real perfection of God and creature.

⁷⁰ Cf. pp. 44—47. In the *De Prin.* p. 58, we read: "Ex hiis ponit quod ex simplicitate Dei non potest probari quod Deus non sit in genere."

See also the *Def. Ock.* c. 17.

"Dissimilar" again means non-similarity; there are no substantial or accidental notes of the same formal character taken concretely. This seems to be what the Thomists call *similitudo dissimilis*:⁷¹ there is some positive comparability between two objects whose forms are not equal, but not so unequal that a third term of comparison is impossible, at least in the abstract.

In the concrete order, then, God and creature are different; they are not similar. Ockham is most emphatic on this point.⁷² We can despoil the creature as much as we will by real abstraction, but we will never find any essential or accidental perfections of the same character as the divine reality. In the first and second degrees of univocity among creatures, such notes are found, and the intellect forms the notion of similarity regarding them.⁷³ This is impossible in the concrete regarding God and creature.

⁷¹ Cf. Penido, M. T.-L., *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique*. Paris, Vrin, 1931, p. 38; Anderson, James, *The Bond of being; an essay on analogy and existence*. St. Louis, Herder, 1949, pp. 5—6.

⁷² In the following text Ockham insists that God and creature are different in the concrete. There is no ontological univocity: "Si enim intelligat, quod aliqua ratio formalis inventa in creatura, sive auferendo ab ea aliquid sive non auferendo, possit Deo attribui et esse in eo, accipit simpliciter falsum; quia nihil, quod est in creatura realiter, qualitercumque spoliatur, potest Deo attribui . . . nihil reale est univocum Deo et creaturae, et per consequens, nihil quod est realiter in creatura (extra animam nisi forte vox) per nullam separationem vel ablationem potest Deo attribui; sed tantum attribuitur sibi et creaturae unus conceptus, qui nec est in Deo nec in creatura (extra), quamvis de utroque praedicatur." — Ord. ed. Boehner, d. 2. q. 9. C.

The parentheses in this text probably indicate the second redaction of this work made by the author himself. (Bohner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, p. 102).

The word "vox" in parentheses does not demonstrate nominalism in Ockham's doctrine. The context says clearly that a *concept* is attributed to God and creature.

Cf. also Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 6. NN; Heiser, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, p. 211.

⁷³ Similarity *itself* is not found in creatures, but the notes which are of the same nature, and which are partial causes of this concept. See note 32.

Still, says Ockham, one concept can be predicated of God and creature. This concept *as such* is not in God nor in creature. That is, the object of this concept, e. g., wisdom, exists in reality with its determinations of finiteness and infiniteness. The one concept "wisdom", however, represents or signifies divine and human wisdom.

Just at this point, continues Ockham, someone may object that, in such univocity, both the common term and the *things themselves* signified by the common term are put on a parity. To put on a parity would be to predicate concrete similarity of them, or to attribute concrete notes of the same formal character to God and creature.⁷⁴ Right here, we find ourselves face to face with a fundamental difference between Scotists and Ockham on the one hand, and Thomists on the other. Ockham anticipates Penido's objection which accuses the Venerable Inceptor of anthropomorphism. Penido tells us that it is absolutely wrong to take created perfection, increase it indefinitely and say: at the end is the divine perfection.⁷⁵ To do this would be an anthropomorphic error; it would be a comparison of concrete similarity between God and creature.

Ockham answers the objection by distinguishing the term *parificatio*. Here we do not compare the *real* wisdom of God with the *real* wisdom of the creature. These two wisdoms are different. In perfect and imperfect similarity, we did compare the concrete perfections, and predicated similarity of both.⁷⁶ In both there is something essential and intrinsic. Moreover, it is something finite, temporal, etc. Consequently, we can form a generic concept signifying both realities. In this sense God and creature are not similar; they are not put on a parity.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. DD: "Quando aliqua univocantur in aliquo, parificantur in illo nomine et in re significata per illud nomen. Sed Deus et creatura in nullo parificantur, nec in entitate, nec in bonitate, nec in quocumque genere."

⁷⁵ Penido, op. cit. p. 20.

⁷⁶ Cf. pp. 67—71.

⁷⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. GG: "Dico quod aliqua parificari intelligitur dupliciter. Vel quod aliquid existens in uno parificetur alicui existenti in alio, et sic Deus et creatura in nullo parificantur, quia nihil quod est in creatura habet paritatem cum aliquo quod est in Deo."

7 Menges, Ockham.

In another place, Ockham cites St. John Damascene as saying that "God is not wise, but super-wise, not good but super-good."⁷⁸ Damascene did not deny for one minute the goodness and wisdom of God. He says expressly: "That God is good and just, these things, I say, we know and confess."⁷⁹ He does not say the perfections of God are unreal, but that they are essentially above all created

⁷⁸ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. Q: "Ideo dicit Damascenus, quod Deus non est sapiens, sed super-sapiens, nec bonus, sed super-bonus."

Ockham is in good company here, for, we find something similar in St. Thomas: "Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit." — Sum. theol. I. q. 3. Proem. ed. Leonina, vol. 4, p. 35.

This idea seems to be taken from Pseudo-Dionysius, *De caelesti hierarchia*, 2, P. G. vol. 3, p. 141. Scotus took up this point (as did Ockham), and showed that purely negative knowledge is no knowledge at all. Cf. Wolter, Allan B., O. F. M., *Duns Scotus on the nature of man's knowledge of God*, in *Rev. Met.* vol. 1, no. 2, 1947, p. 5.

⁷⁹ *De Fide Orthodoxa*, Lib. I. c. 2. P. G. vol. 94, p. 791C: "Et quidem quod Deus . . . bonus, iustus . . . sit; haec inquam, omnia et scimus et confitemur."

Ockham probably alludes to a text of Damascene from the same work, c. 12; p. 847B: "Bonum enim existentia est, et existentiae causa; malum autem boni sive existentiae privatio est. Atque haec sunt vocabula affirmantia et negantia. Ex utrisque porro suavissima connexio fit: v. gr. superessentialis essentia, superdivina Deitas, principium omni principio superius, aliaque similia."

Again in c. 4, p. 799B—C, he says: "De Deo autem impossibile est, quidnam essentia sua ac natura sit enuntiare: aptiusque est ex omnium remotione et negatione sermonem de eo facere. Neque enim aliquid est eorum quae sunt; non ut nullatenus sit; sed quia super omnia quae sunt, atque etiam supra ipsummet esse ipse sit. Etenim si cognitiones circa res quae sunt versantur; profecto quod cognitionem superat, supra essentiam quoque erit: vicissimque quod est supra essentiam, cognitionem superabit."

"Infinitus igitur est Deus, et incomprehensibilis: atque hoc unum est, quod de eo percipi possit et comprehendi. Quaecumque autem de Deo per affirmationem dicimus, non Dei naturam, sed quae circa naturam illius sunt, ostendunt. Ita sive bonum, sive iustum, sive sapientem, sive quodcumque tandem aliud dixeris, non Dei naturam, sed quae circa naturam sunt, exponis."

perfections, and above our comprehension of them. One is infinitely greater than the other.

But in spite of this measureless difference, Ockham insists that one concept can signify the two, even though they are different or dissimilar. He puts them on a parity which is intrinsic neither to God nor to creature.⁸⁰

Why can dissimilar things be considered similar? Or we could ask: why can we consider God and creature similar, although they are so different (dissimilar)? How can my concept of wisdom signify super-wisdom? The concept of wisdom is formed from creatures, but the concept of super-wisdom is not formed from God because we do not know God intuitively.⁸¹

At this particular point, Ockham argues that both words and concepts are *signs*. Both signify *things*, although they are not of the essence of the things signified. The same *word* (artificial sign) "wisdom" can signify God and creature as all admit. This word "wisdom" is not something of the essence of God and creature; still it signifies both. In the same way, one *concept* "wisdom" can signify both God and creature, because a concept is also a sign, and is not of the essence of God and creature. If *one word* can signify the wisdom of God and creature because it is a sign of both, why cannot *one concept* signify in the same way, since it too is a sign of both?

Whenever we abstract from the imperfection of the creature, the resulting concept can be applied equally to God and creature. If I say: Some being is wise,
and again: Some being is wise,

⁸⁰ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. GG: "Alio modo, quia scil. est aliquid unum quod aequaliter respicit illa, et isto modo dico quod Deus et creatura in aliquo parificantur. Illud tamen unum non est intrinsecum Deo nec creaturae. Unde sicut non est aliquid inconveniens Deum et creaturas parificari in aliqua voce aequae primo Deum et creaturam significante, quia illa vox non est aliquid de essentia Dei vel creaturae, ita non est inconveniens Deum et creaturam parificari in aliquo conceptu univoco, quia ille conceptus univocus non est de essentia Dei nec creaturae."

⁸¹ Cf. Chapter I, notes 4, 5.

which of these propositions refers to God and which to creature? Both of them have ignored the imperfections which go with the concept of the concrete thing. We do not know which refers to God. The concept regards either creature or non-creature. What is left in the concept with all its imperfection removed says *perfection*, and this can be attributed to God — in so far as anything can be predicated of God and suppose for Him.⁸²

But there is a difference. A word is a *conventional* sign imposed by man to signify something.⁸³ Therefore, it can signify *different* things. The Latin word *canis* has been chosen to signify a dog and a certain constellation. The concept, however, is a *natural* sign, and cannot signify two *different* beings, according to Ockham. The concept "man" signifies any rational animal. Another concept is needed to signify the picture of man. One word "man" signifies both, but one concept cannot do so because the two objects are entirely *different*.

Should we not argue the same regarding God and creature? Obviously, there is a greater difference between them than between man and his photograph. Why isn't the concept of God's wisdom "qualitatively" different from man's wisdom? Then we would have two concepts for God and creature, and that would be the end of univocal predication for them, since unity of concept is essential to univocity.

The reason is that we begin with created wisdom. All created wisdom is imperfect, capable of increase, etc. If we take the concept of wisdom as found in man, we have a concept of imperfect wisdom.

⁸² Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. S: "Eodem modo tenet alia ratio de remotione imperfectionis et (sic!) sapientia creaturae et attribuendo sibi quid est perfectionis. Hoc non est nisi abstrahere a sapientia creata conceptum sapientiae, quia nullam rem creatam vel increatam abstrahit, quia quaelibet res creata dicit imperfectionem. Et ideo, abstrahere imperfectionem a sapientia creata non est nisi abstrahere conceptum sapientiae a creatura imperfecta, qui non plus respicit creaturam quam non creaturam, et illud quod resultat attribuendum est Deo per praedicationem, et illud dicitur esse perfectionis quatenus potest praedicari de Deo et supponere pro eo."

⁸³ Cf. p. 30.

But if we direct our attention only to the definition of wisdom, if we do not consider the notes "created", "capable of increase", etc., we have not *changed* the definition of wisdom. Consequently, it still signifies man. But since there is no imperfection in this definition, it can signify God also. In this way, one concept signifies the created wisdom of man and the uncreated wisdom of God. Therefore, Ockham can say that God is not wise (taking the definitions of *created* wisdom), and that God is wise (abstracting from the creature notes of the definition). He can say the wisdom of God is of a different formal character because it signifies something other than finite wisdom. At the same time, he can say the *same* formal character can be predicated of God and creature because he abstracts from the determinations of finite and infinite, etc., and he considers only the note "wisdom". Even if the objects differ in "quality", one concept signifies both objects.

This is Ockham's intention when he says that dissimilar things can be united in one concept. It is true to say that God is wise and that creature is wise. If we can abstract without *changing* the formal character, this formal character signifies both God and creature. If the definition must be changed to signify two things, we have two concepts and equivocal predication. "Man" has two definitions when it is predicated of Socrates and of his image. *Concretely*, therefore there is no common concept between God and creature.⁸⁴ In the abstract, if we leave out the consideration of "finite and infinite", there is a common concept.

For Ockham, this unity of concept is demanded if we are to have natural knowledge of God.⁸⁵ In this one concept, God and creature are signified because one concept signifies two *real* things: divine wisdom and human wisdom. The formal character of wisdom is

⁸⁴ Quod. II, 4: "Non praedicatur de eis aliquis conceptus concretus talis secundum eandem definitionem exprimentem quid nominis; ergo non univoce. Assumptum probatur. Nam sapiens praedicatur de creatura secundum istam definitionem, scil., habens sapientiam accidentalem. Et sapiens sic dictum non praedicatur de Deo, sed de Deo praedicatur secundum istam definitionem: existens sapientia ... Ergo, sapiens praedicatur aequivoce et non univoce de Deo et creatura."

⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter I, note 4.

attributed to both, but it is in neither *as such*. In other words, wisdom is not in creatures with all the imperfections removed. Neither is it in God without the determinations proper to Him. But we attribute it to God if we are to know Him at all.

What justifies this attribution? If something is *real* in God and creature, a common concept is justified. For univocity two *things* must be signified by one concept.⁸⁶ A stone is not a reality in God; it is in God *virtually*, since God is the cause of the stone. But it is not formally in God, and cannot be attributed *really* to God. If "stone" is predicated of God, it must be in a figurative sense, e. g., "The Lord . . . shall be . . . for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense." (Is. 8, 13—14) "Stone" corresponds to two concepts: a real rock and God under the aspect of frustrating someone. This is equivocal predication.

Stone is virtually in God as the cause of the stone in about the same way as "health" is in food, since food is the cause of health in man. It is not only because God is the cause of wisdom in creatures that we call God wise. If that were so, we would also have to call God a stone, material substance, etc.

The difference is that wisdom is in God really. Not created wisdom, of course, since wisdom in God and creature is concretely of a different nature; it is objectively different. They are dissimilar in reality. But when we abstract and consider only the definition of wisdom without its intrinsic modes, we attribute it to God and creature, though in this state it exists in neither. The creature has it surrounded by imperfections; God has it — or rather *is* it — in the most perfect manner possible.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Cf. pp. 51, 79—81.

⁸⁷ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. S: "Nisi enim posset talis conceptus abstrahi a creatura, modo non plus per sapientiam creaturae deveniretur in cognitionem sapientiae divinae, puta quod Deus sit sapiens, quam per cognitionem lapidis devenitur ad cognoscendum quod Deus sit lapis; quia sicut sapientia creaturae continetur virtualiter in Deo, ita lapis. Unde nonobstante quod tanta sit distinctio inter sapientiam Dei et sapientiam creaturae, sicut inter Deum et lapidem, nec plus sunt eiusdem rationis

This example of wisdom gives us an illustration of univocal predication of first intention. Both subject and predicate (God is wise, and creature is wise), are predicated about things which are not signs. God and creature suppose personally since they exercise their significative function of indicating the realities of which they are signs. "Wise" also supposes personally; it stands for the realities of which it is a sign, viz., the beings signified by the subject. Since there is one concept "wise" predicated, the predication is univocal. This would be impossible if "stone" were predicated of God and creature. In creature it would be predicated of a real rock; in God it would be predicated figuratively. Even in the abstract, "stone" cannot signify God literally, for it is in God only virtually. The formal character of stone does not correspond to a reality in God which is "qualitatively" the same as a created rock.

From this example we see that knowledge of God is not completely negative, as one might have suspected from the remark of St. John Damascene.⁸⁸ A reality, a positive entity, is attributed to God. Even though we do not know the quiddity of God *in se* (intuitively), we do know something *about* this quiddity. What that knowledge is, and how far it extends, still remains to be seen.

2. *God and creature are similar.* — Despite the infinite difference between God and creature, there is no doubt that Ockham holds one common, univocal concept signifying both. They are not similar

ex una parte quam alia, tamen a sapientia creaturae potest abstrahi conceptus communis et a lapide non."

Here again Ockham is not far from the Thomistic position: "Though it is true that what is said of God and the creature is true because of the relation of the creature to God as its cause, it is not only because God is the cause of goodness in the creature that we call God good, were that so, we should have to call God material substance, because He is the cause of all material substances; moreover, the goodness of God would include in its meaning the goodness of the creature, just as the healthiness of the animal does that of the medicine.

"The healthy medicine contains virtually the health of the animal, that is, the medicine has the power of making the animal healthy." — Byles, W. Esdaile, *Analogy of being*, in *New Sch.* vol. 16, 1942, p. 339.

⁸⁸ Cf. p. 86.

(of the same formal character) in the concrete. But in the abstract, if we attend only to the definition of some perfection, we can form one concept which signifies the two. This is not a mere deduction from the foregoing text. Ockham says explicitly in another passage that God and creature *are similar*. This text will introduce a new notion of similarity. From it we will also see his justification for unity of concept as well as the content and extent of the same concept. This similarity is treated in his tract about creatures as images of the Trinity:

"An image, as far as creatures are concerned, is so-called on account of the conformity of the same formal character in that of which it is an image, and in the image that leads to the recollection of that of which it is the image. That creature is most properly called an image of God which has something very similar to God, in such a way that there will be something precisely univocal to God and to that creature. Since a rational creature is of this kind, therefore, it alone is called an image of God . . . For, it is evident that entity is not predicated univocally of God and irrational creature alone, but also of rational creature. And so it is universally of those things which are predicated according to their proper sense, and not only according to similarity . . . For, it is evident that, just as form, beauty, goodness, truth, causative, perfection, pertain to God and to certain irrational creatures, so they also pertain to rational creatures; but many things belonging to God, not only according to similarity, but also according to their proper sense, are precisely common to God and to rational creatures, such as, to be intellectual, capable of knowing, capable of willing, mercy, justice, wisdom, and so of many others. Therefore, in this way, the rational creature is especially assimilated to God. Consequently, in the impossible supposition that wisdom, Word, love, etc., were accidents in God as they are in creatures, then a rational, created substance, produced and formed according to such accidents to the image and likeness of God according to His own accidents — as the artisan forms a statue in the figure, colors and other accidents to the similarity of Hercules and of the accidents of Hercules —

this creature, as a created substance, would have accidents of the same character as the accidents of God. Thus, it would be truly an image leading to the recollection of God, just as the statue leads to the recollection of Hercules. Therefore, since God is truly wisdom, person, Word, love, mercy, truth, etc., so much more eminently and so properly as though these were accidents in God, and, since they are truly in rational creature alone, therefore, rational creature alone can be called in some way an image of God, although not so perfectly as it would be if there were accidents both in God and in the creature.”⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 10. D: “Imago secundum quod invenitur in creaturis dicitur propter conformitatem alicuius eiusdem rationis in illo cuius est imago et in imagine quod natum est ducere in recordationem illius cuius est imago. Illa creatura maxime proprie dicitur imago Dei quae habet aliquid Deo simillimum, ita quod erit praecise commune univocum Deo et illi creaturae. Et quia creatura rationalis est huiusmodi, ideo ipsa sola dicitur imago Dei. . . . Patet enim quod entitas non dicitur univoce de Deo et creatura irrationali quacumque tantum, sed etiam de creatura rationali, et ita est universaliter de omnibus quae dicuntur secundum proprietatem et non tantum secundum similitudinem . . . Patet enim quod sicut forma, pulchritudo et bonitas, veritas, causativum, perfectio competunt Deo et quibusdam creaturis irrationalibus, ita competunt creaturis rationalibus; multa autem convenientia Deo non tantum secundum similitudinem sed etiam secundum proprietatem sunt praecise communia Deo et creaturis rationalibus, sicut est esse intellectuale, posse intelligere, posse velle, misericordia, iustitia, sapientia, et sic de aliis multis. Et ideo sic creatura rationalis maxime assimilatur Deo. Unde si per impossibile, sapientia, verbum, dilectio et huiusmodi essent accidentia tam in Deo quam in creaturis, tunc substantia rationalis creata, producta et formata secundum talia accidentia ad imaginem vel similitudinem Dei secundum sua accidentia — sicut modo artifex format statuam figurae, coloribus et ceteris accidentibus ad similitudinem Herculis et accidentium Herculis, — illa in quantum substantia creata, haberet accidentia eiusdem rationis cum accidentibus Dei. Et ita vere esset imago ducens in recordationem Dei, sicut modo statua ducit in recordationem Herculis. Et ideo, quia ita vere et eminentius et ita proprie Deus est sapientia, persona, verbum dilectio, misericordia, et veritas, et sic de aliis, sicut si ista essent accidentia in Deo, et ita vere sunt in creatura rationali sola, ideo creatura rationalis sola potest dici aliquo modo imago Dei, quamvis non ita perfecte sicut si essent accidentia tam in Deo quam in creatura.”

The text begins with a definition of image *among creatures*. An image among creatures must have something of the same character (similarity) if it is to represent something else. An image of Hercules must be made according to the accidents of Hercules: color, courage, great strength, and all the things which are proper to Hercules. This is similarity in the second degree, *imperfect* similarity. The statue or image is dissimilar (of a different character) from Hercules in essentials, but similar in accidentals. That gives a basis for univocity.⁹⁰

With this definition in mind, Ockham continues, that creature is more an image of God which is *more similar* to God than any other creature. But rational creature is more similar. Therefore rational creature is an image of God. What does "similarity" mean here? Ockham has just rejected similarity in the sense of "same formal character" in the concrete, so it must mean some other community.

In the abstract, it is true, God and creature are conceived in one concept, in one formal *ratio*, as if they were similar, in the order of being. But why? We see the reason easily enough, let us say, in the concept of two horses. Here we have *objective* perfections which are concretely of the same quality. Therefore they can be conceived in one *formal ratio* signifying both horses. But God and creature are concretely and objectively different. When we abstract from the intrinsic modes of the two, the "qualities" of God are still *objectively* different from the qualities of the creature. Why can I conceive them as if they were the same? What justification is there *in re* for putting objective, infinite wisdom in the same concept with objective finite wisdom? That is the question we must face.

It is not without importance that Ockham, in his first proposition, speaks of the "same formal character" when he talks of image among *creatures*. In the same proposition, however, when he speaks of creature as an image of God, he speaks of *similarity*. That seems to indicate that he can form one concept between God and creature, even though God and creature are really dissimilar.

⁹⁰ Cf. pp. 73, 75—76.

God and creature are absolutely different. Still, if God is already known, some perfections of creatures can be called "similar" to the perfections of God, although they are of an entirely different character (dissimilar). What remains on which to base such a statement? There is *similarity of proportion*. This proportion must say that something real has a relation of dependence on something else. For this reason, it can be attributed to that on which it depends, *provided* there is no imperfection implied in its formal character, and provided both extremes of the relation are real.

Since we say "something real", we exclude figurative predication, such as "health". Although "health" in man is dependent on food, still "health" is not real in food. It is predicated figuratively of food, and needs two concepts for man and food. Wisdom, however, is real in God *and* creature.

For this similarity of proportion between God and creature, the exclusion of *imperfection* from the formal character is also necessary. In this way "stone" is excluded from univocal predication. "Stone" cannot be attributed to God really because it is material. "Wisdom" has no imperfection in its definition. If we strip off all the *de facto* imperfections found in created wisdom, we can attribute to God really what is left. The reason is that the wisdom with which we began (in creature) is dependent on the wisdom of God as its cause. This is similarity of proportion.

This proportion is simple, that is, there are two terms. Now proportion causes a relation in the same field. In other words, the two terms must be adequated to each other in some way. But God and creature are not adequated. How can there be a proportion between them?

But there is adequation in the *concept* by the very fact that all imperfection is removed from the definition. We are dealing with a definition which does not imply imperfection and which applies to a creature. We do not need a *new* definition to include God under it. When we ignore or remove imperfections found in concrete wisdom, we do not *change* the formal character of wisdom. There is adequacy in this concept — adequacy in the sense of proportion. This knowledge is common; it is not proper either to God or to creature. If we wish

to have proper knowledge of God we must add to the concept all perfection.⁹¹ If we want proper cognition of a creature, we have to add some imperfection to the concept, e. g., capable of increase.

The predication of the foregoing common concept is usually called analogy of proportion.⁹² Ockham however constantly identifies analogous predication either with univocity or with equivocation. The reason is always based on the unity or plurality of concepts. For Ockham there is no medium between them. In the present case of analogy of attribution or proportion, he identifies it with the third degree of univocity.⁹³

Here there seems to be a nominal difference only between Ockham and the Thomists. Feuling⁹⁴ says that the consequence of St. Thomas' doctrine is that univocal beings are only logically univocal, and cannot be ontologically univocal. Ockham says: "Universally nothing on the part of things is univocal to anything else."⁹⁵ Where the Thomists reduce this kind of proportion to analogy of proportionality on account of implicit logical univocity, Ockham reduces the same kind of ontological analogy to logical univocity. Possibly the reason is that the Thomists demand "parification" of the *res* and the concept for univocity, as Ockham pointed out.⁹⁶

⁹¹ Cf. note 82.

⁹² Cf. Van de Woestyne, Zacharias, O. F. M., *Cursus philosophicus*, vol. 1. ed. alt. Malignes, typ. S. Francisci, 1932, p. 34.

⁹³ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. R: "Analogia accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro conceptu univoco tertio modo dicto."

The "tertio modo dicto" is found on pp. 82 ff.

⁹⁴ Feuling, *Hauptfragen der Metaphysik*. Salzburg, 1936, pp. 94—95. Cf. St. Thomas, *Metaph.* VII. L. 4. 1331 (ed. Marietti), 1935, p. 396.

⁹⁵ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. U: "Universaliter nihil quod est a parte rei est univocum quibuscumque."

⁹⁶ Cf. p. 85. This would explain why the Thomists shy away from univocity. Take for instance this statement: "It would be worse to say that God is good because He contains formally the goodness which He causes in the creature, as the fire contains formally the heat which restores your good temper on a cold day; that would be blasphemy." — Byles, op. cit. p. 339.

Ockham, of course, does not fall under the "blasphemy". The question seems to come down to this: can we abstract from the intrinsic modes or not. In presenting the problem both sides wish to solve the same difficulties (see note 87), but part company right here.

Prior to this, we said Ockham holds two objects are objectively, really similar in the concrete.⁹⁷ This real similarity was taken as the basis of univocity. Now we are quoting Ockham as saying that things are never univocal *a parte rei*. How then can they be *really* similar? The explanation is that we *conceive* things as univocal *in so far as we know* them. This is an imperfect concept. Objectively, things are always different because the things compared are entirely singular, unique.⁹⁸ But our imperfect *concept* says these things are univocal, or even equal,⁹⁹ because of what it perceives.

Now to continue with our analogy of proportion, or in ockhamistic terminology, with univocity in the third degree. The things compared are different in the concrete. Still, one concept is attributed to both on account of a real relation of dependence of the same formal character. Such a unity of concept is possible, however, only after the intrinsic modes which differentiate them have been removed from the concept. This "real" relation means that something in each extreme is real as the *basis* for the concept of relation — not that the *relation itself* is a distinct reality in the extremes. Instead, the concept of similarity is predicated *conjunctively* of the two extremes.¹⁰⁰

Created wisdom is proportionate to uncreated wisdom as an effect is proportionate to its cause. This seems to be Ockham's idea about the meaning of similarity when the two things are of a different character. The relation of causality is the basis of proportion. In this sense, similarity looks to causal dependence. Wisdom signifies the perfection of intellectual existence (without imperfection), and is attributed both to God and creature. Although wisdom is different in God and creature, the formal character of wisdom is attributed to both. God is eminently wise, as Ockham mentioned in our key text. He is super-wise. Therefore wisdom does not exist or not. In presenting the problem both sides wish to solve the same difficulties (see note 87), but part company right here.

⁹⁷ Cf. pp. 67—71.

⁹⁸ Cf. pp. 22—23.

⁹⁹ Cf. pp. 64—66.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Chapter I, note 44.

as *such* in God or in creature,¹⁰¹ because it exists with its intrinsic modes. But it is predicated of both because of the relation of dependence (similarity) between real created wisdom and real uncreated wisdom.

Ockham does not define similarity taken in this sense. But perhaps the following can be formulated *ad mentem* Ockham: Similarity is a relation of proportion founded in some dependence according to the same formal character taken abstractly. We say "founded on" to eliminate rhetorical figures, such as the one about the stone. "According to the same formal character" is inserted because, if the notes of a definition must be changed to correspond to an object, there is no similarity, but *mere* dependence. The stone depends on God, but the stone is not similar to God because the formal character of "stone" cannot be predicated really of God.¹⁰²

This is the meaning we are giving to "similarity" in our key text. Real similarity in this text looks to the comparison of creatures with God. The same formal character looks to the creatures among themselves, because Ockham is taking it *concretely*. It is evident that similarity, in the sense of notes of the same formal character in the concrete, cannot be predicated of God and creature. Ockham confirms this in his unreal supposition: it is impossible, but let us suppose that those things which are proper to God and to rational creature, such as love, wisdom, etc., are accidents in God. They are really accidents in creatures. In this supposition, the creature would be an image of God, similar to Him, *in the same way* as the statue of Hercules is an image, a similarity, of Hercules. This similarity

¹⁰¹ Cf. note 72.

¹⁰² Again we find Ockham close to St. John Damascene; for the latter also attributes things to God on account of dependence: "Deus itaque, et mens, et ratio, et spiritus, et sapientia, et potentia dicitur, ut horum auctor." — *op. cit.* c. 12, p. 847C.

Here we say there is no similarity if we must change the definition, and consequently there will be equivocal predication. In Chapter IV we will say "health" in man and food is *similar*, but the definition of health is changed to signify the two, and therefore, the predication is equivocal. There is no contradiction because similarity in the second case, of man and food, is *rhetorical*, figurative, it is unreal similarity.

of the statue is perfect similarity because all the accidents are of the same character in both. But this does not hold for God and creature because there are no accidents in God. Therefore, between God and creature we do not find perfect similarity. Still, there is some community between them. Therefore, the creature "in some way" is an image of God. God is eminently what the creature has; there is some kind of community or "similarity" between them. This community must be one of cause and effect, a similarity of dependence of real things. We know this similarity only in some formal character arrived at by perfect abstraction.

The meaning is, therefore, that things are common in some way when the proper perfections of God are compared with the properties of a rational creature. That which is proper to God is also common to creature in a certain fashion, but not so perfectly as would be the case if this "property" of God were an accident in God, as it actually is in creature. This is seen especially in two of his examples: capable of knowing and capable of willing. They certainly are not "properties" of God, but are proper to rational creatures. They can be *compared* with God's perfections which *are* proper to Him: knowledge and volition. The wisdom of God is altogether different from creature's wisdom; still, there is something common. The wisdom of creature is similar when compared with other creatures (same accidents). And afterwards, Ockham says clearly that the community between God and creature is not of the same type, viz., accidents. In his unreal condition he states: "Therefore, in the impossible supposition that wisdom . . . were an accident in God as it is in creature, then the created rational substance, produced and formed according to such accidents to the image and similarity of God . . . *would have* accidents of the *same character* as the accidents of God." But the condition is not fulfilled. Therefore, rational creature is "in some way" an image of God, but not so perfectly as it would be if the supposition were realized. Thus, we must conclude that Ockham uses "similarity" in this text for something common, but of a different type. Similarity consists in the relation of dependence between real things regarding the same formal character.

3. *Content of the common concept* — We have already seen that the concept common to God and creature is based on a proportion regarding the same formal character. The proportion is in the relation of causality between two real things. This community or similarity is found wherever it is possible to predicate one concept of God and creature. Now we want to look into this idea a bit more in detail. What does this common concept tell us?

Negatively, we can say with Belmond that God and creature are *not nothing*. The common concept signifies the existence of both.¹⁰³ Wolter expresses it as "that to which existence is not repugnant" — the concept is quidditative, but is enuniated in terms of existence.¹⁰⁴ This is being in its unrestricted form. It applies to absolutely all things: past, present, future, actual and possible, outside or inside the mind. Ockham takes up this formula of Scotus (*id cui non repugnat esse*), and says definitely that the concept does not predicate the same reality of God and creature. As long as we speak of the *esse creaturae* we are speaking concretely. In the concrete, even "that to which existence is not repugnant" is not the same in God and creature.¹⁰⁵ In the concrete, *no* concept is common to God

¹⁰³ Belmond, S., *Études sur la philosophie de Duns Scot. I. Dieu*. Paris, Beauchesne, 1913, p. 344: "L'univocité scotiste . . . n'est pas, pour Scot, l'aperception d'un fond réel — entitas — commun à Dieu et aux créatures, isolé par l'esprit des différences concrètes. L'on aurait beau protester: *mais l'univocité, c'est cela même!* — Car ce qui est en cause ici, c'est uniquement le sens que Scot attache à cette expression. De plus, nos contradicteurs ne sauraient nier l'indétermination inhérente dans la pensée à la raison formelle de l'existence et des attributs simples."

Again on pp. 334—335 he says: "L'être indéterminé, *transcendental ou univoque* de Duns Scot, c'est l'affirmation du *non-néant* indépendamment des modalités multiples du réel."

¹⁰⁴ Wolter, Allan B., O. F. M., *Transcendentals and their function in the metaphysics of Duns Scotus*. St. Bonaventure, N. Y. Franciscan Institute, 1946, p. 182.

¹⁰⁵ Ord. ed. Boehner, d. 36. q. 1. O: "Haec est falsa: esse existere cognitum creaturae est idem realiter cum Deo, quia implicatur quod esse existere creaturae sit idem realiter cum Deo. Propter idem, si esse ibi stet pro omni illo cui non repugnat esse in rerum natura, adhuc est falsa,

and creature. If the concept considers the intrinsic modes of finite and infinite, there is no univocal predication or similarity of proportion.

What is the *positive* content of the common concept? When we abstract from the intrinsic modes, why are we justified in predicating "similarity" of God and creature? There are two reasons for it:

a) *Existence* — Both created *esse* and uncreated *esse* are realities. After all imperfection is removed from created *esse*, its actuality is still there. This concept signifies creature's being, and it signifies the *esse* of God — after His intrinsic modes are removed from the concept.

But Ockham says there is no distinction between essence and existence. Both are indifferent to *esse* and *non-esse*.¹⁰⁶ Essence

quia haec est falsa: Esse creaturae est idem realiter cum Deo. Nam esse creaturae non potest esse aliud realiter a creatura."

See also *ibid.* G. ff.

¹⁰⁶ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, III. 2. c. 27: "Ideo dicendum est, quod entitas et existentia non sunt duae res, sed ista duo vocabula res et esse idem et eadem significant, sed unum nominaliter et aliud verbaliter. Propter quod unum non potest convenienter poni loco alterius, quia non habent eadem officia. Unde esse potest poni inter duos terminos sic dicendo: Homo est animal. Non sic est de hoc nomine res vel entitas. Unde esse significat ipsam rem. Sed significat causam primam simplicem, quando dicitur de ea non significando ipsam ab alio dependere. Quando autem praedicatur de aliis, significat ipsas res dependentes et ordinatas ad causam primam, et hoc quia istae res non sunt res, nisi sint sic dependentes et ordinatae ad causam primam, sicut non sunt aliter. Unde quando homo non dependet ad Deum, sicut tunc non est, ita tunc non est homo. Et ideo non est plus imaginandum, quod essentia est indifferens ad esse et non esse, quam quod est indifferens ad essentiam et non essentiam. Quia sicut essentia potest esse et non esse, ita essentia potest esse essentia et non esse essentia. Et ideo talia argumenta: Essentia potest esse et non esse, igitur esse distinguitur ab essentia: Essentia potest esse sub opposito esse, igitur essentia distinguitur ab esse, non valent. Sicut nec talia valent: Essentia potest non esse essentia et potest esse essentia, igitur essentia differt ab essentia; essentia potest esse sub opposito essentiae, igitur essentia differt ab essentia. Et ideo non plus sunt essentia et esse duae res quam essentia et essentia sunt duae res; et ita esse non est alia res ab entitate rei ...

and existence signify precisely the same reality. The distinction between them is purely grammatical. Their meaning does not vary, but their extension may.¹⁰⁷ Sometimes the terms are not interchangeable, but this is because their grammatical function is not the same, e. g., we can say: "Man *is* an animal", but in this proposition we cannot substitute "thing" for "is", although the signification of these two words is the same. Ockham refuses to project grammatical differences into his metaphysics.

The only difference between these terms is that "essence" is the abstract form of "being". The concrete terms "being", "thing", "individual", have the same meaning as the abstract terms "reality", "essence", "existence."¹⁰⁸ Let us put this idea in the form of examples. We can point to Socrates and say any one of the following propositions:

This is a being.

This is.

This exists.

This is an essence.

This is an existence.

All of these propositions mean the same. The terms employed are of first intention predicated in personal supposition. Therefore, "is" signifies that there is something which verifies the proposition. Consequently, "is" has the existential import of "being"; it signifies reality. This explanation agrees with Aristotle's definition of truth and falsity:

"Causa autem quare Sancti et alii dicunt Deum esse ipsum esse, est quia Deus sic est esse quod non potest non esse; immo necessario est esse, nec ab alio est. Creatura autem sic est esse, quod non est necessario esse, sicut nec necessario est res, et ab alio est, sicut ab alio est res effective. Et ideo non differunt in Deo quod est et quo est, quia non est aliquid aliud a Deo quo Deus est; sed in creatura differunt, quia illud quod est creatura et quo est creatura sunt distincta simpliciter, sicut Deus et creatura differunt."

The same doctrine is found in *Quod. ed. Boehner, II, 7.*

¹⁰⁷ Boehner, *op. cit.* in *Rev. Met.* p. 76. This explanation of essence and existence is taken from his article, pp. 59—86.

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.* pp. 69, 85. The abstract and concrete forms are synonyms just as we saw they are with "animal" and "animality"; see p. 43.

"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not, that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false."¹⁰⁹

Ockham is well aware of the view which postulates a real distinction between essence and existence in creatures in order to preserve the radical difference between God and creature. He insists that we can say, "a creature *is* its essence and existence", and still admit this difference. When we say that a creature *is* its existence, we imply its dependence on God from Whom it received existence, because the subject, "creature", shows that "existence" includes the finite mode "*ab alio*". In consequence, there is a clear distinction between God and creature; for, when we say that God *is* His existence, the subject "God" shows that "existence" includes the mode "*a se*". Ockham points out the distinction between "*quod est*" and "*quo est*" in the creature, and says that this is a real distinction. A creature is *what* it is — it is itself. But a creature is also *from* something else. This latter distinction, however, is a far cry from the real distinction between essence and existence.

If someone should think that the concept of existence in general is the formal character of existence, then he must exclude the real mode of existence. For Ockham would say: as the essence of God and creature is not the same, so neither is their real existence the same. For by essence is signified the same real thing as is signified by existence.¹¹⁰ The positive content of our concept says only that God and creature are *conceived* similar in existence, because God and creature are real things in the relation of dependence.

While it is true that, in the abstract, God and creature are conceived in one concept, with one formal character signifying both, God and creature are not the same *objectively*. Ockham is not a pantheist. Similarity of the same *ratio formalis* can be predicated

¹⁰⁹ τὸ μὲν γὰρ λέγειν τὸ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἢ τὸ μὴ ὄν εἶναι ψεῦδος, τὸ δὲ τὸ ὄν εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ εἶναι ἀληθές, ὥστε καὶ ὁ λέγων εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἀληθεύσαι ἢ ψεύσεσθαι. — *Metaph.* III. 7, ed. Bekker, vol. 2, p. 1011b, 26.

¹¹⁰ "Idem omnino significatur et consignificatur per unum et per reliquum." Quod. ed. Boehner, II, 7.

of them if the intrinsic modes are ignored in the concept. But when we try to find the ontological basis for this concept, we must say that existence and proportion underlie the similarity. Now, even existence is different in God and creature. Therefore, we must fall back on proportion.

b) *Proportion regarding the same notes* — There is a relation of dependence, for instance, between the *esse* of God and that of creature, because the *esse* of creature is the effect of the *esse* of God as its cause.¹¹¹ Consequently, even though they are of a different reality, we can form one concept of them. Entitatively they are dissimilar, but after we remove all imperfection from the concept of *esse*, this concept signifies created and uncreated *esse*, on account of the relation between them.

This real proportion between two existing realities which are concretely different *is conceived as the same character*. The reason is that the definition, e. g., of wisdom, is not changed when predicated of God; the mind attends only to that which does not say imperfection in the concept, and neglects the intrinsic modes of perfection. This is not a mere *flatus vocis*, not a mere *logical* attribution. This concept corresponds to two realities in so far as a concept can signify God.¹¹²

But if the quiddity of divine wisdom is unknown, how can we justify the predication of wisdom about God? Ockham lines up with Scotus and St. Anselm behind the formula for pure perfections: "*melius est ipsum quam non ipsum.*"¹¹³ If a creature has a perfection

¹¹¹ Cf. Byles, op. cit. p. 339.

¹¹² "Illud dicitur esse perfectionis quatenus potest praedicari de Deo et supponere pro eo." — cf. note 82.

¹¹³ Scotus says: "in quolibet habente ipsam melius est ipsam habere quam non ipsam habere." — Quod. q. 5. n. 13. vol. 25, p. 216a.

St. Anselm's text is found in the *Monologium*, c. 15. P. L. vol. 158, pp. 162—164: "Et quidem si quis singula diligenter intueatur, quidquid est praeter relativa, aut tale est, ut ipsum omnino melius sit, quam non ipsum; aut tale, ut non ipsum in aliquo melius sit, quam ipsum. Ipsum autem et non ipsum, non aliud hic intelligo, quam verum non verum, corpus non corpus, et his similia. Melius quidem est omnino aliquid quam non ipsum: ut, sapiens quam non ipsum sapiens, id est, melius est sapiens

which is not limited in its very formal character, the existence of this perfection can be predicated of God, because it is better for the most perfect Being to have it than not to have it. Otherwise, perhaps a being could be conceived with a perfection which God lacks. For God is "that than which nothing is better, prior, or more perfect."¹¹⁴

We can conclude that, even though we do not know the divine essence *in se*, we still know many things *about* it, *circa naturam Dei*. Neither do we know the nature of electricity, but from its effects, we can conclude to many things about its nature; we can predicate several positive quidditative notions about it.

In order to forestall a possible objection, let us examine the term "proportion". Why do we use this term when speaking of the ontological basis of similarity between God and creature? Is there a proportion between God and creature? Or, is the word "proportion" badly chosen to express the relation between infinite and finite? It is a term borrowed from mathematics, and for this reason, it seems, to suit Ockham's doctrine. If its usage shows up Ockham's mathematical mentality,¹¹⁵ it cannot be helped.

In mathematics, we take the definition of a circle, and apply it to all circles, regardless of their diameters. But can we speak of an infinite circle? Are these two terms compatible? Yes, they are, in mathematics. "Infinite" negates *limits* of circle, but it does

quam non sapiens. Quamvis enim iustus non sapiens melior videatur, quam non iustus sapiens, non tamen melius simpliciter est, non sapiens quam sapiens; omne enim non sapiens, simpliciter inquantum non sapiens, est minus quam sapiens; quia omne non sapiens melius esset, si esset sapiens. Similiter omnino melius est verum quam non ipsum, id est, quam non verum; et iustum quam non iustum; et vivit quam non vivit . . .

"Quare necesse est eam esse viventem, sapientem, potentem et omnipotentem, veram, iustam, beatam, aeternam, et quidquid similiter absolute melius quam non ipsum. Quid ergo quaeratur amplius quid summa illa sit natura, si manifestum est quid omnium sit, aut quid omnium non sit?"

Ockham's text will follow in note 117.

¹¹⁴ Quod. I, 1: "Id quod nihil est melius, prius vel perfectius."

¹¹⁵ Cf. p. 64.

not negate the formal character "circle". The same definition holds for finite and infinite circle.

The comparison is not perfect, but it is only a comparison, an illustration. In a similar way, we take a perfection found in creatures. We study its bare definition, and find that it does not necessarily imply imperfection. Then, we project that definition into God. This definition is now a univocal notion, common to God and creature. Now, if we add to this definition the note "infinite," we do not change the definition. Finite and infinite perfection is defined in the same way. Wolter reduces the problem to a question of the "quantity" of the perfection, rather than to the kind or quality of the perfection: "'Quantity' here is obviously not to be understood in the sense of predicamental quantity, but rather in the sense of representing an answer to the question 'how much?' Likewise quality is understood in the sense of an answer to the question 'what kind of being?' This quantity is more frequently referred to as *quantitas virtualis* or *magnitudo*."¹¹⁶

4. *Extent of the common concept* — The most perfect conceivable Being has all the perfections which do not involve imperfection in their concept. "Man" and "matter" imply imperfection in their very notion; these concepts are not applicable to God. Outside of this restriction we can collect three classes of concepts which are predicable of God, and common to creature:

a) *Pure perfections* — There is similarity of existence and proportion between God and creature in the so-called pure perfections. These are perfections whose formal character does not include some imperfection. When we say "A" is wise, it does not follow that

¹¹⁶ Wolter, op. cit. p. 153. Ockham has this idea in the Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 19. q. 1. K: "Magnitudo vel magnum quadrupliciter accipi potest, scil., largissime, et sic idem est quod perfectio vel perfectum, et sic loquitur Beatus Augustinus, VI. De Trinitate, quod in his quae non mole magna sunt est idem melius quod maius esse. Et isto modo quaelibet res est magna vel magnitudo quaedam . . . Et sic loquitur Beatus Augustinus quando dicit quod Deus est sine qualitate bonus, et sine quantitate magnus."

This is exactly the same as Scotus. Cf. Oxon. I. d. 19. q. 1. n. 6, vol. 10, p. 171 B.

"A" is imperfect. But if we say "A" is extended, or material, or human, it does follow that "A" is imperfect. These latter concepts are common only to creatures. They can be applied at best only figuratively to God. But goodness, wisdom, justice, love, etc., do not imply any imperfection. Such concepts signify God, and a univocal concept of God and creature is possible.¹¹⁷

b) *Convertible transcendentals* — The same is to be said of the convertible transcendentals. Like any other concept, unity, goodness and truth are different in God and creature. After the intrinsic modes are removed, however, one concept predicable of both can be made. There is one slight difference between these transcendentals and the other common concepts. Ordinarily a term of first intention signifies a thing which is not a sign. The transcendentals are terms of first intention which signify simultaneously the thing and the sign.¹¹⁸

c) *Being* — Finally, we can predicate being univocally of God and creature. *Conceptually*, "being" is more common than "God."¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 3. P.: "Aliter accipitur perfectio simpliciter large et improprie pro omni conceptu ad quem consequentia formali non sequitur illud esse imperfectum de quo verificatur; sicut non sequitur formaliter, A est sapiens, ergo, A est imperfectum. Nec sequitur, A est bonum, ergo, A est imperfectum, et sic de multis talibus. Et tales perfectiones simpliciter sunt multae, et sunt attributa divina, et possunt competere creaturae quia sunt conceptus quidam communes de Deo et creatura. Et sic intelligit Anselmus quod in quolibet est melius ipsum quam non ipsum, scil., quia ex tali non sequitur formaliter illud esse imperfectum de quo verificatur, et ex quolibet sibi impossibili, sequitur formaliter ipsum esse imperfectum. Sicut ex hoc quod, A est sapiens, non sequitur formaliter quod A est imperfectum, et ex quolibet cui repugnat formaliter esse sapiens, sequitur formaliter ipsum esse imperfectum de quo verificatur, et ita aliquid esse eo melius."

¹¹⁸ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 11, line 68: "Nomina autem primae intentionis vocantur omnia alia nomina a praedictis, quae videl. significant aliquas res, quae non sunt signa nec consequentia talia signa, cuiusmodi sunt omnia talia: 'homo', 'animal', 'Sortes', 'Plato', 'albedo', 'album', 'ens', 'verum', 'bonum' et huiusmodi, quorum aliqua significant praecise res, quae non sunt signa nata supponere pro aliis, aliqua significant talia signa et simul cum hoc alias res."

¹¹⁹ Cf. p. 83.

Like the previous common concepts, being signifies two realities which are in proportion but different. On the one hand I can say, "A" is God; therefore, "A" is a being. Again I can say, "A" is a creature; therefore, "A" is a being. On the other hand, I cannot say, "A" is a being; therefore, "A" is God; nor, "A" is a being; therefore, "A" is a creature.¹²⁰

In this common concept, "being" surely signifies something existing. But the mode of existence itself is not the same for God and creature.¹²¹ God exists necessarily; creature exists contingently, and contingently in relation to God. Thus, in the final analysis, community or "similarity" between God and creature signifies the relation of real dependence of the creature on God. Because of this proportion we can form one concept of God and creature.

Perhaps someone will consider univocity as an attempt to solve the gnoseological problem, but not as an attempt to solve the metaphysical problem. Ockham considers this solution to be at the limit of both orders. We cannot penetrate further because *de facto God and creature are different*. Moreover, when we abstract the very intrinsic modes to conceive them as similar, we can do no more in the conceptual order.

To those who would say that there must be something *partly* the same between God and creature, Ockham would answer that this is true in the sense that every effect is contained in some way in its cause, but not in the sense that every effect is partly of the

¹²⁰ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. GG: "Ab univoco ad univocatum est bona consequentia, et non convertitur, et quod aliquid sit prius prioritate tali ipsi Deo, non est inconveniens. Isto enim modo potest dici quod aliqua vox prolata est prior Deo, quia in voce etiam ista est bona consequentia: A est Deus; ergo, A est ens, et non econverso. Ergo, illa vox communior est quam Deus."

Cf. Toohey, op. cit. p. 110. It is true that Ockham speaks of a *vox* here and not of a concept. But we can apply his own argument (p. 87): if the word which is a sign can be more common, so can the concept which is also a sign. Besides, we can argue for "being" the same as for the other common concepts: we do not *change* the definition of being when we apply it to God. Finally, Ockham will say later that the *concept* "being" is common to God and creature (Chapter V, note 56).

¹²¹ Cf. pp. 101—104.

same formal character as its cause. For, we know that any formal character of any perfection attributed to God is different from the formal character of any perfection attributed to a creature. It is evident that matter, for instance, is not contained in any real sense at all in God. In other words, matter corresponds to God *only* in the note of *existence*, and existence itself is different. Matter is a contingent reality; God is necessary. The same must be said of wisdom, although wisdom is a reality proper both to God and to creature. When the wisdom of God and the wisdom of creature are compared, the one is again necessary, the other contingent. So it is with all the notes common to both. There remains only a proportion on account of the relation of effect to cause regarding the same formal character; uncreated wisdom created (caused) created wisdom different from Itself.

Another way to illustrate the meaning of Ockham is in terms of *representation*. A concept is said to be *similar* to the object conceived,¹²² even though concept and object are of a different nature. The concept is something spiritual; the object is often material. The concept is the effect; the object is the cause (partially). The concept is accidental; the object is often a substance. They are not of the same nature. Still, they are called similar in the sense of representation. They are dissimilar in the sense of *alterius rationis*, and yet, the concept represents the object. Ockham gives us an example of such dissimilarity between an image and that of which it is an image. Supposing an ox had feet altogether dissimilar to the feet of other oxen. The imprint left in the ground would distinctly represent to anyone knowing this ox the distinction of this ox from other oxen. In the same way, an image of Hercules represents Hercules and not Jupiter to anyone who has distinct knowledge of Hercules.¹²³

¹²² Cf. pp. 21—22 and Chapter I, note 18.

¹²³ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 9. B: "Si unus bos haberet pedes omnino dissimiles ab aliis pedibus aliorum boum, vestigium derelictum ita distincte representaret cognoscenti distinctiones illius pedis ab aliis pedibus hunc bovem; sicut modo de facto imago Herculis representat habenti notitiam distinctam de Hercule ipsum Herculem et non Iovem."

Between the track left in the ground and the ox who made the track, there is nothing of the same character; nevertheless, the track represents the ox. If the track is peculiar to one certain ox, it will even distinguish this ox from any other one. In this sense, a concept is similar to its object.¹²⁴ Now we are ready for the point of comparison: as the concept represents the object, so the creature represents God. As the concept is the image of the object, so the creature is an image of God.

Another illustration might be taken from television. On the screen we see a sport event, a drama, a variety program, which is really nothing but visible rays of light. These rays were converted from electromagnetic waves. The electromagnetic waves in turn were changed over from rays of light in the studio. The transmitted image we see on the screen faithfully "represents" some person, scene or object.¹²⁵ From this comparison we might call our concepts *representative* similarities. The same holds for the creature in relation to God: that which is represented is not in God in the same way as it is in the creature, but the objects of the concept, God and creature, are similar, as the concept is similar to the object, as the image on the television screen is similar to the scene in the studio (even though the image is composed of light rays).

This representative similarity, proportionate because of the relation of causality, is the basis of one concept signifying God and creature. Ontologically, God and creature are analogous, proportionate; logically they are univocal.¹²⁶

Similarity, therefore, is a kind of community, according to Ockham. In the first and second degree of abstraction, similarity consists of two objects which do not differ qualitatively, and which are conceived as of the same formal character. In the third degree of abstraction, similarity consists of proportion. In all three cases we can form one concept of things which are objectively different, and we can predicate univocally about them.

¹²⁴ Cf. Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 12.

¹²⁵ Cf. Tornay, Stephen Chak, *Ockham; studies and selections*. LaSalle, III. Open Court pub. co. 1938, p. 18; Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, loc. cit.

¹²⁶ Cf. p. 96.

When we say "similarity" of God and creature, we say "dependence" of the creature on God in a note which corresponds to some reality in both. These two realities are proportionate regarding the same formal character, and so we say that the perfection of the creature is eminently contained in God. When we say "wisdom" of God and creature, we say a real intellectual entity exists in both. This predication is justified because it is founded on similarity of dependence; it goes from effect to cause without changing the definition to signify the cause. It does not say the effect is the same as the cause, but says it is similar in the sense of proportion of eminence. When we say "being" of God and creature, we say "reality," "existence." Again the basis is similarity of proportion.

5. *Comparison of the two concepts of similarity* — Ockham's first definition of similarity says "notes of the same formal character."¹²⁷ This definition applies to things common among creatures. In this sense, God and creature are not similar.¹²⁸ From a different aspect, Ockham declares God and creature are similar.¹²⁹ We deduced this definition of similarity to apply to God and creature: Similarity is a relation of proportion founded in some dependence according to the same formal character taken abstractly.¹³⁰

Do these two ideas contradict each other? Is there perhaps a desperate attempt to conform to Sacred Scripture and still cling to his own opinion? It hardly seems so. The two notions seem to be compatible. In both cases there is a relation of real proportion. In neither case is there a rhetorical figure of speech, but a comparison between two realities. In the first definition, two "qualities" are compared, and each exists in the objects concerned: whiteness exists in man and in animal. It is not a comparison between a thing and a figure of speech, such as "health" in man and food would be. In the second definition, two realities are compared, divine perfections and human perfections. Ockham excluded the comparison of a reality and a figure of speech when he showed the difference between predicating "stone" and "wisdom" of God.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Cf. pp. 63—64.

¹²⁸ Cf. pp. 81 ff.

¹²⁹ Cf. pp. 91 ff.

¹³⁰ Cf. p. 98.

¹³¹ Cf. p. 90 and note 87.

In both cases, similarity is predicated as a concept of first intention; it signifies non-signs. The individuals signified are considered conjunctively by the mind.

Again in both definitions, we compare things without changing the formal character of the concept. In the first definition this is easily seen. "Animal" is a "sensitive being" when it signifies man and when it signifies horse. In the case of God and creature (second definition), "wisdom" is taken as an intellectual perfection when it signifies God and when it signifies man or angel.

The sole difference in the two ideas of similarity is found in the notes of dependence and eminence. In the first and second degrees of univocity, dependence is not — at least not necessarily — the reason for the proportion. As for God and creature (third degree of univocity), dependence seems to be the only reason for proportion. Still, in the first and second degrees *there is proportion* between the things conceived: the proportion of equality of perfection, the proportion of identity.

We should be able then to construct a definition *ad mentem Ockham* which would include the definition of similarity in the sense of the same formal character, and in the meaning of proportion between God and creature. Perhaps it could be formulated thus: Similarity is a relation between things regarding the same definition on account of some proportion.

It would seem from this that Ockham's two "similarities" are compatible. In all cases he holds the necessity of one concept which signifies several realities. The basis of this one concept is a similarity which is perceived by the mind. It is not always complete, perfect similarity. Sometimes it is not founded on the same ontological basis, but there is always an ontological basis. This foundation renders possible the formation of a concept of proportion between things. "Similarity" and the concepts which are similar to both God and creature are concepts of first intention. Therefore, they signify realities which are not concepts. It follows that Ockham intends more than a mere logical attribution. This is his way of attaining natural knowledge of God.

Looking at univocity objectively, from the viewpoint of the objects conceived as univocal or similar, we find three requisites:

1. The notes which are said to be similar must signify a *reality* in both objects, not a reality and a figure of speech.¹³²

2. The same formal character of the one common concept must be attributed to both.¹³³ Some kind of objective similarity is the basis of this one concept.

3. When the common concept includes God, no imperfection may be implied in the definition.¹³⁴ When no imperfection is included in the formal character, Ockham concludes that this concept must be attributed to God because the most perfect Being must have the perfection which corresponds to this concept. "*Melius est ipsum quam non ipsum.*"

¹³² Cf. pp. 89—90.

¹³³ Cf. pp. 88—89.

¹³⁴ Cf. pp. 104—107.

CHAPTER IV

EQUIVOCATION AND ANALOGY

Occamistic univocity postulates two realities in proportion as regards the same formal character. If there are no two *things*, or if two things are not compared according to the same character, the predication cannot be univocal. In the latter case, *two* concepts would correspond to the common *word*. Such a predication is only equivocal, says Ockham. He does not admit analogy as a medium between univocity and equivocation. It is true he speaks of analogy, but invariably he reduces it either to univocity or to equivocation.

In this chapter, we will get a further insight into Ockham's doctrine on univocity by looking into its opposite which is equivocation. Then we will study analogy as related to both univocity and equivocation. To attain this objective we will take up two points: I. Equivocation; II. Analogy.

I. NOTION AND DIVISION OF EQUIVOCATION

Unity of concept is essential to univocity. When a word is predicated to which correspond more than one concept, we have a different mode of predication. This is equivocation. Ockham defines it: "A word is equivocal which, while signifying several, is not a sign subordinated to one concept, but it is a sign subordinated to several concepts or intentions of the mind."¹

¹ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 13, line 10: "Est autem vox illa aequivoca, quae significans plura non est signum subordinatum uni conceptui, sed est signum unum pluribus conceptibus seu intentionibus animae subordinatum."

The Venerable Inceptor speaks of an equivocal *word* because there is no equivocation in concept.² A concept cannot signify different things in so far as they are different because it signifies *naturally*.³ Socrates is conceived in the concept "man" (rational animal). The same concept cannot represent the *image* of Socrates. When I see the picture of a man, a new concept rises in the mind with different notes.⁴ But a word is not limited in this way. It is instituted as a sign *ad placitum*, and so it can signify different things even as different. The word "man" can signify real men and their pictures. The word or artificial sign is subordinated to several concepts, and can signify the same things as these several concepts.⁵ Ockham's argument for this is the point we have mentioned: a concept *naturally* signifies its signified objects; a word is chosen freely by man to signify anything he wants it to.⁶

Ockham follows Scotus in the assertion that the concept is a *formal* sign of things, formal in the sense that the whole entity of the concept is destined to signify. As a result, it is psychologically impossible for a concept to have two different significations.⁷ One concept signifies certain things and no others, just as the wax tablet receives one impression and cannot receive another while the previous one remains clear.

Univocity, then, pertains to the order of concepts and words. Equivocation is found only in the order of spoken and written words.

² Cf. Chapter II, note 8.

³ Cf. p. 25 and Chapter I, note 42.

⁴ Cf. Elem. Lib. I: De Terminis, Ad: *De nominibus propriis et communibus*.

⁵ Although words signify "subordinate to concepts", they still signify things by signification parallel with concepts. Cf. Chapter I, note 49.

⁶ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. F: "Aequivocatio non est in conceptu, sed tantum in voce vel scripto. Hoc probatur quia ad aequivocationem requiritur unitas signi et pluralitas significatorum. Aut igitur illa plura significata significantur mediante uno conceptu tantum, aut mediantibus pluribus. Si primo modo, illud signum est univocum. Si secundo modo, est aequivocum . . . quia conceptus naturaliter significat quaecumque significat, vox ad placitum sicut significat aequivocum."

See also U.

⁷ *ibid.* For Scotus, see Wolter, *op. cit.* p. 33. Cf. also Def. Ock. c. 19.

Both modes of predication agree in demanding unity of sign.⁸ The elements of equivocation are *unity of word* and *plurality of concepts*. Ockham follows the traditional division of equivocation into *a casu* and *a consilio*.

A. A CASU EQUIVOCATION

This type of equivocation is aptly called *a casu* because it is *casually* imposed on several.⁹ The common term is not imposed on account of some relation perceived.¹⁰ One word in a certain language is imposed to signify a definite thing. The Latin word "canis", for example, imports a certain animal. Afterwards, another language — or perhaps another person in the same language — may use the same term "canis" to signify something entirely different, such as a constellation. In this way a man using the Latin language has one word signifying two widely divergent objects.¹¹ The one word "canis" is thus subordinated to the first concept (animal) as if it were not subordinated to the other (constellation). Consequently, it is imposed on the second object *casually*.

⁸ Quod. IV, 16: "Si autem praedicatur in voce, praedicetur de pluribus sicut terminus communis."

See also notes 1 and 6.

⁹ Def. Ock. c. 19: "Aequivocum a casu est quando una vox pluribus conceptibus subordinatur quasi casualiter."

¹⁰ Quod. IV, 16: "Aequivocum a casu est quod significat plura aequae primo, pluribus impositionibus et mediantibus pluribus conceptibus, et ita imponitur uni acsi non imponeretur alteri."

Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 13, line 22: "Tale autem aequivocum est duplex. Unum est aequivocum a casu, quando scil. vox pluribus conceptibus subordinatur et ita uni, ac si non subordinaretur alteri, et ita significat unum, ac si non significaret aliud; sicut est de hoc nomine, 'Sortes,' quod imponitur pluribus hominibus."

See also Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. EE.

¹¹ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. EE: "Verbi gratia, si haec vox 'canis' imponeretur in una lingua, vel ab uno ad significandum animal latrabile, et in alia lingua vel ab alio imponeretur ad significandum sidus caeleste, ista vox scienti tantum unam linguam esset univoca, et tamen scienti utramque impositionem vel utramque linguam, esset aequivoca, et ita non est inconveniens quod eadem vox sit aequivoca et univoca diversis, et tunc esset haec vox aequivoca a casu."

Ockham and the other scholastics use this example which does not conform to history. For the ancients, the constellation "Canis" was a *real* celestial dog. Historically, therefore, the name "Canis" was not imposed *a casu*, but on account of the relation with the animal "canis." Still, the example holds for the scholastics since they no longer considered the constellation as a real dog.

Even here, however, we might say the constellation was named because of some resemblance: a relation perceived between the objects. Perhaps a better example would be the name "Socrates" given to two men completely separated in every respect. Whether there is any actual resemblance between them or not, does not enter into the question; it is not the reason why the same was imposed twice. In fact, there was no reason as far as relation to each other is concerned. The English word "page" also illustrates casual imposition. It signifies a part of a book and also a messenger boy. Whichever imposition came second surely did not receive its meaning because of the first.¹²

B. A CONSILIO EQUIVOCATION

Equivocation *a consilio* agrees with the preceding in so far as it is found in the order of artificial signs and not concepts. Furthermore, it is predicated by means of more than one corresponding concept and with a common term. It differs in this that an equivocal term of this kind is imposed on the second object on account of some relation perceived. "Animal" belongs in this class because it is imposed first on a true animal and afterwards, on account of similarity, it is imposed again on the picture of an animal:

"Equivocation *a consilio* is that which is imposed by several impositions to signify many by means of several concepts, and it is imposed on one because it was previously imposed on another, and this because of some similarity causing proportion. Example: 'animal' is thus equivocal to a true animal and to a pictured animal,

¹² Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. P; also Toohey, op. cit. p. 112.

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since it is imposed on a pictured animal, but previously on a true animal, and this on account of similarity between them.”¹³

In the foregoing chapter, we saw that Ockham compared Hercules and his image with God and His image (creature). There we said that the creature is an image because of similarity of proportion, and that similarity was the basis of *univocal* predication. In the present, text, the same Author says that similarity of proportion is the basis of *equivocal* predication. If the accidents of Hercules and his statue are similar,¹⁴ and if therefore, the predication is univocal, why do we not predicate univocally of a true and of a pictured animal?

The explanation is that the word “man”, pointing to Hercules, corresponds to the concept “rational animal”. The same word “man”, pointing to the statue of Hercules, corresponds to the concept “picture of rational animal”. This is equivocation. For this reason Ockham reminds us that univocity is not *simply* opposed to equivocation. This proposition is not altogether false, in fact it can be true: an equivocal term is univocal. The same word can be both

¹³ Quod. IV, 16: “Aequivocum a consilio est quod imponitur pluribus impositionibus ad significandum plura mediantibus pluribus conceptibus, et imponitur uni quia prius imponitur alteri, et hoc propter aliquam similitudinem causantem proportionem. Exemplum: ‘animale’ est sic aequivocum ad animal verum et animal pictum, quia imponitur animali picto et prius animali vero, et hoc propter similitudinem inter illa.”

Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 13, line 26: “Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinatur uni conceptui, et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad aliquid aliud . . . imponitur illa alteri, ita quod non imponderetur illi alteri, nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine ‘homo’; primo enim imponebatur ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum omne illud, quod continetur sub hoc conceptu ‘animal rationale’; postea autem utentes videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quandoque hoc nomine ‘homo’ pro tali imagine, ita quod, nisi hoc nomen ‘homo’ fuisset primo impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponderent hoc nomen ‘homo’ ad significandum vel standum pro tali imagine; et propter hoc dicitur ‘aequivocum a consilio.’”

Cf. also Sum. tot. log. III. 3. c. 2; Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. EE.

¹⁴ Cf. pp. 92—93.

equivocal and univocal, but *not with respect to the same things*.¹⁵ As the same man can be both father and son, but not with respect to the same person, so the same term can be both univocal and equivocal, but not with respect to the same things. My father is both father (in respect to me) and son (in respect to his father and my grandfather), but my father cannot be both father and son in respect to me. Likewise, the same term, e. g., "man", can be both univocal (in respect to Socrates and Plato) and equivocal (in respect to Socrates and his statue), but the same term "man", cannot be both univocal and equivocal in respect to Socrates and Plato.

In the same way, the terms "similar" and "dissimilar" are opposed. "Similar" means the same formal character in several; "dissimilar" means a *different* formal character in several. Again, "similar" says "proportion," and "dissimilar" says "without proportion". We can use the term "similar" to denote that man and horse are the same in the concept of animal. But we can say, too, that man and horse are dissimilar — looking to their forms. We can say that God and creature are similar, i. e., in proportion, and we can say God and creature are dissimilar, i. e., of a different nature.

But the question must be stated still more precisely. Regarding God and creature, we saw that "no similarity" meant beings of a different character.¹⁶ Then we said that "similarity" can signify *proportion* between God and creature, and here we found the basis for univocal predication.¹⁷ Now Ockham tells us that similarity *just in the sense of proportion* is the basis for *equivocal* predication.

A few examples will bring out the reason for this distinction. Take the concept of wisdom. *Concretely*, if we predicate the common

¹⁵ Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 13, line 52: "Est autem intelligendum, quod ista divisio terminorum per aequivocum et univocum non est simpliciter per opposita, ita quod haec sit omnino falsa: 'Aliquid aequivocum est univocum', immo vera est, quia vere et realiter eadem vox est aequivoca et univoca sed non respectu eorundem; sicut idem est pater et filius, non tamen respectu eiusdem; et idem est simile et dissimile, non tamen eidem per idem."

See also note 11.

¹⁶ Cf. p. 82.

¹⁷ Cf. p. 95.

term "wisdom" of God and creature, it will signify by means of two concepts because uncreated wisdom and created wisdom are entirely different.¹⁸ And yet there is a proportion between uncreated wisdom and created wisdom because God is the cause of the creature's wisdom, and it is real in both. Therefore, in the *abstract*, we can form one concept which signifies divine and human wisdom. After all imperfection is removed from the concept, it signifies both; it says both are real, wise, existing beings (and that one is the cause of the other). In the *concrete*, this same term is predicated equivocally of God and creature because there are two concepts: wise by His very existence, and, having wisdom. The two concepts are not similar when considered with their intrinsic modes.

Now take the example of healthy food and healthy animal. Here too, we have two realities, food and animal, and one is the cause of the health in the other. Therefore, one reality is dependent on the other. Why do we not predicate "healthy" univocally of food and animal? God and creature are realities, and God is the cause of the creature's reality. — The difference is here: if we take the formal character corresponding to "health" as found in animal, this *same* formal character does not signify the quality of health as found in food,¹⁹ because the same term, "healthy", predicated about animal and about food, is subordinated to two concepts. "Health" is predicated figuratively of food and literally of animal, on account of causal dependence. This is the same example which is so often used to illustrate analogy of proportion taken *improperly*.²⁰ There is a relation of dependence, and the term is predicated first of some object which has the quality intrinsically (animal has health formally). Then, because of the relation, it is attributed figuratively (extrinsically) to another being which does not have this quality formally.

But the *ratio formalis* "wisdom", found in the abstract in creature, exists formally in God also. Therefore, it is predicated really both

¹⁸ Cf. Chapter III, note 84.

¹⁹ Cf. Chapter II, note 29.

²⁰ Cf. Van de Woestyne, *op. cit.* p. 34, note 1.

of God and of creature.²¹ Here we have an example of analogy of proportion in the *proper* sense of the word.²² The perfection predicated is intrinsic to both objects (wisdom to God and creature), but God has the perfection primarily, and the creature has it dependently on God as the cause.

It is true, the *same* formal character does not exist in God *in the same way* as it exists in the creature. In God it is absolutely perfect and in creature it is always imperfect. This is why all imperfection must be removed from the concept of wisdom as found in creature.²³ That which results is the same *ratio formalis* in abstract — without the consideration of the imperfections of concrete created wisdom. *We do not change the definition of wisdom in this process.* "Wisdom" still signifies the creature from which it was taken. But since there is now no imperfection in the definition, it can signify God as well. That gives us one concept signifying both. But by no process can this be done regarding the same formal character of "health" in animal and in food.

The *basis* of univocal and equivocal predication is the same: similarity of proportion. But the *content* of the concept differs, because "healthy", cannot be predicated of animal and food regarding the *same* formal character, scil., health.

As for the case of real man and the picture of man, we can easily extract univocal concepts from both: accidents of color, figure, etc. But the term "man" is equivocal here because it is used the first time to signify a *real* rational animal. Upon observing the picture of a man, someone says again "man". It is true that the second imposition is made on account of similarity of proportion: the above-mentioned accidents of color and figure. But if we turn to the *concept*, the notes of the first concept do not agree with the second object, i. e., neither "animal" nor "rational" can be predicated in a *real* sense of this picture. The *word* "man" is common to both. But two concepts are necessary to signify man and his

²¹ Cf. Chapter III, note 87.

²² Van de Woestyne, loc. cit.

²³ Cf. Chapter III, note 82.

picture *as man*, because the formal character of the concept of real man does not correspond to some reality in the picture of man.

Right here in this point is the difference between univocal predication based on similarity of proportion, and equivocal predication based on similarity of proportion. It is a conclusion which Ockham implied in his contrast between "stone" and "wisdom."²⁴ The concept "stone" (petrine substance) cannot signify God in a real sense because the perfection corresponding to this concept is not found in God. This concept contains imperfection in its very notion.²⁵ Consequently, it can signify God only figuratively. There is *no proportion regarding the same* formal character.

In Ockham, therefore, we do not have any such thing as an equivocal *concept*; he acknowledges only equivocal *words*. He evolves this theme further in the following section where he reduces all analogy either to univocity or equivocation.

II. ANALOGY

Analogy of proportion is the ontological basis of univocal predication about God and creature.²⁶ Ockham does not have a special tract on analogy²⁷ as he does on univocity. His ideas on this subject are found as answers to objections against his views on univocity. His constant theme is that all analogy is either univocity or equivocation. To prove this he supposes two possibilities. First, either equivocation is predication which includes under it both *a casu* and *a consilio* — and in this supposition, analogy is not a distinct predication, because it is identified with equivocation *a consilio*, or secondly, equivocation embraces only *a casu*. In this supposition also, analogy is not distinct, but quasi-distinct from equivocation; for again, he identifies analogy with *a consilio* predication.

There is no third possibility in Ockham's system. Even analogy of *proportionality* is reduced either to univocity or equivocation.

²⁴ *ibid.* note 87.

²⁵ *ibid.* note 117.

²⁶ Cf. pp. 96, 110.

²⁷ Except in the *Defensorium Ockham*, the authenticity of which is doubtful. Even here it is treated the same as in works which are certainly Ockham's. Cf. c. 20.

Moreover, there is no third possibility because of an *analogical concept*; for a concept does not say "partly the same" about things. Things are considered either the same or not the same. If things are considered the same, one concept signifies all of them. If they are not considered the same, there are several concepts. There is no medium in concept.²⁸

A. FIRST POSSIBILITY:
EQUIVOCATION IS TAKEN AS COMMON
TO A CASU AND A CONSILIO

"In the supposition that equivocal predication is taken generally, as common to a *casu* and a *consilio*, I say that analogical predication is not a medium between equivocal, univocal and denominative predication."²⁹

To prove his conclusion in this supposition, Ockham uses a typical argument of exclusion. All predication is either in concept, or in word, or in writing. But in none of these is there a special case of analogy. It can always be reduced to and identified with univocity or equivocation.

1. *In concept* — Ockham goes into detail to eliminate analogy from predication in concept. He tells us that in concept we predicate one concept about one concept, or several concepts about one concept, or several concepts about several.³⁰ For the sake of clearness, let us examine each case separately.

²⁸ Cf. pp. 115—116.

²⁹ Quod. IV, 16: "Hoc supposito, dico ad quaestionem, quod accipiendo praedicationem aequivocam generaliter, ut est commune ad praedicationem aequivocam a casu et a consilio, sic praedicatio analogica non est media inter praedicationem aequivocam, univocam et denominativam."

See also Com. ed. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. E.

³⁰ Quod. IV, 16: "Omnis praedicatio vel est in conceptu vel in voce vel in scripto. Sed in conceptu non est praedicatio aliqua analogica, quia aut praedicatur unus conceptus de uno conceptu, aut plures conceptus de uno conceptu, vel plures conceptus de pluribus conceptibus. Si praedicetur unus conceptus de uno conceptu, si uterque conceptus sit simpliciter proprius alicui singulari, tunc est praedicatio discreta, nec aequivoca, nec univoca, nec denominativa proprie loquendo, quia Philosophus et

First he says, one concept can be predicated about one concept. Here, he subdivides into two possible cases. Either this predication will be discrete or common. *Discrete* predication is predication of one concept about one concept, in which subject and predicate are *proper* to some singular, e. g., this man is Socrates. We rule out this type of predication because our topic concerns itself with predication of a concept common to many.³¹

If one concept is predicated about one concept and the predicate at least is a common term, the predication is univocal. In this proposition, "Man is an animal," "animal" is predicated about the subject "man" by means of one concept and by the same mode of signifying. — Or, as Ockham inserts, if at least the predicate is a common term, the predication is univocal, e. g., Socrates is a man. — "Man" is a common term, and it signifies Socrates and all men by means of one concept and by one mode of signifying.³² Again, we can take "wisdom" applied to God and creature, and come to the same conclusion.

The second possibility of predication in concept proposes that several concepts can be predicated about one concept or about several. We have several predicated of one, e. g., in the propositions, "Socrates is a white man"; "God is wise and just"; "Creature is wise and just." We have several predicated about several if we say,

alii auctores tractando de istis praedicationibus tractabant solum de praedicatione termini communis. Si autem uterque conceptus vel saltem praedicatum sit conceptus communis, tunc est praedicatio univoca, quia omnem talem praedicationem vocant univocam.

"Si autem praedicentur plures conceptus de uno, tunc conceptus a parte praedicati aut natus est determinare reliquum, aut sunt conceptus repugnantes, aut impertinentes. Si primo modo ut hic: 'Sortes est homo albus,' sic est composita praedicatio ex univoca et denominativa, quia 'homo' praedicatur univoce, 'albus' denominative. Si secundo modo vel tertio, tunc vel propositio non est intelligibilis ut hic: 'Sortes est homo asinus,' vel erunt propositiones plures ut hic: 'Sortes est grammaticus albus homo animal,' et omnes isti conceptus praedicantur univoce vel denominative."

³¹ At least the praedicate must be a term common to many as he says in note 30. ³² Cf. pp. 39 ff.

"Socrates and Plato are white men"; "God and man are wise and just."

Here again, Ockham tries to provide for all eventualities by subdividing. Such predication is either unintelligible, or not pertinent, or it is composed of univocal and denominative predication. We rule out at once unintelligible predication, such as, Socrates is a man horse.

If the predication is not pertinent, e. g., Socrates is a grammarian white man animal, we really have several propositions in which the predication is univocal or denominative. "Grammarian" and "white" are denominative. Since they are predicated by means of one concept, they are univocal *in quale*.³³ The other predicates, "man" and "animal", are univocal *in quid*.³⁴

Finally, he offers the possibility of predicating several concepts about one or about several. Again, this is composed of univocal and denominative concepts, e. g., Socrates is a white man.

This is Ockham's argument excluding analogy as a distinct predication from predication in concept. There is no place for it because all such predications are either univocal or denominative — and denominative itself is univocal (in this case, since we are dealing with concepts).³⁵ All predication in concept therefore is univocal; this fits in with his former statement that there is no equivocation in concept.³⁶ Nor is there an *analogical concept*; for, if the concept considers things the same, it is one. If things are considered different, there are several concepts. If we wish to consider different things *as different*, we will have a distinct concept for each note perceived,³⁷ even though the collection of concepts should be expressed in a common *word*.

The fundamental point seems to be Ockham's insistence that several concepts are necessary to signify things in so far as they

³³ Cf. text on pp. 36—37. ³⁴ *ibid.* ³⁵ *ibid.* and p. 51.

³⁶ Cf. note 6 and Chapter II, note 8. One might object that Ockham does not examine all the possibilities he himself proposed. He does not explain predication of several concepts *about several*. But regarding univocal predication, it makes little difference whether I say: Socrates is a white man; or: Plato and Socrates are white men.

³⁷ Cf. pp. 65—66.

are perceived to be partly the same and partly different. Those who hold an analogical concept say that such a concept is one, but they add a qualification. If this unity is a unity *secundum quid*, as Gredt explains it,³⁸ there seems to be only a terminological difference between Ockham and them. This unity *secundum quid* is explained as *proportional* unity, which contains two concepts in the *unity* of some proportion between them (uncreated wisdom and created wisdom in the unity of the definition of abstract wisdom, to which God and creature correspond proportionally).³⁹

2. *In word and writing* — Concepts or natural signs have only one signification. Now we come to the second part of his argument of exclusion: Predication which is not in concept is in word or writing (artificial signs). A word can have more than one signification because it is given its signification by the free choice of men. Equivocation thus finds a place in spoken and written signs.⁴⁰

Here again, Ockham says there are only two possibilities: Either one word is predicated about one thing, or one word is predicated about several things. In neither case is there analogical predication. Both cases are reduced to univocity or equivocation.

If one word is predicated about one thing, this word can be a discrete term, which we ignore.⁴¹ If a common term is predicated, it is taken either significatively or non-significatively. If the predicate is non-significative, we are not interested. This would be the case if the predicate stood in simple or material supposition.⁴²

³⁸ Gredt, Ioseph, O. S. B., *Elementa philosophiae aristotelico-thomisticae*, vol. 1. Freiburg in Br., Herder, 1937, p. 131.

See also Cajetan, *De ente*. Rome, Marietti, n. 21: "Analogata sunt quorum nomen est commune, et ratio secundum illud nomen est aliquo modo eadem, et aliquo modo diversa, seu secundum quid eadem, et secundum quid diversa; v. g. animal et medicina sunt analogata sub sano, unde habent illud nomen commune, utrumque enim illorum dicimus sanum."

³⁹ The unity of the analogical concept is hard to understand. The example which Gredt offers, op. cit. p. 132, is simply a case of equivocation *a consilio*. Byles, op. cit. p. 349, offers an instance which seems to have an implicit univocal concept underlying the proportions compared.

⁴⁰ Cf. note 6; also Boehner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, p. 157; Wolter, op. cit. p. 34. ⁴¹ Cf. p. 124. ⁴² Cf. pp. 32—33.

The second possibility supposes one term is predicated of several things. If the term is accepted significatively, two cases come up. First, the term signifies by means of one concept, e. g., man is an animal, horse is an animal, or God is wise, creature is wise. Once more we have univocal predication.

Secondly, the common term signifies by means of several concepts. This is equivocal predication, e. g., "man" predicated of a real man and of his picture. The word "man" signifies these objects by means of two concepts: "rational animal" and "picture of rational animal."⁴³

Therefore, concludes Ockham, no special place is to be found for analogy as a predication distinct from univocity and equivocation. In concept, each sign signifies its signified objects naturally. If a new *ratio formalis* is conceived, it is a new concept. There are as many concepts as there are really distinct objects, if the objects differ qualitatively. Each of these signifies the perfection corresponding to this character. Each is predicated univocally *in quid*, or univocally *in quale*. In word there is no analogy distinct from the other two modes of predication, because artificial signs are reduced to univocal or equivocal signs which cover all cases. In the assumption that equivocation includes in its notion both *a casu* and *a consilio*, there is no room for analogy as a distinct predication.

⁴³ Quod. IV, 16: "Secundo dico quod praedicatio analogica non est distincta a praedicatione univoca, aequivoca et denominativa in voce nec in scripto, quia eadem est ratio de illis, quia quaero: aut in voce praedicatur terminus de uno solo aut de pluribus. Si de uno sicut nomen proprium, sic est terminus discretus et praedicatio discreta, quum nec est univoca nec aequivoca, nec denominativa, nec analogica, quia de tali praedicatione non est quaestio. Si autem praedicatur in voce, praedicetur de pluribus sicut terminus communis, tunc aut illud praedicatum accipitur significative aut non. Si non, nihil ad propositum quia sic non intelligitur quaestio. Si sic, aut significat ista pro quibus supponit una impositione et mediante uno conceptu, et sic est praedicatio univoca, sicut est hic: 'homo est animal.' Aut significat ista pro quibus supponit pluribus impositionibus et mediantibus pluribus conceptibus, tunc est praedicatio aequivoca, sicut hic: 'animal latrabile est canis.' Et eo modo arguo per omnia de praedicatione in scripto."

Cf. pp. 117—122.

B. SECOND POSSIBILITY:

EQUIVOCATION IS IDENTIFIED WITH A CASU ONLY,

AND

ANALOGY IS IDENTIFIED WITH A CONSILIO

Up to now, equivocation was taken in a broad sense, including both *a casu* and *a consilio*. Now Ockham proposes his second possibility where equivocation is restricted to *a casu* equivocation. Analogy is taken as identical with *a consilio* predication. Here, analogy is a predication distinct from univocity and equivocation (*a casu*). In this supposition, "health" is predicated analogically of animal and food, because, as he says, it is predicated neither equivocally *a casu*, nor univocally (*in quid*), nor denominatively (univocally *in quale*).⁴⁴

This possibility tells us nothing new. It merely restricts the meaning of equivocation. All the other things we said still hold. The formal character of "health" cannot be predicated of food by means of one concept, since there is no health inhering formally in food. "Health" is contained *virtually* in food as the cause of health formally inhering in man. There is a proportion between healthy man and healthy food, a relation of effect to cause, and this justifies the predication of "similarity" about them. But "health" is not in food *formally*. Therefore, it cannot be attributed to diet and to animal *by one concept* having the same notes.⁴⁵

The term "virtually" reminds us of Ockham's previous use of it in distinguishing the predication of "wisdom" and "stone" about

⁴⁴ *ibid.*: "Accipiendo aequivocam praedicationem pro aequivoca a casu et praedicationem analogam ubi praedicatur aequivocum a consilio, sic praedicatio analogica est medium inter praedicationem univocam, aequivocam et denominativam. Sic enim 'sanum' praedicatur analogice de animali et urina et dieta, quia nec praedicatur aequivoce a casu, nec univoce, nec denominative, sed aequivoce a consilio, sicut etiam animal praedicatur analogice de animali vero et picto."

Cf. Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. EE.

⁴⁵ Cf. p. 120.

God.⁴⁶ "Virtually" does not mean the power of becoming, as is evident, but it means *causally*. God has the power to produce the stone, as food has the power to produce health in man. In both cases we have a comparison of causality. In both cases God and food produce something: stone and health with natures different from themselves. Each cause, God and food, has something virtually in itself, and each cause *formally* lacks the effect: stone and health.

But the formal character "wisdom" can be attributed to God and creature by one concept because of the proportion regarding the *same* formal character, since wisdom is a reality in both.⁴⁷ This cannot be said for "health" predicated of man and food, because there is no real proportion between two *realities*. "Health," therefore, is predicated equivocally *a consilio* — or analogically in this possibility. It cannot be reduced to one concept signifying two *things* because two *things* corresponding to the concept of health in man do not exist.

We call this predication *equivocal* because the word corresponds to two different concepts. It is *a consilio* because of the figurative similarity. Because of the proportion of mere dependence, it is called *analogy*.

The same holds for the example of man and his picture. First someone conceives a real man, a rational animal. He imposes the word "man" to signify along with this concept. Afterwards he sees a man's picture. A new concept is formed, a representation of rational animal. The same word is imposed to signify the picture along with the new concept. This is equivocal because of the two concepts corresponding to the one word. It is *a consilio* due to the similarity perceived between the accidents of the two.⁴⁸ It is analogy on account of the proportion caused by these similar accidents.

Analogy, then, is distinct from the other modes of predication if it is taken as synonymous with equivocation *a consilio*, and if equivocation is taken strictly, as meaning only *a casu*. But this is

⁴⁶ Cf. Chapter III, note 87.

⁴⁷ Cf. pp. 90—91, 97—98, 104.

⁴⁸ We are not *selecting* and turning our attention to these similar accidents and predicating them. We are predicating *man*. Cf. pp. 121—122.

no different from his previous doctrine. It still remains a fact that concepts are univocal, and words are either univocal or equivocal. There is no medium.

C. THERE IS NO THIRD POSSIBILITY

In the two preceding possibilities, analogy was understood as analogy of *proportion*. This is simple proportion, or the relation of two terms because of similarity. What does Ockham say about analogy of *proportionality*? This is the comparison of two proportions with each other. According to Giacon,⁴⁹ Ockham did not have a correct idea of this kind of analogy. For this reason he reduced analogy of attribution (proportion) to equivocation, and analogy of proportionality to univocity.

But Ockham did not reduce the former only to equivocation. Giacon is mistaken, as we see from the *Quodlibeta*,⁵⁰ where Ockham says analogy is *either* univocity or equivocation. Moreover, we will see in this section that Ockham had some kind of idea of analogy of proportionality. He does not always reduce this to univocity, but also to equivocation. Whether Ockham understood "the full value of analogy of proportionality" or not, is a different question, and the full value is a disputed one.⁵¹ Here we are interested in a correct interpretation of what Ockham taught.

Ockham speaks of analogy of proportionality only twice. For him it did not have much importance. In one text he shows that it is univocity; in the other, that it is equivocation. We will consider the two passages separately.

1. *Analogy of proportionality is univocity.* — Of course, Ockham does not use this terminology, but his text gives examples which can well fit under the heading of analogy of proportionality. He does not apply it to God and creature, but restricts such analogy

⁴⁹ Giacon, op. cit. vol. 2, p. 450.

⁵⁰ As quoted in notes 29, 30 and 43.

⁵¹ Descoqs, Pedro, S. J., *Institutiones metaphysicae generalis*. Paris, Beauchesne, 1925, pp. 260—262, 269 ff.

to the first and second degrees of univocity: to perfect and imperfect similarity.⁵²

After he completed his reduction of analogy to univocal, equivocal and denominative predication, Ockham proposed some doubts. In one of these we find his introduction to our present investigation: "It seems that there is some analogical predication, because according to the Philosopher, if the *passio* is analogous, the medium will be analogous."⁵³

He answers this objection by distinguishing: "Analogy is taken in a twofold sense."⁵⁴ The first of these meanings we have seen.⁵⁵ It is a univocal concept in the third degree; it says things are not conceived as of the same nature, but are similar because of proportion.

Aristotle, however, is not speaking of analogy in the first sense, i. e., as identical with the third degree of univocity. He is asking why proportionals alternate. When they are lines, the cause is the same and different from when they are numbers. They are the same because a given increment is there, etc.⁵⁶ As we will see (p. 134), where Ockham identifies analogy of proportionality with equivocation, the Venerable Inceptor will take up this passage in detail. Here he says no more about it. Instead, he gives at once the *second* way he understands analogy, and this is proportionality. There are four terms, and they are in proportion within the first and second degrees of univocity. His first example is imperfect similarity, the relation of species to genus: man is to animal, as whiteness is to color. His

⁵² Cf. pp. 72 and 75 respectively.

⁵³ Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. H: "Videtur quod sit aliqua praedicatio analogica, quia secundum Philosophum, si passio sit analogica, medium erit analogum."

For the definition of "passio," see Chapter V, note 115.

⁵⁴ *ibid.* R.: "Analogia accipitur dupliciter." ⁵⁵ Cf. p. 96.

⁵⁶ οἷον διὰ τί καὶ ἐναλλάξ ἀνάλογον; ἄλλο γὰρ αἴτιον ἐν γραμμαῖς καὶ ἀρνημοῖς· καὶ τὸ αὐτό γε, ἥ μὲν γραμμαί, ἄλλο, ἥ δ' ἔχον αὖξῃσιν τοιανδί, τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως ἐπὶ πάντων, τοῦ δ' ὅμοιον εἶναι χρώμα χρώματι καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. ὁμώνυμον γὰρ τὸ ὅμοιον ἐπὶ τούτων· ἐνθα μὲν γὰρ ἴσως τὸ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν τὰς πλευρὰς καὶ ἴσας τὰς γωνίας, ἐπὶ δὲ χρωμάτων τὸ τὴν αἰσθησιν μίαν εἶναι ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. — *Anal. Post.* ed. Bekker, vol. 1, II. c. 17, p. 99a, 8—15.

second one is perfect similarity: Socrates is to man, as this whiteness is to whiteness.⁵⁷

In the first example, the relation of species to genus, the *ratio* for similarity consists in this that the genus (animal, color) is predicated of its species as something broader, more universal. It is true, there is no common term expressed, but it is implied: the relation of species to genus.

In the second example, we have perfect similarity; all the notes are of the same formal character. It expresses the relation of an individual in a *species specialissima* to its species. In this relation, we find the *ratio* of comparison and the implicit common term.

This particular text gives examples which have little or no value in discussing analogy of proportionality because they are too easy. They consider things which are conceived as equal — there is no dependence or order as the basis of comparison. There is no reason to spend more time on them. Let us turn at once to his second text where he reduces this same kind of analogy to equivocation.

2. *Analogy of proportionality is equivocation.* — The second time Ockham brings up this kind of analogy he broaches exactly the same objection.⁵⁸ As in his previous answer,⁵⁹ he says that analogy can be understood in two ways.

⁵⁷ Com. ed. Lug. III. p. 9. R: "Secundo modo analogia, quando sunt quattuor, et duo praedicantur de duobus, et sunt impertinentia nisi per conformitatem et proportionem, et talis analogia non excludit perfectam univocationem. Exemplum: hic est analogia tali modo: sicut se habet homo ad animal, ita se habet albedo ad colorem, modo illud quod praedicatur in utraque propositione est univocum secundo modo dictum. Similiter hic est talis analogia: sicut se habet Sortes ad hominem, ita haec albedo ad albedinem; ubi est perfectissima univocatio. Et sic patet ad propositum quod ens non dicitur pure univoce, nec pure aequivoce, sed medio modo."

⁵⁸ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. DD: "Videtur quod sit aliqua praedicatio analoga, quae nec sit aequivoca nec univoca nec denominativa, quia aliqua est praedicatio analoga secundum Philosophum, I. Posteriorum, versus finem, ubi dicit quod, si passio sit aequivoca, medium erit aequivocum, et si passio fuerit analoga, medium erit analogum."

Aristotle's text is not in I. Posteriorum, but in II, as we see in note 56.

⁵⁹ Cf. p. 131.

The first way is the old example of "health."⁶⁰ This has been discussed often enough to pass it by this time. But Ockham adds here an illustration showing how denominative (*in quale*) predication can be equivocal, as we said before.⁶¹ "Healthy" predicated of Socrates and Plato is univocal because it is predicated by means of one concept. But here Ockham points out that "healthy" signifies man and *food* by means of two concepts; for, "healthy" signifies man directly, and the health he has; again, it signifies food directly (food is healthy). Obliquely it connotes the quality of health formally existing in man which it causes or preserves. "Healthy" is, therefore, predicated *in quale*, and it is also predicated equivocally because it is subordinated to two concepts.

The other meaning of analogy in this passage is a case of proportionality. A common term is imposed on many things because of similarity of proportion, and a comparison is made between the proportions: as color is similar to color, so figure is similar to figure.⁶²

Ockham says this is equivocation.⁶³ The reason is that the term "similar" is an equivocal term which has two meanings. For,

⁶⁰ Com. ed. Lug. loc. cit. EE: "Alio modo secundum intentionem multorum loquentium dicitur analogum, quando aliqua denominantur eodem nomine non propter unitatem conceptus communis eis, sed propter identitatem alicuius alterius quod primo significatur isto nomine, ad quod ipsa habent aliqualem attributionem, et hoc secundum quod . . . dicitur de illis ponitur illud primum significatum in obliquo et aliquid aliud in recto, sicut exemplificat de 'sano' respectu animalis et respectu dietae et urinae."

⁶¹ Cf. p. 51.

⁶² Com. ed. Lug. loc. cit.: "De analogo potest distingui. Uno modo accipitur secundum quod est commune nomen impositum multis, propter consimilem proportionem quam habent diversa ad illa, sicut ponit Philosophus exemplum quod, sicut se habet color ad colorem, ita figura ad figuram, de quibus simile dicitur analogice quia sicut color similis est colori, ita figura similis est figurae."

⁶³ *ibid.*: "Ad propositum dico quod analogum primo modo est aequivocum simpliciter, non tamen a casu sed a consilio, et hoc dicit Philosophus, II. Posteriorum, quod simile quid dicitur de colore respectu coloris, et dicitur figura respectu figurae est aequivocum, et secundum analogiam dictum. Unde dicit sic Philosophus similem esse colorem colori et figuram figurae aliam causam oportet esse, aequivocum enim est simile in omnibus.

¹⁰ Menges, Ockham.

Aristotle says (and here he really refers to him) that, regarding colors, "similar" means the *identity of the act of perceiving* colors. But regarding figure, "similar" signifies the *equality of angles*.⁶⁴

This is all Ockham has to say about analogy of proportionality. He does not bother about it to any appreciable extent. Since he does not go into the problem, we can only speculate as to what he would say about more difficult cases. That he knew the problem seems sure from the fact that he proposed the examples treated here. Perhaps he let it go at that because he considered his system sufficient to cover all cases. We could infer this from the way he consistently reduces it to another mode of predication.

Is there analogy of proportionality implicitly contained in his doctrine? What would he say about cases which can be derived from his own statements? Perhaps we can deduce that from what he has said. For instance, we might reduce one remark⁶⁵ of his to this form:

$$\frac{\text{word}}{\text{arbitrary sign}} \sim \frac{\text{concept}}{\text{natural sign}}$$

Ockham would reduce this to imperfect similarity. A word is one kind of arbitrary sign, and a concept is one kind of natural sign. There are other arbitrary signs, e. g., gestures, oral propositions, etc. There are also other natural signs, e. g., smoke, groaning, etc. This would be univocity because we predicate the relation of genus to species. The genus (artificial sign, natural sign) is predicated of one of the species subsumed under it (word, concept).

Here is a more difficult case:⁶⁶

$$\frac{\text{God}}{\text{super-wisdom}} \sim \frac{\text{man}}{\text{wisdom}}$$

Hoc quidem enim fortasse est secundum analogiam habere latera et aequales angulos, in coloribus autem sensum unum esse aut aliquid aliud huiusmodi. Secundum autem analogiam hae eadem sunt, medium se habet secundum analogiam. Ex quo patet quod illud analogum est aequivocum."

⁶⁴ Cf. note 56. ⁶⁵ Cf. p. 87 and Chapter III, note 80.

⁶⁶ Cf. p. 86 and Chapter III, note 78.

Ockham would surely object first of all that "super-wisdom" is not the same *ratio formalis* as "wisdom."⁶⁷ Moreover, God is not related to His wisdom as creature to his. God *exists* wise, and creature *has* wisdom. This would be concrete predication of God and creature, and cannot be univocal.⁶⁸ Possibly he would object, too, that it is not strictly equivocal either, because there is no common term.⁶⁹ He would probably change the example and say:

$$\frac{\text{God}}{\text{His wisdom}} \sim \frac{\text{man}}{\text{his wisdom}}$$

Then he would have to say it is a case of equivocation. "Wisdom" is used in two different meanings because a note ("His" and "his") is added to wisdom, which forces us to include the intrinsic modes and predicate concretely. Ockham would deny that God is to *His infinite* wisdom as Socrates is to *his finite* wisdom. This example would be equivalent to analogy of proportionality in the proper sense of the word, i. e., where the *ratio* signified by the common term is intrinsic to both members of the analogy.⁷⁰

In some such manner Ockham would have to explain any example proposed. Analogy is not a distinct form of predication in his system. Even though it may be contained implicitly in his teaching, it is not a *third* mode of predicating.

If we proposed another well known example, which Ockham does not have, nor can we derive it from what he does have, the answer would have to be the same:

$$\frac{\text{homo}}{\text{ridens}} \sim \frac{\text{pratum}}{\text{ridens}}$$

Those who hold analogy say we can intend the *whole* in *one act*. Therefore, we would have one concept of four widely divergent things. Here is a case of analogy of proportionality taken *improperly*,

⁶⁷ Cf. Chapter III, note 72.

⁶⁸ Cf. Chapter III, note 84.

⁶⁹ Cf. notes 1, 6, 8.

⁷⁰ Cf. Byles, op. cit. p. 341; Van de Woestyne, op. cit. p. 35.

i. e., where the *ratio* signified by the common term is intrinsic to one and extrinsic to the other.⁷¹

Ockham holds that the whole is intended in four acts, in a composed concept.⁷² He would again reduce it either to univocity or to equivocation on the same basis as before; for, nothing new is added here. The ockhamistic mind perceives in a mosaic way.⁷³ Whatever is to be said of the advantages of Ockham over those who hold analogy, or of analogists over Ockham, this much is certain: Ockham did not penetrate analogy as profoundly as he did univocity. His adversaries on the other hand do not penetrate univocity as profoundly as they do analogy. Ockham has a place in his system for everything that is postulated in analogy (as a separate mode of predication). He showed us analogy of proportion both in the proper and improper sense.⁷⁴ He also has analogy of proportionality and can discuss it in both the proper and improper sense.⁷⁵

In conclusion, let us remember we are not so much interested in settling a disputed question as we are in understanding Ockham's doctrine, — and disputed the question surely is. Bochenski, for instance, points out that the modern Thomists are wrong when they say analogy is a third class coordinated to univocity and equivocation. He holds that analogy is a subclass of equivocation, i. e., equivocation *a consilio*, and nothing more.⁷⁶ It is certain that Ockham had little use for analogy. It has no middle place between univocity and equivocation. This is the point to carry over from this chapter as we approach the application of these terms to God and creature.

⁷¹ Cf. Van de Woestyne, loc. cit.

⁷² Cf. p. 24.

⁷³ Cf. Wolter, op. cit. p. 55. This "mosaic" knowledge may be one reason Ockham is considered the precursor of sensism. Cf. Federhofer, op. cit. in *Phil. Jahr.* vol. 39, pp. 282 ff.

⁷⁴ Cf. pp. 120—121.

⁷⁵ Cf. pp. 135—136.

⁷⁶ Bochenski, I. M., O. P., *On Analogy*, in *The Thomist*, vol. 11, 1948, p. 432.

CHAPTER V

APPLICATION TO GOD AND CREATURE

Univocal predication is predication of one concept signifying many things. These things can be different (man and horse), but a common note can be selected from them (animal). One such concept signifies or represents both real men and real horses.¹

Ockham goes still further, and says that, even if things are not similar, e. g., God and creature, they can be formed into one concept predicable of both. After all imperfection has been removed from the concept of wisdom, justice, unity, etc., these concepts signify uncreated and created wisdom, justice and unity. He does not say that wisdom is the same in God and creature, but that created wisdom represents uncreated wisdom — just as any concept represents its object,² even if concept and object are different.

The basis of the common concept applicable to God and creature is the fact that God is represented by the creature, the creature is an image of God. The reason creature is an image of God is because of the dependence of a created reality on uncreated reality in reference to the *same* formal character.³ The content of the concept is the *ratio formalis* of that perfection which is attributed (because of dependence) to God and creature as *something real* according to the same definition.

It is now time to test this doctrine. We must show that Ockham goes farther than equivocal and analogical predication of God and creature, and holds univocal predication of one concept concerning them. Then we must see how he abstracts this one concept common to God and creature. Moreover, we want to investigate whether this

¹ Cf. pp. 74 ff.

² Cf. p. 109.

³ Cf. pp. 104, 119—122.

predication is *in quid* or *in quale*, in order to determine more precisely the extent of his teaching. Finally, we will ask whether the predication of these concepts is *always* univocal or not.

I. THERE IS A PREDICATION ABOUT GOD AND CREATURE WHICH IS NEITHER EQUIVOCAL NOR ANALOGICAL

Ockham tells us that terms common to God and creature are neither equivocal nor analogical. On this subject we have two texts which at first sight could be understood either in favor of univocity, or equivocation, or analogy. For the sake of clearness, let us begin by looking at these texts, and then enter upon an explanation of them.

A. TEXTS

Ockham teaches that one concept of God and creature is possible only in the third degree of abstraction.⁴ God and creature have nothing real in common; in the concrete, they are dissimilar. We have already considered this text,⁵ but for the sake of convenience in comparing, it is repeated here:

(1) "In the third way, univocity is taken for a concept univocal to many not having any similarity either in substantial or in accidental things. In this way, every concept applicable to God and creature is univocal to them, because in God and creature there is absolutely nothing either intrinsic or extrinsic of the same character. The Saints deny the first and second univocity of God. The first, because nothing essential in God and creature is of the same character. The second, because nothing accidental is of the same character. As the essence of God is dissimilar to the essence of the creature, so also the wisdom of God and His goodness. Therefore, Damascene says that God is not wise but super-wise, nor good but super-good."

⁴ Cf. p. 82.

⁵ This text is found in three different places: Chapter III, notes 67, 78 and 93, also p. 131. Now we will put it together as it stands in Ockham.

(This text states clearly that there is *univocity* between God and creature. But a few lines further in the same text, Ockham continues):

"Analogy is taken in a twofold sense. In one way it is taken for a concept univocal in the third way mentioned, which is neither purely equivocal nor univocal, because it is one concept and not many concepts; nor is it a pure univocal concept of the most perfect univocity, that is, in the first way mentioned, nor is it in the second way. Therefore, it is said to be a medium between pure univocity and equivocation."⁶

This type of analogy — or univocity in the third degree — means that God and creature are "similar" in the sense of a real proportion between effect and cause.⁷ He is not speaking of analogical *predication*, but he presupposes metaphysical analogy as the basis of univocal predication.⁸ The things themselves are "similar" regarding proportion.

But in a different text Ockham says that similarity causing proportion is the basis of *equivocal* predication. We have seen this text also,⁹ but will repeat it here for the same reason as the preceding one:

(2) "Equivocation *a consilio* is that which is imposed by several impositions to signify many by means of several concepts, and it is imposed on one because it was previously imposed on another, and this because of some similarity causing proportion."

(Ockham goes on to explain his notion of equivocation, and then continues, identifying equivocal with analogical predication):

⁶ This last part of the text has not been quoted in full. It is from the same passage in the Com. ed. Lug. III. q. 9. Q: "Analogia accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo pro conceptu univoco tertio modo dicto, qui nec est pure aequivocus nec univocus, quia est unus conceptus et non plures; nec purus univocus univocatione perfectissima, puta primo modo dicta, nec etiam secundo modo. Ideo dicitur esse medius inter puram univocationem et aequivocationem."

⁷ Cf. p. 95.

⁸ Cf. p. 96.

⁹ Cf. Chapter IV, notes 13 and 44. Again we put them together here. In the foregoing places they were separated for an analysis of the terminology.

"If we take equivocal predication for equivocation *a casu*, and analogical predication where it is predicated for equivocation *a consilio*, then analogical predication is a medium between univocal, equivocal and denominative predication."

Let us review the apparently conflicting ideas in these texts. Ockham says that the predication of some concept common to God and creature is *univocal on account of similarity of proportion*. (First text) Next he declares that similarity of proportion is the basis of *equivocal* predication. (Second text) Our first question therefore is: How can he say that the predication of some concept about God and creature is *still univocal*?

Again Ockham says that *analogical predication is the same as equivocation a consilio*. (Second text) It follows that if we do not predicate equivocally *a consilio*, we do not predicate analogically. But in the first he said that analogy is the basis of univocal predication. From this rises our second question: *Why do we not predicate analogically* of God and creature?

B. EXPLANATION

The answer to these difficulties lies in the preceding chapter. The predication of one concept *about God and creature* is neither equivocal nor analogical, just as we said about other concepts.

1. *Predication about God and creature is not equivocal*. — This is true both of equivocation *a casu* and *a consilio*.

a) *It is not equivocation a casu*. — Certainly the predication of a common concept about God and creature is not equivocal *a casu* because Ockham admits similarity between God and creature as the basis of a common predication.¹⁰ This predication is not to be compared with that, let us say, of the term "canis" applied to animal and constellation.¹¹ The terms "being," "wisdom," etc., are not applied *casually* to God and creature by means of two concepts, but they are imposed because of a relation perceived, and by means of one concept.

¹⁰ Cf. pp. 92—93.

¹¹ Cf. pp. 116—117.

b) *It is not equivocation a consilio.* — Univocity is not opposed *simpliciter* to equivocation *a consilio*.¹² The same term can be both univocal and equivocal, but not in the same respect. This point is very important for an understanding of why Ockham excludes equivocation between God and creature. While it is true that between man and food (compared in the term "healthy") we have two realities, we do not have the *same* formal character compared. "Healthy" corresponds to one concept in man, and to another in food. When God and creature are compared regarding "wisdom," we have two realities, plus a relation of dependence, and above all, the *same formal character* signifying God and creature. Even though they differ infinitely, this is possible because no imperfection is found in the concept of wisdom.¹³

In the concrete, that is, if we consider the intrinsic modes, there is no univocity between God and creature. Such predication is equivocal *a consilio*.¹⁴ But if we abstract and consider only the formal character of some perfection — neglecting the intrinsic modes — this formal character signifies both, provided there is no imperfection implicitly involved in its definition.¹⁵ Since, *in the abstract*, one concept signifies God and creature, the predication is not equivocal. But, before we can conclude that it is univocal, we must examine Ockham's teaching on analogy; for, analogical predication must be excluded too.

2. *Predication of God and creature is not analogical.* — The predication of a common term about God and creature is not analogical. This holds if equivocation is taken as common to both *a casu* and *a consilio*; for, in this supposition, analogy is not a medium between univocity and equivocation.¹⁶ It holds, too, if equivocation is taken as restricted to *a casu*, and analogy as synonymous with *a consilio* predication; for, there is still plurality of concept.¹⁷ The same is true if we take analogy in the sense of analogy of proportionality; this, too, is reduced either to univocity or equivocation.¹⁸

¹² Cf. Chapter IV, note 15. ¹³ Cf. Chapter III, note 117.

¹⁴ *ibid.* note 84. ¹⁵ *ibid.* note 117. ¹⁶ Cf. p. 123.

¹⁷ Cf. p. 128. ¹⁸ Cf. p. 130 ff.

a) *Equivocation is common to a casu and a consilio.* — In this first supposition Ockham told us that all predication is either in concept, in word, or in writing. In neither of these can we find analogical predication of God and creature.

aa) *In concept* — We have already concluded that Ockham holds analogy between God and creature in the real order, but not in the conceptual order.¹⁹ It cannot be a medium in the conceptual order because of his doctrine about the concept as a formal sign.²⁰ One concept has one signification, and cannot signify several things in so far as they differ. The wax tablet receives the impression of a fifty-cent piece, and thus becomes a sign of it. Until that impression is removed, it cannot become a sign of a different coin, i. e., a *qualitatively* different one.²¹ There is no equivocal or analogical concept in the doctrine of Ockham. A *simple* concept which says “partly the same and partly different” is impossible, according to him. Therefore, a common *word* can signify two different things as different, but it will signify along with *two* parallel concepts. There is no equivocation in *concept*. Moreover, since he identifies analogy with equivocation (*a consilio*) in this supposition, it follows from his own words that all analogy must be reduced to univocity when it is a case of predication of concepts.²²

Still, one common concept signifies God and creature only in so far as they are conceived as *similar*, as existing realities in the proportion of dependence regarding the same formal character or definition. All *concrete* predication of concepts about God and creature is predication of an equivocal *word* which signifies along with two concepts: one signifies God, and the other, creature.²³ Now, if analogy is identified with equivocation *a consilio*, as it is here, this predication of *word* could be called analogical predication. But it is doubtful whether this would please those who hold an analogical concept.²⁴

It should also be noted that *abstract* predication is also predication of equivocal words (with more than one parallel concept), if there

¹⁹ Cf. p. 96. ²⁰ Cf. pp. 25, 115, 123—125.

²¹ Cf. pp. 67—71. ²² Cf. Chapter IV, note 30.

²³ Cf. Chapter III, note 84. ²⁴ Cf. pp. 125—126.

is no proportion regarding the *same* formal character, as happens when "stone" is predicated of God and of petrine substance.²⁵

The difference between the proponents of analogy and Ockham seems to come down to this: when Ockham says *composed concept*, or several concepts signify things which are partly the same and partly different, his opponents say that such a concept is *one secundum quid*.

If this is the correct state of the question, Ockham could ask with Toohey:²⁶ If God and creature are partly the same and partly different, so far as they are signified by one term, which part of the signification of this term shows them the same, and which part shows them different?²⁷

bb) *In word or writing* — Regarding God and creature, there are no analogical concepts. What about analogical words? There is no such thing as a distinct mode of predication called analogy.²⁸ The signification of words is parallel to the signification of concepts, and is subordinated to them.²⁹ If the word "wisdom" is imposed once to signify God and creature by means of one concept, the word is predicated univocally, just as the concept is. If a word, such as "stone," is imposed to signify two things to which correspond two concepts, e. g., the immutability of God and a rock, the predication is equivocal. Two *different* formal characters are in the mind; one corresponds to a reality, and the other to a figure of speech. Ockham admits these might be called analogical words, but he is talking of analogy as synonymous with equivocation;³⁰ it is not a distinct mode of predication.

Again, we have equivocation in *concrete* predication of God and creature. For instance, creature is wise according to his own proper wisdom, and God is wise according to His proper wisdom. The word "wise" signifies God and creature, but this is an equivocal

²⁵ Cf. Chapter III, note 87 and pp. 119—122.

²⁶ Toohey, op. cit. pp. 109—110, 124—125.

²⁷ Cf. pp. 87—90 and Chapter III, note 120.

²⁸ Cf. Chapter IV, note 43.

²⁹ Cf. p. 31. ³⁰ Cf. Chapt IV, note 44.

word, for it corresponds to two concepts. Once more we may call this an analogical word, but it means exactly the same to call it an equivocal word. In Ockham's system there is no analogical predication distinct from univocity and equivocation, as long as equivocation is taken to include both *a casu* and *a consilio*. Analogy is identified with *a consilio* predication, and in our present supposition, *a consilio* is equivocal. Predication of God and creature is either univocal or equivocal.

b) *Equivocation is restricted to a casu and analogy is identified with a consilio.* — Here Ockham offers a sort of compromise. Analogy means exactly the same as *a consilio* equivocation.³¹ But it is no longer called *equivocation*. Equivocation is now restricted to *strict* equivocation or *a casu*. Equivocal predication then means *no* notes are considered the same, and one word is imposed *casually* on two objects.³² Such equivocation would be a mode of signifying where one word signifies different things which are *merely called* the same; the mind perceives nothing common about them. This leaves the whole field of predication based on causal relation (except univocal predication) open to analogy. Analogy, as we must remember, is identified with what was previously called equivocation *a consilio*.

Ockham rejects this type of predication about God and creature. The reason is that even here there is not *one* concept signifying God and creature. As long as we do not have one concept common to both, we have no knowledge of God in this life.³³ In any predication which is not univocal, we have two concepts: one signifying the first being (God, in this case), and another signifying the second being (creature). There is no equivocation or analogy in concept.

It is true that the *Defensorium Ockham* admits analogy in concept.³⁴ This work, however, is not certainly authentic. Moreover, even

³¹ Cf. pp. 128—130. ³² Cf. pp. 116—117.

³³ Cf. Chapter I, note 4.

³⁴ Def. Ockh. c. 20: "Analogia est quidam ordo attributionis, cum scil., praedicatum aliquod per prius convenit uni quam alteri. Et iste ordo habetur potissime in conceptibus, quia voces non videntur habere essentialem ordinem ad res in repraesentando eas, ad placitum enim est, quod voces significant. Et per consequens, si aliquo ordine significant, hoc prius, hoc vero posterius, hoc est ad placitum."

granting its authenticity, or that the author knew and expressed the mind of Ockham correctly, there is no change in position. For this work confines analogy in concept to concepts which are called analogical — not because *one* such concept signifies two different beings in so far as different — but because of the order of attribution found in these concepts.

There is such an order of concepts in three cases. First, when concepts are predicated of one object *in quid*, and of another *in quale*, e. g., “wise is wise,” and “man is wise.” The subject of the first proposition has a priority regarding the signification of the predicate because it is predicated *in quid*. The second proposition is predicated *in quale*, and so its signification is posterior in order to the first.³⁵ But this term “wise” can have two concepts corresponding to it in the concrete, e. g., when applied to God and creature. Even here it is not one analogical concept signifying both, but two concepts: one for God, and one for creature. In the abstract, it is one denominative concept (univocity *in quale*) signifying both.

The second mode of analogy is found where the concept of the predicate is denominative of two things, or it is predicated *in quale* of both. But of one the denomination is intrinsic, and of the other extrinsic, e. g., “animal is healthy,” and “food is healthy.” Here again we have order in the attribution of the two concepts: “animal”

³⁵ *ibid.*: “Videtur autem analogia in conceptu plures habere modos: Unus est quando conceptus praedicatur de uno in quid et de alio in quale. Tunc per prius convenit hoc ei, de quo praedicatur in quid, posterius autem ei, de quo praedicatur in quale. Priores enim sunt conceptus quidditativi quam denominativi. Verbi gratia, accipio istas propositiones: Album est coloratum, lignum est coloratum. Istud praedicatum ‘est coloratum’ per prius convenit subiecto primae propositionis, per posterius vero subiecto secundae propositionis, quia in prima est praedicatio quidditativa et per se, in secunda praedicatio per accidens et denominativa. Similiter: Sapiens est sapiens, et: Homo est sapiens. Per prius convenit praedicatum subiecto propositionis primae, per posterius subiecto propositionis secundae. Immo secunda propositio non esset vera, nisi prior esset vera. Et ita erit quaedam attributio et analogia in conceptibus talium praedicatorum. Et iste est primus modus analogiae, secundum quem conceptus praedicati est quidditativus de uno et denominativus de alio.”

has a prior claim to the signification of the concept "healthy."³⁶ The explanation of this case need not detain us; we have treated it often enough. There are two concepts, and they are called analogical because of the order of attribution between them.

The third mode of analogy is had in a *quidditative* concept, or one concept common to many, where there is an essential order between the objects signified. Then the concept signifies first that which is prior in that order, and it signifies in the second place the posterior object. This can happen, for example, when the second depends on the first in such a way that it would be a contradiction to verify that concept of the second example except when it depends on the prior. In this way it might be said that "being" is predicated analogically of God and creature, because it cannot signify creatures except for the reason that creature depends on God; but it signifies God even if creature would not depend on God. Moreover, it signifies God more principally than it does creature.³⁷

³⁶ *ibid.*: "Secundus modus analogiae est quando conceptus praedicati est denominativus de duobus, de uno quidem denominatione intrinseca, de altero vero extrinseca. Tunc enim conceptus denominativus per prius convenit ei, quod est denominatum intrinsece, quam ei quod est denominatum extrinsece. Sicut cum dicitur: Animal est sanum, et: urina est sana. In prima enim praedicatione est praedicatum denominativum denominatione intrinseca, in secunda denominatione extrinseca, quia a forma extrinseca non informante rem significatam sed rem aliam; et ideo per prius dicitur praedicatum de subiecto primae propositionis, puta sanum de animali, quam de subiecto secundae propositionis, puta sanum de urina."

³⁷ *ibid.*: "Tertius modus analogiae est quando conceptus praedicati est quidditativus de duobus habentibus ordinem essentialem inter se; tunc enim conceptus ille, quamvis sit quidditativus de utroque, tamen per prius dicitur de illo quod est prius in illo ordine, quam de illo quod est posterius essentialiter."

"Iste autem ordo contingit tribus modis. Uno modo quando posterius sic dependet a priori, quod contradictio est illum conceptum verificari de posteriori nisi cum dependet a priori. Isto modo dicit Commentator, quod ens convenit analogice Deo et creaturae, quia non potest convenire creaturae nisi quia dependet a Deo; convenit autem Deo etiam si creaturae non dependerent a Deo, et pro tanto convenit principalius Deo quam creaturae."

But the fact remains that, in this last case, there is *one* concept, and the predication is univocal. This is certain because the *Defensorium* continues by reducing analogy to univocity, equivocation or denomination (*in quale* univocity) in the same way as Ockham's certainly authentic works.³⁸ As for this example of "being" predicated analogically of God and creature, the author says plainly that this is univocal predication, since the one concept is quidditative of both, and this is always strict univocity.³⁹ It is *called* analogy because the concept does not apply equally primarily, but has some order in its signification of two objects.⁴⁰

Consequently, the *Defensorium* can be used as a confirmation of Ockham's doctrine as explained in other works. Analogy is not a distinct mode of predication. Even when analogy is substituted for equivocation *a consilio*, it is not a third mode. The definition of *a consilio* in this supposition remains the same; therefore, it is not in the order of *concepts*. If we speak of an analogical *concept*, as the *Defensorium* does, it is synonymous with a univocal concept. This univocal concept is predicated *in quid* (strict univocity) or *in quale* (denominative univocity).

3. *Analogy of proportionality*. — In conformity with his doctrine, Ockham reduces analogy of proportionality to either univocity or

³⁸ *ibid.*: "Oportet autem nos reducere hanc divisionem praedicamentorum, quae est per univocum, aequivocum et denominativum, ut ostendamus quoniam omnis analogia est aut in univocis, aut aequivocis, aut denominativis, et quod analogia non est aliquid praeter ista, sicut quidam existimant."

³⁹ *ibid.*: "Analogia tertii modi qui est ex hoc quod unus conceptus quidditativus duorum propter ordinem essentialem inter ipsa dicitur de eis quodam ordine et non aequae primo, vere est univocatio, quia in tali analogia conceptus est quidditativus plurium; et ideo conceptus est univocus quia, de quibus est quidditativus, de eisdem est univocus. Immo et vox quae imponitur iuxta illum conceptum, est univoca per definitionem univocorum. Quia vero conceptus non aequae primo convenit illis pluribus, ideo ille conceptus est analogus, et vox iuxta illum conceptum, si talis ordo debet attendi in voce qualis in conceptu, est analogia per definitionem analogiae."

⁴⁰ See the preceding note. Analogy and univocity are practically synonymous here.

equivocation.⁴¹ Consequently, there is no analogical predication of God and creature even in this sense. Analogy of proportionality is univocity if the basis of predication is similarity at least regarding the same formal character.

A problem arises from these various statements of Ockham. We know that he says "wisdom" is predicated univocally of God and creature in the abstract.⁴² We know, too, that this same term is predicated equivocally in the concrete.⁴³ Finally, we know that he must reduce this concrete predication to equivocation, if it is placed in the form of analogy of proportionality.⁴⁴ The reason is that analogy of proportionality compares things as they are in reality, with their intrinsic modes; in a word, they are compared *concretely*. As a matter of fact, Thomistic analogy is expressed concretely: "Wisdom : God : : human wisdom : Solomon."⁴⁵ But in this sense there is no similarity between God and creature.⁴⁶ If we accept Ockham's idea of real similarity, we cannot compare God and creature concretely in the form of proportionality; or better, if we do compare them, we will see at once that the predication is equivocal.

When the example is placed in the form of proportionality, the difference between Ockham and the analogists is placed in a new light. In this form, the latter do not want to admit that we can abstract from the intrinsic modes of God and creature. Once this would be done, there would be no reason to deny a univocal concept of God and creature. Ockham puts his finger squarely on the crux of the problem when he says that some demand both the *word* and the *thing* be put on a par before we can predicate univocally.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Cf. pp. 130—136.

⁴² Cf. p. 89.

⁴³ *ibid.* and Chapter III, note 84.

⁴⁴ Cf. pp. 134—135.

⁴⁵ Cf. Byles, *op. cit.* p. 341.

⁴⁶ Cf. pp. 84—85.

⁴⁷ Cf. p. 85. Van de Woestyne seems to demand this parity of both thing and concept, for he says: "Est ponendum . . . illud reale indeterminatissimum in quo entia omnia, determinationibus relictis, conveniunt, quodque, obiectivo conceptu obtento, *in ordine logico* subiectum est omnium praedicatorum, *in ordine ontologico* est fundamentum realitatis.

"Hinc iam quaeritur:

"Utrum in rebus existentibus, sive sint substantiae aut accidentia, sive dicantur Creator aut creaturae, conceptui obiectivo respondeat

He rejects this requisite, and says that only the word must be put on a par regarding both objects. Then he takes another step, arguing that words are signs. All admit that a word-sign can be treated in this way. Concepts are also signs. Therefore, a concept can be put on a par with two different objects — provided we neglect the individual differences.⁴⁸

The Thomists especially do not want to abstract these intrinsic modes. They argue that the Being of God is infinitely more perfect than the being of creature.⁴⁹ That which gives the meaning to the word "being" in the creature is formally different, infinitely different from that which gives the meaning to Being in God. The concept of "being" does not make a perfect precision between the different modes of being, *for the very reason that the very difference is also being*.⁵⁰

Even though Ockham brushes off analogy of proportionality, he would have to concede that the formula of proportionality expresses the conflict between him and his adversaries. If we acknowledge with Ockham that we can conceive something without implicitly including its intrinsic modes, it follows that we can have a univocal concept of that something and of another thing, even if the two differ infinitely. If we do not admit this possibility, if there is not a perfect precision between the modes of being, then it is evident that there can be no one common concept of God and creature. At best we would have an analogical concept.

It seems to me that Ockham can hold his own in answering this position. Toohey points out that we cannot know or prove that

realitas, quae in omnibus eodem modo invenitur et describitur? Affirmantes non possunt non admittere entis univocationem, negantes analogiam entis ponunt." — op. cit. vol. 2, p. 186.

Garrigou-Lagrange says expressly that we cannot abstract from the intrinsic modes, and therefore, being signifies God and creature in a simple concept of proportional unity. Cf. *God: His existence and nature*; vol. 2; trans. from the 5th French ed. by Bede Rose, O. S. B. St. Louis, Herder, 1947, pp. 453 ff.

⁴⁸ Cf. Chapter III, note 80.

⁴⁹ Cf. Byles, op. cit. p. 344.

⁵⁰ *ibid.* p. 359.

¹¹ Menges, Ockham.

God is infinite from the fact that He is a being.⁵¹ Ockham told us that "being" is a more general term than either God or creature. We cannot say: "A is a being; therefore, A is God." Nor can we say: "A is a being; therefore, A is a creature." But we can say: "A is God (or creature); therefore, A is a being."⁵²

Toohy takes up the point that "being" prescinds only imperfectly and inadequately from the modes of infinite and finite, and that consequently, these modes are always included in the concept. Let us hear his own answer to this: "'Prescinding' means 'leaving something out of thought'; hence, 'imperfectly or inadequately prescinding' means 'imperfectly or inadequately leaving something out of thought.' And what does this mean? Surely no one would maintain that we partly leave and partly do not leave something out of thought. However, the expression 'imperfect or inadequate precision' is probably intended to mean that there is only one side to the precision; that is, that while we may think of an object as a being without thinking of it as such and such, we cannot think of it as such and such without thinking of it as a being . . .

"For example: 'Four-footed' is either being or nothing: obviously it is not nothing; therefore it is being. Consequently, the term 'being' signifies 'four-footed,' though it signifies this mode implicitly. Therefore, when the term 'being' is applied to a horse, it signifies 'four-footed.' Does the term 'being' drop this signification when it is applied to God and a man? How can a term drop this signification which it necessarily has even though that signification is implicit?"⁵³

The whole dispute boils down to two questions: 1. Must the *res* be the same in both objects in order to have one univocal concept of them?⁵⁴ 2. Can we abstract from the intrinsic modes of a perfection when we conceive it? If the *things* need not be put on a par, and if we can neglect the intrinsic modes, then God and creature are not predicated of analogically. For Ockham, however, analogy

⁵¹ Toohy, op. cit. p. 111.

⁵² Cf. pp. 87—88 and Chapter III, note 120.

⁵³ Toohy, op. cit. pp. 113—114, 120.

⁵⁴ Cf. pp. 85, 148—149.

is a distinct mode of predication in no sense of the word. Consequently, if the predication of God and creature is neither equivocal nor analogical, it must be univocal.

II. HOW OCKHAM ABSTRACTS TO ONE UNIVOCAL CONCEPT ABOUT GOD AND CREATURE

In spite of the immeasurable difference between God and creature, one concept common to the two is possible: "Although many things are at first diverse, as the authors express it, still one concept common and univocal to God and creature can be predicated."⁵⁵ How does Ockham show that there is one univocal concept? In the following text he uses a process of elimination. We do not know God intuitively or abstractively, i. e., in the first abstraction which takes place before the formation of a concept. Therefore, there remains only conceptual knowledge of God. This concept is not proper to God; in consequence, it is common to God and creature:

"I say that the concept of being is univocal to God and to all things. This is evident because . . . we know God neither intuitively nor abstractively. Concerning intuition it is evident. As for abstractive knowledge, this is proved by the fact that every such abstractive knowledge presupposes intuitive. We do not know God then in Himself as He is, but in some concept. And then, either this concept will be simple, and then it is common because it is not proper (and our thesis is proved), or it is a composed concept. In the latter case, some part of it will be common and simple, because that concept is not composed of proper concepts and therefore, it is composed of common concepts. And thus, our thesis is proved that there is some concept common to God and to all other things."⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Quod. V, 14: "Quamvis multa sunt primo diversa illo modo quo loquuntur auctores, tamen de eis bene potest praedicari unus conceptus et univoce."

⁵⁶ *ibid.*: "Dico quod conceptus entis est univocus Deo et omnibus rebus, quod patet, quia . . . nec cognoscimus Deum cognitione intuitiva nec abstractiva. De intuitiva patet. De abstractiva probatur quia quaelibet

The general division of this text offers two ways of knowing God: *in se* and *in concept*. The first way cannot be held whether it is intuitive or abstractive knowledge. In consequence, we must know Him in a concept. This concept is either proper to God or common to God and creature. Each of these possibilities deserves separate treatment.

A. GOD IS NOT KNOWN IN SE

Cognitio in se is singular knowledge. It includes two acts: intuitive and abstractive. Furthermore, it is opposed to *conceptual* knowledge.⁵⁷ Ockham's text above says we do not know God in this way. That is to say, we do not have this immediate, singular knowledge of God either in the intuitive or in the abstractive act.

1. *Intuitive act* — This intuitive act is a cognition which is intellectual, immediate and singular of the *existence and presence* of a thing. It is also *evident* knowledge, known *per se*. In this life, the objects of this act are sense data and our internal states, such as intellections, acts of the will, joy, sadness, etc.⁵⁸

We see at once from the nature and objects of this act that we do not know God intuitively. God is not evident to me as Socrates, or whiteness, or my feeling of sadness.⁵⁹

2. *Abstractive act* — The *first* act of abstraction abstracts from the existence and presence of objects known intuitively. The same objects are known here as in the intuitive act.⁶⁰ Since we do not

talis notitia abstractiva praesupponit intuitivam. Aut cognoscimus Deum non in se sicuti est sed in aliquo conceptu. Et tunc, aut ille conceptus erit simplex et tunc est communis quia non est proprius, et habetur propositum. Aut est conceptus compositus, et tunc aliqua pars eius erit communis et simplex, quia ille conceptus non componitur ex propriis conceptibus, ergo ex communibus, et ita habetur propositum quod aliquis conceptus erit communis Deo et omnibus aliis rebus."

⁵⁷ Cf. pp. 16—20.

⁵⁸ Cf. Chapter I, note 5.

⁵⁹ De Prin. p. 138 (40): "Sole autem qualitates pro statu vie cognoscuntur a nobis intuitive, ut patet, quia cognitio intuitiva est qua scimus de re an sit vel non sit."

⁶⁰ Cf. p. 19, or the following text: "Non quod aliquid cognoscatur, per notitiam intuitivam, quod non cognoscitur per notitiam abstractivam,

know God intuitively, neither do we know Him in *this* act of abstraction. It is true that we can have simple apprehension of the propositions: God is wise, God exists, etc., but this knowledge is not evident, since it is not founded on intuition. Consequently, God is not known *in se*, immediately, whether this be the intuitive or the simple abstractive act.

B. GOD IS KNOWN IN A CONCEPT

Since we do not know God *in se*, and since we do know Him in some way, we must know Him in conceptual knowledge. Ockham's attitude is that, if we deny univocity of being, we fall into agnosticism, because we have no intuitive or abstractive knowledge of God. In this life, conceptual knowledge is the only link between us and what cannot be experienced. Therefore, our knowledge of God must rest upon something common to both.⁶¹

The concept of God must begin with creature, since we do not know Him directly in singular knowledge. Our key text says that this concept of God is either simple or composed. A simple concept is one which *de facto* apprehends in one act of the intellect.⁶² A composed concept *de facto* conceives in several acts of the intellect; it is not a single concept, but several.⁶³ God is known to us in simple and composed concepts.

1. *Simple concept* — A simple concept can be either proper to God or common to God and creature. Certainly, we do not know God in a concept which is simple *and proper* to Him, because we do not know Him *in se*. Our concepts of God are taken from creatures. Consequently, they cannot be proper to God. A simple, proper concept is had only when something is perceived immediately.

sed idem totaliter et sub omni eadem ratione cognoscitur per utramque notitiam. Sed distinguuntur per istum modum, quia notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia, virtute cuius potest sciri, utrum res sit vel non, ita quod, si sit res, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse, et evidenter cognoscit eam esse." — Prol. ed. Boehner, q. 1. Z, p. 24, lines 18—24.

How intuitive and abstractive knowledge differ is found in Vignaux, op. cit. pp. 11 ff. and Day, op. cit. pp. 182 ff.

⁶¹ Cf. Chapter I, note 4.

⁶² *ibid.* note 28.

⁶³ *ibid.* note 30.

A blind man, for instance, cannot have a simple, proper concept of color.⁶⁴

It follows that, if we know God in a simple concept, this concept will be common to God and creature. As a matter of fact, we do have simple concepts of God: being, wise, good, etc. Hence, concludes, Ockham, our thesis is proved that we know God in a concept common to Him and to creature.⁶⁵

Such a concept does not signify God exactly and perfectly. We never have perfectly exact knowledge of anything, much less of God. Here we neglect the intrinsic modes of God and creature. The formal character of this concept intends both. It is not a concept of God *alone*. If a concept proper to God alone is desired, we must add all perfection to this formal character, and then we no longer have a simple concept, but a composed one.

2. *Composed concept* — A composed concept is, of course, a collection of concepts. As such, it can be proper to God: "Some being is goodness, wisdom, love, etc."⁶⁶ In our key text, Ockham

⁶⁴ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. R: "Nihil potest cognosci a nobis ex puris naturalibus in conceptu simplici sibi proprio, nisi ipsum in se praecognoscatur. Ista patet inductive. Aliter enim posset dici quod color cognosci posset a caeco nato in conceptu proprio coloribus, quia non est maior ratio quod Deus cognoscatur in conceptu sibi proprio, sine praecognitione ipsius in se quam color, sed patet quod a tali non potest concipi color in conceptu sibi proprio. Ergo nec Deus."

⁶⁵ Before we continue, a word is in order about *proper* knowledge of God. On pp. 98—99, we spoke of the "proper perfections" of God. Now, we are saying that God is not known *in se*, and therefore, there is no *proper* (and simple) concept of God. But in the former place, Ockham is not speaking of something simple and proper to God alone, but of something proper to God and to *some* creatures. There he opposes a concept common to God and *some* creatures. "Perfection," for instance, is common to God and all things — there is nothing proper about it. "Wisdom," however, is common to God and *some* creatures, i. e., only rational creatures. Therefore, it is proper to God and to *some* creatures. Here we are speaking of a concept which would be simple and proper to God *alone*.

⁶⁶ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 2. F—G: "Aliquod ens est bonitas, est dilectio, est sapientia, etc." Raymond Lull had the same idea. Cf. *Ars generalis ultima*. Pars II. *De figuris*. Majorca, 1645, p. 3.

argues that some part of such a concept is common and simple. This is easily grasped because he already pointed out that we do not have simple *and proper* concepts of God. Now, a composed concept is composed of simple concepts. If simple concepts are not proper to God, they are common to God and creature.

The example quoted above, "some being is goodness, wisdom, love, etc.," is proper to God alone. If predicated of a creature, it would not be a true proposition. But if the proposition is analyzed, if the concepts are separated, each one of them is simple and common to God and creature. When put together however, the composition is applicable to God only.

Vignaux⁶⁷ explains this doctrine well. "Being," "wisdom," "love," etc., taken together *in creatures*, cannot signify the same thing — otherwise there would no longer be *several* concepts. The objects corresponding are really distinct. These concepts coincide only when they signify the divine object. Separately, they are common to God and creature; together, they are proper to God. When we say: creature is wise and good, these two concepts signify two distinct realities, two accidents or qualities. In God there is no such distinction. God has no accidents. His attributes are not distinct from His essence. The distinction is only in our mind, which considers the undivided divinity in a *mosaic* fashion because of our weak intellect. But our concepts cannot create a distinction in God.⁶⁸

Abbagnano's otherwise excellent work on Ockham slips at this point, for, he says that, according to Ockham, we cannot know God by reason in any way at all, neither His existence nor His essence. (Cf. Abbagnano, Nicola, *Guglielmo di Ockham*. Dott. Gino Carabba. ed. Lanciano, 1931, p. 253.) He refers to Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 3. q. 2. Q. But in this passage, Ockham says we do not know the essence of God more than His existence, *for the two are the same*. This text, of course, must be interpreted in the light of what we have said on pp. 101—104.

⁶⁷ Vignaux, op. cit. p. 46. Cf. pp. 25 ff.

⁶⁸ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. U: "Et ideo dico, quod sine omni compositione ex parte Dei, aliquid est univocum sibi et creaturae, quia sicut univocum quibuscumque individuís cuiuscumque speciei specialissimae non facit compositionem cum ipsis individuís, nec cum quibuscumque existentibus in individuís, ita nec univocum cum Deo et creatura facit

This point of view must deny the formal distinction between the attributes of God. Ockham does deny it, not however in the Trinity.⁶⁹ Our concepts are really distinct, but we cannot argue from them to a real distinction or a formal distinction in God. The reason is because there is no univocity *in re*, but only in concept.⁷⁰

Critical Notes

As a conclusion to this section, it seems necessary to go into detail a bit on two points which have been implied. They are related topics, and need more development to bring out Ockham's teaching. This is not intended as a defense of Ockham, but as an illustration of his consistency within his own system. These points deal with distinction in God and the adequacy of the concept of God. One might object that an *adequate* concept which seems to say *distinction* of perfections in God should correspond to the same distinction *in re*.

1. *Distinction in God* — We have seen that a concept common to two objects tells us that these two objects have similar qualities. If the qualities are not similar, *two* concepts are needed to signify the two different objects, e. g., "stone" means a petrine substance (one concept), and it can also mean in a figurative sense a stumbling block (second concept).⁷¹ It would almost seem, then, that wherever

aliquam compositionem in Deo, et causa est, quia universaliter, nihil quod est a parte rei est univocum quibuscumque."

ibid. O: "Dico quod nullum univocum est de essentia univocatorum suorum, nec ponit in eis aliquid realiter, nec facit compositionem cum eis, nec cum aliquo quod est in eis, quia omne univocum est universale, vel saltem commune praedicabile de illis de quibus praedicatur coniunctim acceptis in numero plurali, sicut Sortes et Plato sunt homines, homo et asinus sunt animalia, per quod excluditur essentia divina, quia non praedicatur pluraliter. Haec enim est falsa: pater et filius sunt plures essentiae, sed declaratum est in quaestionibus praecedentibus quod nullum universale est de essentia vel quidditate suorum inferiorum, nec facit compositionem cum aliquo singulari, nec aliquo existenti in singulari."

⁶⁹ Cf. Chapter I, note 27.

⁷⁰ Cf. note 68, Chapter III, note 95 and pp. 148—151.

⁷¹ Cf. pp. 89—91.

there are two concepts, there are two really, or at least formally, distinct objects.

If this were correct, we could propose a serious objection, because Ockham denies the real distinction in God and the formal distinction everywhere except in the Blessed Trinity.⁷² The problem would be this: how can Ockham say that distinct concepts signify distinct things, if there is no distinction in God? Moreover, we saw that these concepts signifying God and creature signify *realities* in both, not a reality and a figure of speech.⁷³

Now: justice is a reality, wisdom is a reality, goodness is a reality, etc. But justice is not wisdom, and neither of them is goodness. For each of these we have a really distinct concept. Does it follow from this that there should be a real or a formal distinction in God? This same argument seemingly reasons to real distinction in creatures. On the one hand, Ockham apparently needs a distinction in God, and on the other, he denies all distinction. Or, if he prefers to deny it, as he really does, should it not follow that justice, wisdom, goodness, etc., are synonyms in God? Each of these concepts signifies God. Why do we speak of *many* concepts signifying God? Another way to present this objection would be to say that Ockham holds that God knows by His will, and wills by His intellect.⁷⁴

The bottom falls out of this objection because distinct concepts do not argue to distinct realities in Ockham's teaching.⁷⁵ When we have denominative concepts, each concept signifies *principally* the *whole* thing, and *secondarily*, each concept has its own *connotation*.⁷⁶

⁷² Cf. Chapter I, note 27.

⁷³ Cf. note 56: "conceptus erit communis Deo et omnibus aliis *rebus*." See also pp. 90—91, 122.

⁷⁴ Cf. Maurer, *op. cit.* p. 219, and Gandillac, *op. cit.* p. 445. Maurer gives no text of Ockham. Gandillac refers to the text quoted below in note 77, as well as to q. 1. C. This latter citation, however, is not Ockham's opinion but that of an adversary, and Ockham clearly rejects it later. Cf. BB.

⁷⁵ Cf. note 68.

⁷⁶ With quidditative concepts, of course, Ockham says that distinction of concept conforms to distinction in the object, and vice versa: *Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 3. H:* "Quod tamen A et B sint una res, et A non

Let us take an example where there is definitely no distinction of parts in the object, viz., the soul. Its faculties are neither really nor formally distinct, according to Ockham. Suppose we have two concepts, "intellect" and "will," signifying this one thing (the soul). Ockham says that the intellect is not distinct from the will. In this theory, the mind cannot conceive the intellect without knowing the will, and vice versa. The reason is that the concept of intellect signifies principally the *whole* soul, and the concept of will signifies principally the *whole* soul, just as in any other *in quale* predication.⁷⁷ But these distinct concepts do not imply distinc-

distinguatur realiter a B, et tamen, quod intellectus dividat A et B, intelligendo A et non intelligendo B, vel econverso, est impossibile."

⁷⁷ Cf. pp. 47 ff. Abbagnano (op. cit. p. 286) calls attention to this text: Com. ed. Lug. II. q. 24. K: "Intellectus et voluntas sunt idem realiter in se et cum essentia animae. Sed distinguo de potentia, nam potentia primo modo accipitur pro tota descriptione exprimente quid nominis potentiae; alio modo pro illo, quod denominatur ab illo nomine vel conceptu. Primo modo loquendo de intellectu et voluntate, dico quod distinguuntur, nam definitio exprimens quid nominis intellectus est ista: 'intellectus est substantia animae potens intelligere.' Sed descriptio voluntatis est quod est substantia animae potens velle . . . Sed loquendo de intellectu et voluntate secundo modo, sic intellectus non plus distinguitur a voluntate quam ab intellectu, vel quam Deus a Deo, vel Socrates a Socrate, quia nec distinguitur a voluntate se nec ratione. Et sic est una substantia animae potens habere distinctos actus ratione."

The Def. Ock. c. 17 confirms this view: "Praedicamenta sunt coordinationes signorum et non rerum . . . Eadem res simplex potest multis modis concipi tam secundum multitudinem conceptuum quidditativorum quam secundum multitudinem conceptuum denominativorum. Secundum multitudinem quidem conceptuum quidditativorum, quod res simplex potest conceptu quidditativo concipi confuse et distincte. Et confuse quidem per multos gradus confuse concipiendo. Primo, quod si concipiatur tali conceptu quod intellectus non distinguit hanc rem a quacumque re, et est conceptus entis. Secundo, si concipitur tali conceptu quo intellectus non distinguit hanc rem ab aliis rebus sui generis, et est conceptus generis generalissimi. Et sic ulterius usque ad conceptum speciei specialissimae, et usque ad conceptum proprium in quo concipitur distincte. Secundum multitudinem autem conceptuum denominativorum, multis modis potest eadem res simplex concipi, quia conceptu absoluto et respectivo, ut cum

tion in the object (the soul). Their *secondary* significations connote different *acts* of the one soul: the concept of intellect connotes the soul capable of intellectual acts, and the concept of will connotes the soul capable of volitional acts. The same is true of our distinct concepts of God. We cannot say, according to Ockham, that God knows with His will, and loves with His intellect. The concepts of intellect and will signifying God, signify principally the essence of God. God knows by His essence, and wills by His essence. Secondly, these concepts signify *acts* of God, scil., acts of knowing and willing, and the formal characters of these two concepts are different.

albedo concipitur ut extensa et ut similis. Ad propositum dico quod, non obstante simplicitate, infinitate, independentia primae causae, et quibuscumque aliis conditionibus rei, ipsa poterit esse in praedicamento eo modo quo competit rei esse in praedicamento, et potest concipi conceptibus absolutis et respectivis, qui vere sunt respectus praedicamentales, nam conceptus causae verissime est conceptus realis, et verissime supponit pro Deo, et convertibiliter cum hac determinatione prima, ut dicatur causa prima, et uterque conceptus determinantis scilicet et determinabilis est relativus. Item conceptus sapientiae est conceptus qualitatis. Conceptus sapientiae quidditativus est de Deo, et conceptus substantiae confusus est determinabilis per conceptus alios ut supponat convertibiliter pro Deo. Et de istis conceptibus quidditativis, si essent nobis notae, posset formari ratio indicans quid est esse, et ista compositio solum est in conceptibus et signis. Sed res simplex est essentia in se, et non est limitatio in Deo propter hoc quod conceptus supponentes pro Deo limitantur ad certa genera, sicut non est limitatio in Deo ex hoc quod vox ipsum significans et pro eo supponens limitatur ad certam partem orationis . . .

“Deus vere est substantia et in genere substantiae et ita vere sicut angelus, et praedicatio quidditativa dicendo Deus est substantia. Item Deus denominatur sapiens denominatione quae est de genere qualitatis, nec oportet propter hoc quod sapientia sit res distincta in Deo, etsi sit res addita in creatura, quia per accidens est quod distinctio in re concomitatur quandoque distinctionem in denominantibus . . .

“Conceptus sapientiae qua denominatur Deus sapiens pertinet ad genus qualitatis, et ita non sunt removenda a Deo illa praedicamenta artis dialecticae, quamvis hoc dixerit quidam . . . vulgo philosophantium . . . circa simplicitatem divinam, quoniam si concepisset praedicamenta de Deo, crederet vulgus huiusmodi debere consequenter concedi plures realitates in eo.”

Why do we conceive God in this way? The only reason for this seems to lie in the weakness of our mind. We know objects are really distinct in creature because they come and go; some have them, and some do not. But with God, we can conceive Him only *per partes*, in a *mosaic* fashion, and to *conceive* by parts does not make parts in Him.

But the question is not yet finished. Why do we say that wisdom is a *reality* in God, and goodness is a *reality* in God, etc., and that wisdom is not goodness? Ockham would answer that every effect demands a cause. Created wisdom is an effect and its cause is God. Cause and effect are in the relation of similarity.⁷⁸ Therefore, wisdom must be in God *in some way*. Since wisdom has no imperfection in its formal character, and since it is better to attribute such a perfection to God than not to attribute it,⁷⁹ wisdom must be in God *really*. The same must be said for goodness, justice, and all like perfection. Now these perfections are not in God in the same way as in creatures, i. e., accidentally and really distinct from the essence.⁸⁰ God *is* justice, *is* wisdom, etc. If our intellect were not so imperfect, it would conceive a perfection of God, for instance, wisdom, as including all other perfections in its formal character. But because our intellect is not capable of this we are forced to conceive Him like a mosaic.

Here again, Ockham is facing the same problem as the Thomists. Byles points out precisely the same thing. In the creature, perfections exist separately; in God, as a single unit. When we say that Solomon is wise and powerful, we mean there are two realities in Solomon. When we say the same of God, we attribute one reality to Him, but we are forced to think of it as two. God's supreme simplicity is in no way impaired by our manner of thinking about Him.⁸¹

⁷⁸ Cf. p. 121.

⁷⁹ Cf. Chapter III, note 117.

⁸⁰ *ibid.* note 84.

⁸¹ Byles, *op. cit.* p. 353; cf. also note 68; De Prin. p. 58. Ockham expresses the same thing in the Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 2. F: "Perfectio attributalis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo pro aliqua perfectione simpliciter, quae est ipse Deus realiter. Alio modo pro aliqua praedicabili

2. *Adequation* — When Ockham says that we do not know God *in se*, as He is, he does not wish to intimate that our concept of God does not signify God, or in other words, that such knowledge of God is inadequate in the sense of untrue.⁸² There is no reason to say that it is less true than the cognition of any other scholastic. The Thomists also admit that knowledge of God is inadequate. Byles tells us: "Analogical knowledge . . . though it truly conveys to us the IS-ness, it does so inadequately, that is, it does not convey the full measure of the IS-ness."⁸³

Ockham means the same thing. God is not known *in se* means simply that we do not know God *intuitively*, face to face. Surely we do not know Him in this way; for all that, we do not know substance *in se* either.⁸⁴ From this we do not conclude that the quiddity of substance is absolutely unknown to us in every respect. Why conclude that Ockham means this about God? God expresses Himself in creation, and this expression cannot be false. Therefore, creation reveals something to us of the nature of God, even though this revelation is imperfect and incomplete. When we see the pure perfection of some creature, one which has no imperfection implied in its definition, this perfection belongs in God because it is better

vere de Deo et de omnibus tribus Personis coniunctim et divisim. Primo modo, dico quod non sunt plures perfectiones attributales, sed tantum est ibi una perfectio indistincta re et ratione, quae proprie et de virtute sermonis, non debet dici esse in Deo vel in divina essentia, sed est omnibus modis ipsa divina essentia. Secundo modo, dico quod non sunt nisi conceptus quidam vel signa quae possunt praedicari vere de Deo, et magis proprie debent dici conceptus attributales, vel nomina attributalia, quam perfectiones attributales, quia proprie, perfectio non est nisi res aliqua, et tales conceptus non sunt proprie res, vel non sunt perfectio, vel saltem, non sunt perfectiones simpliciter. Isti autem conceptus attributales, vel nomina attributalia, quaedam important ipsam divinam essentiam, absolute et affirmative, quaedam connotative, connotando aliquid aliud . . . Prima sunt sicut intellectus et voluntas, etc. Secunda sunt sicut prae-destinans, creans vel creativum."

⁸² Guelluy, op. cit. p. 345.

⁸³ Byles, op. cit. p. 334. Maritain has the same idea in his *Introduction to logic*; trans. by Imelda Choquette. N. Y. Sheed & Ward, 1937, p. 286.

⁸⁴ Cf. Chapter I, note 4.

for Him to have it than not to have it.⁸⁵ Ockham is in good company here. St. Bonaventure has a very similar idea, especially regarding the expression of God in creation.⁸⁶ St. Anselm, through Scotus, taught him the formula, "*melius est ipsum quam non ipsum.*" St. John Damascene says practically the same: we do not know what God is, but we know something *circa naturam Dei*.⁸⁷

It is true that this knowledge is somewhat negative. God expresses Himself in finite beings. Out of these created works, the human intellect is forced to use positive expressions about God. It is also true that God is not the same as creature, that He is fundamentally, infinitely, essentially different. Moreover, the notes of "infinite" and "finite" change the formal character of a concept, i. e., when these notes are added to a concept, it becomes a composed concept, whereas before it was simple. The formal character of the *simple* concept *does not change*. Wisdom remains wisdom, even when infinite or finite is added to it. Likewise, Ockham can point out that man differs essentially from ass, but one concept can be predicated which signifies both. Regarding God and creature, if we can abstract from the intrinsic modes, the formal character is not changed. Here is the real point of difference: can we make that abstraction or not? The Thomists cannot: "It is important to note that, though the notion of being represents to us different whatnesses, it does not represent them to us as different. It makes no perfect precision between the different modes of being, *for the very reason that the very difference is also being.*"⁸⁸

This has already been commented on,⁸⁹ so we can proceed. It is also true that in a *proper* concept of God, the formal character of the concept is changed because infinite and finite are essentially different. But a *proper* concept is not a concept *common* to God and creature. Only when we consider the bare concepts of being, goodness, wisdom, etc., — without their intrinsic modes — have

⁸⁵ Cf. Chapter III, note 117.

⁸⁶ Cf. St. Bonaventure, I. Sent. d. 35. a. 1. q. 1. ed. minor. Quaracchi, 1934, pp. 479—480.

⁸⁷ Cf. Chapter III, note 79.

⁸⁸ Byles, op. cit. p. 359.

⁸⁹ Cf. pp. 148—151.

we a common concept. This common concept does not signify God and creature *perfectly*, because it does not include the notes of infinite and finite. But if the concept has no imperfection in its definition, it is the beginning of a proper concept of God, a concept to which we add all possible perfection, and form a composed concept predicable of God alone.

Nor can a common concept be condemned as inadequate (false) on account of universality on one side (in the mind), and singularity *in re*. Certainly, any school which would hold a universal *in re* would have a more complete adequacy: a universal concept would signify a universal in the object. Ockham does not have this. He opposes the *content* of the concept, not its predicability of many.⁹⁰ But the former type of adequation has never been proved necessary, or corresponding to reality.

For adequation — a term, by the way, which Ockham does not use⁹¹ — there is required a certain similarity between knowledge and object. It need not be perfect similarity, for inadequate knowledge is not always erroneous. Inadequate knowledge is true if the positive notes of the thing are not known otherwise than as they are in the object. Ockham says if we do not change the formal character, we have true knowledge about the nature of a thing. Surely this knowledge is often very imperfect, especially in the case of a concept common to God and creature. But imperfection does not destroy the validity of the concept.

Finally, it might be objected that a *proper* concept is more or less adequate to God. But a *common* concept is not, because as Ockham insists, it includes creature as well, and therefore, it *implicitly* says *finite* being. In other words, there is no abstraction from the intrinsic mode. But for Ockham the common concept must be *generic*.⁹² If "animal" is adequate to man and horse, "being"

⁹⁰ Cf. Chapter I, note 16.

⁹¹ Cf. Boehner, *Ockham's theory of truth*, in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 5, 1945, pp. 138—161. The author tells us that Ockham's theory of truth is basically the modern theory of correspondence. The definition of logical truth is traced to its origin, and explained according to the great scholastics.

"Adequatio" means or implies conformity. ⁹² Cf. p. 83.

can be adequate to God and creature. In neither case do we include the intrinsic mode. "Animal" does not imply four-footedness when predicated of man, nor does "being" imply finite when predicated of God and creature. We simply do not consider these notes in our generic concept. — Again and again, we have seen that the point of departure occurs at the question: is it possible to conceive God and creature without implicitly considering their intrinsic modes? Ockham answers in the affirmative. If his answer is denied, then his concept is inadequate and false.

III. BEING IS PREDICATED OF GOD AND CREATURE IN QUID, PER SE, PRIMO MODO

Now we are ready to answer the last question. Some concepts are predicated univocally of God and creature (being, the convertible transcendentals, and the pure perfections).⁹³ Are they predicated *in quid* or *in quale*? For the concept of being, Ockham responds clearly that it is predicated *in quid, per se, primo modo*. For the other concepts, we must deduce from their notions how they are predicated. If they are predicated *in quid*, it follows that they are *per se*. Again, if they are *in quid*, are they the first or second mode? Finally, are *all* univocal concepts predicated *in quid*? If some are *in quale*, are they *per se* or *per accidens*?

A. THE CONCEPT OF BEING

To prove his point, Ockham uses another of his "either . . . or" arguments. From it we can see how the transcendentals and pure perfections are predicated.

1. *In quid* — The concept common to God and creature is predicated either *in quid* or *in quale*.⁹⁴ If it is predicated *in quid*, the thesis is proved. If *in quale*, we ask again: to what is this concept attributed? For instance, the concept "creative" must be attributed to *something*. There is no creative, but there is a creative *being*.

⁹³ Cf. pp. 106—108.

⁹⁴ Cf. pp. 42—51.

If this concept "being" is denominative (*in quale*), to what is it attributed? And so on, until we come to a quidditative concept, or to a *processus in infinitum*. Therefore, "being" is predicated *in quid*, since it is the most general and most simple of all notions.

The first step, then, establishes "being" as a concept predicated *in quid*. This concept of being is either common to God and creature, or proper to God, or proper to creature. It cannot be proper to God because being is a *simpliciter simplex* concept,⁹⁵ and none of our simple concepts can be proper to God,⁹⁶ because this would imply intuitive knowledge of God.

Therefore, two alternatives remain. Since the concept of being is not proper to God, it is either proper to creature, or common to God and creature. But being cannot be proper to creature. If it were, it would follow that this proposition would be false: Some creative *being* is God.⁹⁷

There is no doubt that Ockham holds the univocity of being between God and creature. We have seen this clearly stated in texts from the *Quodlibeta*⁹⁸ and from the *Commentarium in Sententias*.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ Cf. Chapter I, note 29.

⁹⁶ Cf. pp. 153—154.

⁹⁷ Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 9. T—U: "Ostendam per unam rationem quam facit doctor iste subtilis, quae mihi concludit, et arguo sic: Si Deus cognoscatur in aliquo conceptu communi sibi et aliis, quaero: aut ille conceptus est quidditativus aut denominativus. Si quidditativus, habetur propositum. Si denominativus, tunc quaero de illo cui attribuis istum conceptum denominativum. Aut est denominativus, et sic est processus in infinitum, aut quidditativus, et habetur propositum. Verbi gratia, habeo istum conceptum, puta esse creativum, quem scio esse denominativum. Et ideo oportet prae habere unum conceptum cui istum attribuo, puta dicendo quod aliquod ens est creativum, et certum est quod iste conceptus cui iste attribuitur non est denominativus, vel si sit, erit processus in infinitum, vel stabitur ad aliquem conceptum quidditativum. Et tunc quaero de illo ultimo conceptu quidditativo: aut est communis Deo et creaturae, et habetur propositum. Aut est proprius Deo, et hoc est improbatum. Aut proprius creaturae, et hoc est impossibile, quia tunc non posset supponere nisi pro creatura, et tunc haec esset falsa: aliquod ens creativum est Deus . . . Ex isto sequitur quod est aliquis conceptus unus praedicabilis in quid, per se, primo modo de Deo et creatura."

⁹⁸ Cf. note 56.

⁹⁹ Cf. note 97.

It is very surprising, therefore, to find that Baudry still holds a different view. He tells us in his latest work that Ockham rejects univocity of being, and that man cannot form a simple concept of God, but only a composed concept.¹⁰⁰ This eminent scholar uses a text from the *Expositio super librum Porphyrii* which, it seems to me, says the same thing as the texts referred to above, plus an explanation of why being is sometimes said to be equivocal. This text deserves an analysis:

"From this text of Aristotle, many think that being is predicated equivocally and not univocally, and therefore, one concept in the mind does not correspond to it, but only a common name, and the corresponding concepts are distinct. In the same way, they say that there is nothing common and univocal to the first being and to other beings. Although it is true that being is not predicated univocally of the ten predicaments, as the author says here, still I do not think it is true when they say, together with this, that to no beings of the different predicaments can there be any common concept, nor to the first being and to other beings. The reason for this is that, since the first being can be known neither *in se* nor in a simple concept proper to him, he must be known in a concept common to him and to others, and moreover, in a concept composed of many common ones which can be proper."¹⁰¹

¹⁰⁰ Baudry, op. cit. pp. 36—37: "Considérons encore la doctrine de l'univocité de l'être. Guillaume la rejette, et dégageant déjà les conséquences que son attitude implique, il conclut, en des termes proches parents de ceux qui se lisent dans le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, que l'homme ne peut pas se former de Dieu un concept simple, mais simplement un concept composé."

¹⁰¹ Porph. c. de specie, Ad: *Sed in familiis*: "Ex ista littera accipiunt multi quod ens dicitur aequivoce de decem praedicamentis et non univoce, et ideo sibi non correspondet in mente unus conceptus sed solum nomen commune est, et conceptus correspondentes sunt distincti; et eodem modo dicunt quod enti primo et ceteris entibus non est aliquid commune univocum. Quamvis verum sit quod ens non dicatur univoce de decem praedicamentis sicut auctor hic dicit, tamen quod simul cum hoc dicunt, quod nullis entibus diversorum praedicamentorum potest aliquis conceptus communis nec etiam primo enti et aliis entibus, non reputo verum. Cuius ratio est ad praesens quia, cum primum ens non possit in se cognosci aliquo

This text substantiates Ockham's previously explained position about "being" as a concept common to God and creatures. Ockham denies the position of those who reject a univocal concept between God and other beings: "I do not think it is true . . . that to no beings of the different predicaments can there be any common concept, nor to the first being and to other beings."

Being, then, is a concept common to God and creature, a univocal concept. Moreover, God can be known in a *simple* concept. In this same text, Ockham says that God cannot be known *in se*, i. e. in immediate knowledge proper to God alone. This, too, agrees exactly with the texts from the *Quodlibeta* and the *Commentarium*. The point of misunderstanding seems to be in this sentence: "the first being cannot be known . . . in a simple concept proper to him." Here again Ockham is saying precisely what he taught in the other works: God is not known in a concept which is both simple *and proper*. This does not deny that God is known in a concept which is simple *and common* to God and creature. In fact, Ockham continues and says just this in the same sentence: "he must be known in a concept common to him and to others." Up to now, he has been talking about *simple* concepts. Since Ockham is talking about the concept of being in this passage, and being is a simple concept, we can reasonably conclude that he is speaking of a simple concept common to God and creature in this text. Then he goes on exactly as in his other texts: "he must be known . . . moreover, in a concept composed of many common ones which can be proper." This, too, fits in with his previous statements. God is known in simple and common concepts, as well as in composed concepts. Composed concepts can be proper to God alone: "Aliquod ens est bonitas, est

modo, nec in conceptu simplici sibi proprio, oportet quod cognoscatur in conceptu communi sibi et aliis, et imo in conceptu composito ex multis communibus qui potest esse proprius."

Ockham refers to this text in the *Summa totius logicae*. There he states expressly that being is univocal *and* equivocal, and says that he explains how this can be in his exposition of Porphyry, i. e., in the text from Porphyry quoted here. Hence there is no change in thought here. Cf. Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 38.

dilectio, est sapientia, etc.”¹⁰² Each of these simple concepts is common to God and creature; when compounded, as here, it is proper to God alone.

The only new idea introduced in this text is the statement: “it is true that being is not predicated univocally of the ten predicaments.” What does this mean? Is it a denial of the univocity of being? Not at all. It conforms perfectly to everything we have said up to now. In the same text which Baudry cites, Ockham continues with an explanation:

“The intention of Aristotle is that being is not predicated univocally of the ten predicaments, but equivocally. The reason for this is that some predicaments signify things not only conjunctively, but *divisim*”¹⁰³.

This is not a flat and complete denial of the univocity of being. It points out that being *can* be predicated equivocally, for instance, in a case where it would signify something *divisim*, considered separately by the mind, and something else conjunctively, considered simultaneously. Thus, I can say this substance is susceptible to contraries, and this substance is susceptible to contraries, and so for each and every substance. This is one type of predicament, and being is predicated univocally and *divisim* of substance.¹⁰⁴ But some predicaments must be considered conjunctively. We cannot verify that one thing is such and such; considered together however, the predicate can be verified. For example, I cannot say this white thing is similarity, or that white thing is similarity, but I can say that two white things are in the relation of similarity.¹⁰⁵ The

¹⁰² Cf. note 66.

¹⁰³ Porph. loc. cit.: “Dico breviter quod intentio sua et etiam Aristotelis est quod ens non dicitur univoce de decem praedicamentis sed aequivoce. Cuius ratio est quia aliqua praedicamenta significant res pro quibus non tantum coniunctim sed *divisim* supponunt.”

¹⁰⁴ *ibid.*: “Verbi gratia, si dicam sic: omnis substantia est susceptibilis contrariorum, denotatur quod haec substantia sit susceptibilis contrariorum, et quod haec substantia sit susceptibilis contrariorum, et sic de aliis, sive sit una substantia sive plures in rerum natura.”

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*: “Sed aliqua praedicamenta sic res significant, quod non significant alias res quae faciant alia praedicamenta, sed magis significant

predicament of relation, therefore, receives the predication of the concept of being *equivocally and conjunctively*. The difference is seen in these examples. We can say: this substance is a being, but we cannot say: this relation is a being. Instead, we must say: these related things are beings. But being and beings are different concepts, and consequently the word "being" is equivocal.

How do we know which predicaments are predicated *divisim* and which are predicated *coniunctim*? Some predicaments signify absolute things in themselves. These are substance and certain qualities. Of these, being is predicated *divisim*, because it is said of each individually, and it is said univocally. These predicaments are absolute terms. All predicaments which are relative or imply relation are predicated *coniunctim*, because as relatives, they demand *two relata*. Therefore, being is not predicated of them individually, but beings is predicated of them conjunctively. These are the predicaments other than substance and quality. Among them Ockham lists relation, action and passion. They are connotative terms; they signify things (the subject) directly, and obliquely they connote the relation.¹⁰⁶ Being, then, is not predicated univocally of *all ten* predicaments. Nevertheless, being is predicated univocally of *some*

tales diversas res coniunctim, ut non possit verificari quod aliqua una res sit talis vel talis, sed magis quod plures res simul sumptae recipiunt praedicationem talis praedicati, sicut non possum dicere quod hoc album est similitudo, vel quod illud album sit similitudo, sed possum aliquomodo dicere quod haec duo alba sunt similitudo."

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*: "Sic igitur breviter dico quod aliqua praedicamenta sunt praedicabilia, quae secundum intentionem Aristotelis non important semper res simpliciter distinctas, immo eadem res quae importatur per unum praedicamentum, sicut per praedicamentum substantiae vel qualitatis, et hoc absolute et non cum alio, hoc est, quod ipsummet per se sumptum recipit praedicationem illius praedicamenti, et non tantum sumptum cum alio, sicut vere possum dicere quod Sortes est substantia, et quod haec albedo qualitas. Eadem res etiam importatur per praedicamentum relationis, actionis et passionis, et sic de aliis, quamvis de nulla tali re per se sumpta et sine replicatione alterius vel eiusdem, quod dico propter relationem identitatis et consimiles, nullum tale praedicamentum vere possit praedicari, ideo praedicamentis non dicitur ens univoce, quia de talibus numquam aliquide de univoce praedicatur."

predicaments. Being is univocal to *all things*, but it is equivocal to *all categories*, for some categories signify things individually and other categories signify things only as related to each other.¹⁰⁷

From the same argument we can see that the convertible transcendentals and the pure perfections are predicated of God and creature in the same way as "creative." They must be attributed to a quidditative concept to avoid a *processus in infinitum*.

"Being," therefore, is predicated *in quid* of God and creature. It is predicated *truly*, for no one will deny the truth of the proposition: God is a being, and creature is a being.¹⁰⁸ Since "being" signifies existence, ¹⁰⁹ it is surely *not an extrinsic* predication; for, existence and essence are the same regarding the act of signifying. "Being" is predicated *totally*; this can be seen from the negative standpoint. If it were predicated partially (and therefore, *in quale*) of God and creature, it would be a *connotative* term.¹¹⁰ But what would it connote? Being is the ultimate concept, and it must be quidditative if we are to avoid a regress *in infinitum*.

2. *Per se* — To predicate *per se* is to predicate necessarily.¹¹¹ If being is predicated *in quid*, it must be *per se*, for only denominative predication can be *per accidens*, or contingent. Here we have no difficulty: It is necessary that, if God exists, He is a being, and it is necessary that, if a creature exists, it is a being.¹¹²

3. *Primo modo* — This predication must be the first mode because the predicate "being" is logically superior to God and creature. "Being" is more common than God and creature; therefore, we can say: "A" is God; hence, "A" is a being; "A" is a creature; therefore, "A" is a being.¹¹³ Being is the last determinable notion of all reality.

Negatively, we can see that the predication of being cannot be the second mode. For, in the proposition, "God is a being, and creature is a being," neither God nor creature enter into the definition

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Chapter III, note 32.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. pp. 42 ff. for the requisites of *in quid* predication.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. p. 101. ¹¹⁰ Cf. pp. 48—49. ¹¹¹ Cf. pp. 52 ff.

¹¹² Cf. Chapter II, note 41. ¹¹³ Cf. p. 108.

of the predicate "being."¹¹⁴ According to Ockham it would be false to say: being *equals* finite existence, or: being *equals* infinite existence. Once more the reason is that the intrinsic modes are not implied in the concept of being.

B. THE CONCEPTS OF THE CONVERTIBLE TRANSCENDENTALS AND THE PURE PERFECTIONS

Being, therefore, is predicated *in quid*, *per se*, *primo modo* of God and creature. The same is true of any reality in whose concept no imperfection is implied. But when these same concepts (except "being") are considered apart from the concept of being, how are they predicated? In the *abstract*, they are predicated *in quale*, *per se*, *secundo modo*. In the *concrete*, they are predicated equivocally; *in quid* of God, and *in quale* of creature.

1. *In the abstract* — If we do not consider the intrinsic modes, the predication of "one," "true," "good," "wise," "just," etc., of God and creature is univocal because we predicate one concept of both. We need not treat the transcendentals separately because they are connotative terms just like the other passions,¹¹⁵ such as "wise."

It might be objected that "one," for example, is convertible with being, and therefore, it is predicated *in quid* just as being is predicated. But the transcendentals are convertible in the sense that they are predicable about *all* things (*omne ens est unum*), not in the sense

¹¹⁴ Cf. pp. 53—54.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Sum. tot. log. ed. Boehner, I. c. 10, lines 82 ff.

"Passion" is a technical term and means that the term is predicated *per se*, *secundo modo*. See Boehner, op. cit. in *Fran. Studies*, vol. 6, p. 101.

Here is Ockham's own definition of "passion": "Passio realis . . . dicitur passio quia praedicabilis secundo modo dicendi per se; et dicitur realis quia est passio importans unam rem extra animam; non tamen est res extra animam . . . sed est quidam conceptus mentis supponens pro rebus extra animam, sicut patet in ista propositione: omnis homo est risibilis. Subiectum non est aliqua res extra animam, sed est quidam conceptus mentis supponens praecise pro ipsis hominibus singularibus, quia ad veritatem istius propositionis praecise sufficit quod 'risibile' vere praedicatur de quolibet homine particulari, nec requiritur quod praedicetur de aliqua re universali, quia tunc numquam talis universalis posset sufficienter induci ex suis singularibus." Com. ed. Lug. I. d. 2. q. 4. S.

that they are synonymous with being. All the transcendentals, whether absolute (one, true, good), or relative (wise, just, etc.), are passions of being, and passions or attributes are predicated *in quale*.

That these are connotative terms is seen from the fact that they signify principally the object, e. g., "one" signifies God or a creature. Secondly, they connote precisely that note of the thing designated by the concept, e. g., "one" connotes *indivision*.¹¹⁶ "Wise" is also a connotative term, and is predicated *in quale*. It does not signify God or creature *totally* in its *secondary* signification. In creature the secondary signification refers to the rational *part* of man or angel, scil., the intellectual soul. Principally, of course, it signifies the whole object. In God this term does not signify a *part* of God secondarily, but neither does it signify God *totally*. This concept is really distinct in man's mind from other concepts of God, and when it is composed with other concepts, it forms a "mosaic" concept proper to God alone. Hence, it does not signify *precisely* the same as is signified by the subject, and thus, it is a connotative term predicated *in quale*.¹¹⁷

Denominative predication can be either *per se* or *per accidens*. The transcendentals and pure perfections are predicated of God and creature *per se*. Unity, for instance, is predicated necessarily of all beings. All rational beings are intellectual of necessity. This needs no further proof.

These passions of being are predicated *per se secundo modo*. In the proposition, every being is one (infinite or finite), being enters

¹¹⁶ Sum. tot. log. I. c. 39: "Unum autem est passio entis quia est praedicabilis de ente per se secundo modo et hoc quia significat aliquid quod non eodem modo significatur per ens, quamvis aliquo modo significatur per ens."

ibid. c. 37: "Est autem sciendum quod passio semper supponit pro illo eodem pro quo subiectum supponit; quamvis aliquid aliud ab illo significet aliquo modo, scil., in recto vel in obliquo, affirmative vel negative; unde etiam quaedam passionibus vocantur positivae et quaedam negativae. Ex praedictis potest patere quomodo ly 'unum' est passio 'entis,' et distinguitur ab illo ente cuius est passio, scil., a communi conceptu entis, et tamen significat idem quod ille conceptus licet alio modo; sicut patet per definitionem exprimentem quid nominis."

Cf. also Def. Ock. c. 14.

¹¹⁷ Cf. pp. 48—49.

into the definition of the predicate "one," i. e., "one" means a *being* undivided in itself and divided from all others. Again, in the proposition, God is wise and creature is wise, the predicate "wise," as common to both is defined: a *being* which is intellectual.

2. *In the concrete* — If we take into our concept the intrinsic modes, the transcendentals and pure perfections are predicated equivocally *a consilio*.¹¹⁸ This predication is *in quid* of God, *in quale* of creature. We know this is equivocation because two concepts correspond to the common word. God *is* wise; creature *has* wisdom. It is *in quid* of God because, in the concrete order, God is truly, intrinsically and totally one, wise, good, etc. The same terms are *in quale* of creature because they do not signify creature *totally* in their secondary signification. Moreover, the pure perfections are accidents in creature.¹¹⁹ An accident is not predicated precisely the same as the subject. Nevertheless, these denominative terms are predicated necessarily of certain creatures because it is necessary that, if creature exists, it is one, and it is necessary that, if it is rational, it is wise. Finally, it is the *second* mode of predicating *per se* because the subject enters the definition of the predicate.¹²⁰

This concludes the exposition of Ockham's univocal predication of God and creature. Whether it is the best possible theory or not, is of no interest at present. Our investigation merely wishes to see what Ockham taught on the matter, and to examine his consistency within his own system. It seems he can answer the questions which interested the medieval scholastics without falling into either pantheism or agnosticism. There is no reason to condemn his teaching on univocity as inimical or dangerous to Catholic belief, whatever else may be said against it.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Chapter III, note 84.

¹¹⁹ Quod. II, 4: "Sapiens . . . praedicatur de creatura in quale, puta de homine et angelo. Sapiens vero . . . praedicatur de Deo in quid, sed non praedicatur sic de creatura, quia sapiens sic dictum importat de creatura aliquam perfectionem accidentalem."

Ockham says wisdom is predicated *in quid* of God. Here he is speaking of *concrete* predication, for this text is a continuation of the one quoted in Chapter III, note 84.

¹²⁰ As was said above in abstract predication.

CONCLUSION

Ockham's teaching on univocity is not so far removed from the position of other scholastics as one might think. Ockham tells us that a univocal concept is had when one formal character can signify two realities, even though they differ infinitely. An analogist will object to this, and say that the **objects** must be equal if we are to have a univocal concept.¹ Both sides agree that one *univocal* concept cannot signify two different things, in so far as the differences are considered.² Ockham, however, says we can neglect the differences, consider only the common notes, and thus form one univocal concept which signifies both objects. In other words, we can abstract from the intrinsic modes of God and creature. Analogists say we cannot make such a precision, and therefore, we can predicate only concretely of God and creature. In the concrete order, we can have only analogical knowledge of God.³

Ockham points out that we need unity of concept, if we are to know God at all by reason. We must have a concept which will serve as the middle term of a syllogism.⁴ The analogist also wants unity of concept for the same reason.⁵ Ockham gets this unity by ignoring the intrinsic modes of the objects. The analogist has it in proportional unity, i. e., one concept signifies identity in diversity.⁶ Right here, we can make a fairly exact comparison between Ockham and the analogist: where Ockham has a composed concept,⁷ the analogist has a concept which is one *secundum quid*. But Ockham

¹ Cf. pp. 85 ff.

² Cf. pp. 89 ff.

³ Cf. pp. 148 ff.

⁴ Cf. Introduction, note 13.

⁵ Cf. pp. 125 ff.; Bandas, Rudolph G., *Contemporary philosophy and mystic principles*. Milw. Bruce pub. co. 1932, pp. 80—81.

⁶ Cf. Anderson, op. cit. p. 30.

⁷ Cf. p. 154.

goes further, and says these composed concepts are made up of simple concepts common to God and creature. With his theory of natural signification, he cannot admit an analogical concept in the accepted sense of the word. The nearest he comes is an admission of some order of attribution,⁸ which however, takes back nothing he has said previously, since he can prescind from the intrinsic modes.

The reason for the so-called analogical concept seems to be a desire to express things as they are in the concrete. The concept must be analogical, according to this theory, because things are analogical in reality.⁹ Ockham says we have logical univocity based on ontological analogy.

This work does not intend to take sides in the matter. Possibly, some may consider Ockham's way of knowing God rather crude, but at least it *is* knowledge of God obtained naturally. Consequently, Ockham is neither an agnostic nor a fideist.

Nor can we say that Ockham is a nominalist, if nominalism means a denial of universal concepts, for he surely holds them.¹⁰ His universal knowledge is founded ultimately on intuition, *cognitio in se*, and so it is knowledge of reality.¹¹ But we do not know God immediately, or *in se*.¹² God is known only conceptually, and at first, only in a common concept. From this common concept, we progress to a concept proper to God alone, and this concept is composed.¹³ It is made up of simple and common concepts which justify the proper one.

Here we might object that Ockham is forced into a nominalistic position from his own words. If there is no similarity, in the sense of notes of the same formal character, in this concept common to God and creature,¹⁴ how can we know God? We know causes in

⁸ Cf. Chapter V, note 39.

⁹ Cf. pp. 95 ff. Platzek says even here we have an implicit logical univocity: *op. cit.* pp. 94—95.

¹⁰ Cf. pp. 20 ff.

¹¹ Cf. pp. 16 ff. See Boehner, *op. cit.* in *Traditio*, vol. 4, p. 310.

¹² Cf. pp. 152—153. ¹³ Cf. pp. 154—156.

¹⁴ Cf. p. 82 and Chapter III, note 72.

general because they are similar to their effects, i. e., they have the power to *produce* these effects, but there is no other similarity in many cases, e. g., between a carpenter and a house. Should we not argue, then, that the effect "wisdom" does not point to a *wise* Creator, but only to a *not-unwise* Creator? Thus, Ockham could reason only to a first cause, but not to any positive divine attributes. Byles points out that this was the position of Rabbi Moses: "What we say of God gives us no knowledge of what God is, but only of what He is not, that He is not weak, that He is not foolish."¹⁵ Descoqs calls attention to the fact that this opinion has been condemned as heretical. In this condemnation are included those who say "wise" signifies one who causes wisdom without himself being wise, as one who causes matter without being material. These names of God say that something real exists, but that something real is altogether unknown and unknowable as to its intrinsic nature. The medieval *Nominalists*, according to Descoqs, followed this trend, as well as the Mystics, such as John Eckhart. They distinguished between "Nothing" and "Non-being." God is certainly not Non-being, but He can well be Nothing.¹⁶

While this may have been the teaching of the "Nominalists," it is not Ockham, nor is it ockhamistic. In fact, Nicholas of Autrecourt was condemned for this doctrine,¹⁷ and Nicholas had held this against Bernard of Arezzo, who was a disciple of Ockham.¹⁸

Ockham himself has positive knowledge of God in his similarity of proportion and his "pure" perfections.¹⁹ The perfection of wisdom,

¹⁵ Byles, op. cit. p. 331.

¹⁶ Descoqs, *Praelectiones theologiae naturalis*; vol. 2. Paris, Beauchesne, 1935, pp. 746—747. The errors of Eckhart were condemned in the Constitution *In agro dominico*, Mar. 27, 1329. Cf. Denziger-Bannwart, 528 (2): "Quod Deus non est bonus neque melior neque optimus; ita male dico, quandocumque voco Deum bonum, ac si ego album vocarem nigrum."

¹⁷ *Chartularium universitatis parisiensis*; vol. 2. Paris, Delalain, 1891, no. 1042, p. 506; the retractation of Nicholas of Autrecourt is found in no. 1124, p. 578: "Item, dixi in quadam disputatione quod Deus et creatura non sunt aliquid." — "*Falsam et scandalosam prout verba sonant.*"

¹⁸ Cf. Moody, op. cit. in *Fran. Stud.* pp. 124—125.

¹⁹ Cf. pp. 95 ff. and Chapter III, note 117.

for instance, is a created perfection which requires a cause, and ultimately, a first cause. If the concept is analyzed, its definition reveals no imperfection, and so it can suppose for the most perfect being. In the concept, we abstract from all the imperfection which clings to it in a concept proper to creature, and now it can be attributed to both God and creature. In fact, it must be attributed to God because of Anselm's formula for pure perfections: "*melius est ipsum quam non ipsum*." This concept tells us that both God and creature have a positive intellectual perfection. Its basis lies in the dependence of created wisdom on God. It is real in God because all perfection must be attributed to the most perfect being which causes these pure perfections in creatures. Surely this is an imperfect concept. It represents the intrinsic modes neither of God nor of creature. Imperfection, however, does not destroy the validity of a concept.²⁰ There is a vast difference between the negative notion "*non-insipiens*" in the mind of Rabbi Moses, and the positive intellectual perfection of wisdom in Ockham's mind.²¹

But just what does Ockham's concept of God and creature tell us about God, if it does not tell us anything in the *concrete*? It tells us that the concept signifies God *really*, and not figuratively. God *is* wise. It lays the basis for a proper concept of God, a concept in which we add all perfection to wisdom: infinite, eternal, uncaused, etc. Even with all these additions, however, we still say *wise*. The *structure* of the concept remains the same even in the concrete, and we project this notion into God.

The most general of all concepts, "being," is conceptually common to God and creature. It does not correspond to some reality outside the mind which would make one substance of God and creature. The concept of being, however, signifies God and creature, i. e., it says both are realities existing in the relation of similarity of dependence regarding the same formal character.

But even existence differs objectively in God and creature.²²

²⁰ Cf. Wolter, op. cit. p. 44, and *Rev. Met.* pp. 3 ff.

²¹ Surely Ockham cannot be accused of blasphemy for this view. Cf. Byles, op. cit. pp. 332, 339; also Chapter III, note 96.

²² Cf. pp. 101—104.

Consequently, this idea of proportion is the ultimate basis of similarity. It is called proportion because of the relation of cause and effect regarding the *same* formal character. This same formal character is really and formally attributed to God because no imperfection is implied in it, and it is better for the Supreme Being to have all such perfections than not to have them.

Therefore, it is difficult to see how Ockham falls under the condemnation. But perhaps he can be forced into the camp of nominalims from a different angle. The argument could be formulated something like this: Ockham's common concept of God and creature always refers to the *same formal character*, or in other words, to the *same definition* signifying both. Now, a definition gives *fines*, limit to as thing. For instance, the definition of wisdom limits wisdom by implying that wisdom is not justice, not goodness, etc. These other perfections surround and put up barriers to the perfection of wisdom to keep it within its conceptual limits. Since there are no such limits in God's wisdom, and no such barriers separate one perfection from another, the concept tells us nothing *about God*, and what it does tell us is wrong. Consequently, our concept is *not common* to God and creature, and therefore, Ockham is forced to deny universal concepts at least here.

If Ockham would have taught this notion of a concept, the objection might hold. The distinct concepts would be in reality only *words* which would signify God equivocally. These words would tell us nothing about God since distinct *things* are missing in God; there is no distinction in God corresponding to our distinct concepts.

But Ockham has denied that *conceptual* limitation of the definition is an imperfection. Distinction of concept does not always argue to distinction in God.²³ Nor does he hold that distinction of concepts about creatures always argues to distinction in reality.²⁴ That this is true of concepts signifying God, he states clearly.²⁵ The only possible explanation of this seems to be that we know God's simplicity from other arguments, and we know creature's composition from

²³ Cf. pp. 156—160.

²⁴ *ibid.*

²⁵ Cf. Chapter V, note 68.

other arguments. Therefore, we do not say that distinct concepts *make* distinctions in creature, but that *de facto* there are distinct concepts of distinct things in creature. In God, however, we know there is no distinction. We conceive Him in a mosaic manner because our intellect cannot grasp His simplicity. We are forced by the innate weakness of our mind to know Him in this way, but we know too that the distinct concepts do not correspond to distinct perfections. We have something similar in concepts about creatures, e. g., "animal" does not signify a part of man and beast; it signifies the whole man and the whole beast.²⁶ The concepts common to God and creature are generic too. Conceptually, they are more common, more universal than God and creature.

Although Ockham is not a nominalist, he certainly is a conceptualist. He denies emphatically the reality of universals outside the mind; he denies even the common nature.²⁷ But this conceptualism is not idealistic. It is designated more exactly as *realistic* because of the causal connection between concept and object,²⁸ and because of the "real" similarity between things.²⁹

Conceptualism, however, is a far cry from the many serious charges which have been levelled at Ockham. As a final point, then, it may be well to say a word or two along critical lines. First of all, Ockham has been accused of every theological, philosophical and political sin. He is said to deny theodicy and metaphysics on account of his theory of concepts.³⁰ He falls into skepticism, agnosticism and idealism.³¹ The denial of the reality of universals leads to an

²⁶ Cf. pp. 42—44.

²⁷ Cf. pp. 20—23.

²⁸ Cf. p. 26.

²⁹ Cf. pp. 67—71.

³⁰ Federhofer, op. cit. in *Fran. Stud.* vol. 12, pp. 291—292; Becher, H., *Gottesbegriff und Gottesbeweis bei W. von Ockham*, in *Scholastik*, vol. 3, 1928, pp. 369—393; De Lagarde, Georges, *La naissance de l'esprit laïque au déclin du moyen âge*; vol. 5. Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1946, pp. 95 ff.; Gilson, *Unity of philosophical experience*, pp. 74 ff.; Michalski, Konstanty, *Les courants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XIV siècle*, in *Bull. inter.* 1919—1920, p. 83; Pegis, Anton C., *Concerning William of Ockham*, in *Traditio*, vol. 2, 1940, pp. 479—480.

³¹ *ibid.*

ethics without foundation.³² Ockham's ethics is the father of positivism and of social individualism.³³ The fundamental principle of "nominalism" is a love of novelty and nothing more;³⁴ moreover, it leads to the doctrine of the superiority of a Council over the Pope.³⁵ — And, if you prefer accusations wrapped in one package, here is a collection in one work: Ockham is a negative philosopher, an innovator, a skeptic, a subjectivist, a destructive critic. He aimed to destroy all spiritual acquisitions, the objective order of reality, ethical values, the fundamental principles of logic, all supreme and indispensable universal truths.³⁶ A work of this kind should settle all problems regarding the evolution of history.

To verify or moderate or deny all these charges would require a separate book for each one. Moody admonishes such authors that it would be well to proceed cautiously in forcing any historical character into a pre-conceived system of the evolution of thought.³⁷ In some cases, it could be possible that the moderns reacted against Ockham, rather than followed or developed him.

Up to the present we can safely say only a few generalities about Ockham. We have touched briefly on a few of these. Ockham is not a nominalist in the modern sense of the word.³⁸ He is definitely a conceptualist,³⁹ but a realistic one; his system is far removed from idealism.⁴⁰ He is not an agnostic or a fideist.⁴¹

³² Tornay, op. cit. pp. 54—76; Garvens, Anita, *Die Grundlagen der Ethik Wilhelms von Ockham*, in *Franz. Stud.* vol. 21, 1934, pp. 273, 407; Allers, op. cit. in *Franz. Stud.* p. 58.

³³ De Lagarde, op. cit. vol. 6, pp. 111 ff.; *ibid.* *Marsile de Padoue et Guillaume d'Ockham*, in *Rev. des sc.* vol. 17, 1937, pp. 168—185, 428—454.

³⁴ Ehrle, Franz, S. J., *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisanerpapstes Alexanders V*, in *Franz. Stud.* Beiheft 9, 1925, p. 110.

³⁵ Schnuerer, Gustav, *Kirche und Kultur*; vol. 3. Paderborn, Schoeningh, 1924—1930, pp. 166—169, 281.

³⁶ Zuidema, S. U., *De Philosophie van Occam in zijn Commentaar op de Sentenziën*; 2 vol. Hilversum 1936. — Quoted from Picard, Novatus, O. F. M., in *Antonianum*, vol. 19, 1944, p. 101, note 1.

³⁷ Cf. Moody, op. cit. pp. 6 ff.

³⁸ Cf. pp. 27, 175—179.

³⁹ Cf. p. 179.

⁴⁰ Cf. p. 26.

⁴¹ Cf. p. 175.

For the rest, we must content ourselves by saying we do not know the influence of the Venerable Inceptor.⁴² In his own times he seems to have had considerable authority as an interpreter of Aristotle.⁴³ Ehrle does not hesitate to assert that the school of Ockham led all others in the fourteenth century.⁴⁴ At least in his intention, he was not an innovator, but insisted on a return to the "ancients," and he fought against the "moderns."⁴⁵

Even in a specific work such as this one, many problems could have received lengthier treatment from the critical standpoint. To keep it within reasonable bounds, however, I preferred to give a historical exposition. Criticism and defense of Ockham were restricted to one aim: to show that his system is complete and consistent. It can answer the same questions as the other scholastics regarding knowledge of God from reason.

Moreover, it is difficult to see how the cause of truth is served by making Ockham a philosophical scapegoat to be loaded with all the sins of thought and verbally beaten for them in book after book. We can go further and say this is not the traditional view of Ockham. Where he opposed the Supreme Pontiff, yes, we condemn him unequivocally. In philosophy and theology, however, he surely knew the Franciscan school, and commented ably on it. This is not my view but Wadding's, so let us close with this outstanding Franciscan historian's words on Ockham:

"Neque vero depravatorem Theologiae . . . aut Philosophiae fuisse Occhamum, probant ipsa eius scripta Philosophica et Theologica, quae passim in Scholis leguntur, approbantur, commendantur; confirmantque destinata sibi subsellia in quibusdam Orthodoxis Academiis, ex quibus solae Occhami sententiae tum Philosophicae, tum Theologicae, designatis stipendiis edocentur . . . Non eam ego sumo provinciam, ut velim omnes libros Occhami defendere, et quidquid scripserat, commendare; immo aperte condemno, et ex corde detestor omnia, quae in Joannem pontificem

⁴² Vignaux, *Occam*, in *Dic. de théol.* vol. 11-A, pp. 888—889.

⁴³ Grabmann, Martin, *Methoden und Hilfsmittel des Aristoteles-Studiums*. Munich, C. H. Beck, 1939. p. 48.

⁴⁴ Ehrle, op. cit. p. 112. ⁴⁵ Moody, op. cit. p. 7.

13 Menges, Ockham.

insolenter evomuit. Theologicis censuris dignum existimo Opus Nonaginta Dierum . . . illud solum velim, quae communi scholasticorum methodo vel scripsit in Aristotelem, vel in libros Sententiarum, aut elaboravit absque bile ante indignationem conceptam contra Joannem Pontificem, catholica esse et in scholis recepta absque acri censura, et proinde immerito atque iniuste depravorem dici Philosophiae seu Theologiae.”⁴⁶

⁴⁶ *Annales Minorum*, ad annum 1347, vol. 8, ed. Quaracchi, 1932, nn. XXX—XXXI, pp. 17—18.

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